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Abstract 
 
 
This PhD dissertation project focuses on the collective agency of Thai organized 
workers—a group of regional migrant workers in one of Thailand’s most industrialized 
areas—whose labor geography and organizations were conditioned by Thai state-capital-
labor relations. It examines how the social, political and geographical organizations of 
Thai workers shape their practices of labor activism. By linking workers’ ties to their 
place of origin with the new geography of automotive production in Thailand’s Eastern 
seaboard, this dissertation examines the agency of workers through labor activism and its 
relationships to migration—a geographical mechanism that bridges production and 
reproduction across workers’ multi-sited households. 
This dissertation builds on the critical traditions within Human Geography as well 
as the work of feminist geographers to center the role of households and cultural practices 
of labor activism. By bringing together processes of production and social reproduction 
often examined separately, it sheds light on the ways in which gender and class politics 
within labor activism are inextricably linked to the division of labor within spatially 
extended households of Thai migrant workers. It highlights how workers draw on their 
collective resources (i.e. the regional ethnic culture) and social reproductive network 
stretched across the geography of household reproduction, which sustain labor struggle 
strictly seen in the sites of production.  
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Introduction 
 
My PhD dissertation project focuses on the collective agency of Thai organized 
workers—a group of regional migrant workers in one of Thailand’s most industrialized 
areas—whose labor geography and organizations were crafted by Thai state-capital-labor 
relations. As labor geographers view migration as a form of labor’s geographical agency 
(i.e., Herod 1997; Rogaly 2009), autonomous feminist Mariarosa Dalla Costa goes 
further to say that migration reveals the relationships between production and social 
reproduction—the latter being the main pillar of defense for the working class (1977 
[1974]). This research examines labor activism and its relationships to migration, a 
geographical mechanism that bridges production and reproduction across workers’ multi-
sited households. It aims to shed light on workers’ collective resources within the 
reproductive domain, which sustain labor struggle strictly seen in the sites of production. 
It also investigates how unionized workers, constrained by the limited scope of the labor-
relation regime, drew on their collective resources from the regional ethnic culture and 
social reproductive network that stretched across the geography of household 
reproduction. 
 
Research Questions and Methodologies 
To wholly understand how and why the place-based workers organized 
themselves the way they did, this dissertation examines organizing practices, internal 
dynamics to labor activism and gender relations among regional migrant workers in one 
of Thailand’s most industrialized areas. It seeks to understand three main questions. First, 
how did strategies of the state, capital, and organized labor shape the labor geographies 
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and agency of workers in Thailand’s Eastern seaboard? Second, how did labor and 
gender politics within spaces of activism inform the way in which Thai migrants 
organized their labor for household reproduction?  Third, how did the intersections of 
class, gender, and regional ethnic identities inform the political and class consciousness 
of labor activists? 
The processes of waged labor subjectivity are primarily concerned with the 
making of disciplined workers through production of consumers (Mills 1999a) and 
breadwinners (Cunningham 2001). However, the questions posed by scholars tend to be 
either, or (see Schmidt 2017). In this dissertation, I focus instead on the making of labor, 
simultaneously as consumer, breadwinner and caretaker, and the choices they make. I 
argue that, such making can be disrupted when labor-organizing attempts lead to labor 
disputes (i.e., corporate reprisals, dismissals, and lawsuits). This research investigates the 
way in which a group of ‘disruptive’ workers grappled with the tensions between 
material and financial gains and the sense of purpose in wage work, on the one hand, and 
a personal and collective sense of justice and belonging, on the other. This dissertation 
explores how a group of workers relied on their organizations, households, communities, 
and culture, as pillars of defense, to tackle the materiality of labor struggle, as well as the 
conflicts between their aspiration and disillusionment. 
Methodologically, this study employs primarily ethnographic research methods to 
study unionists and labor activists working and organizing themselves in Thailand’s 
Eastern Seaboard. These sites have been chosen on the basis of workers’ concentration 
and the density of labor unions, as well as the sites’ significance for the production of 
auto parts in global commodity chains.  
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Between July-November 2015 and April-August 2016, I spent ten months 
conducting research with a group of trade unions organizing themselves under the 
‘Eastern Labor Relations Group’ (ELRG) in Thailand’s Eastern Seaboard, a region 
promoted by the government as an Asian hub of automobile production and dubbed the  
‘Detroit of Thailand’ by industrial estate developers. It is the new geography of 
automotive production not only in Thailand but in Asia as well. Since the 1980s, the 
Eastern Seaboard has hosted multinational automotive manufacturers such as American 
carmakers Ford and General Motors, Japanese parts and car-makers Yokohama, Mazda, 
and Suzuki, and several hundred joint venture and local auto-parts suppliers. As waves of 
foreign investment turned local farmland into assembly lines, a series of migrant workers 
drawn from the poverty-stricken region of Northeastern Thailand cultivated traditions of 
labor militancy in the Detroit of Thailand. 
During the field research, I conducted participant observation of meetings, often 
organized weekly and monthly, by labor union members of the Eastern Labor Relations 
Group—a core-working group of the Thailand Confederation of Trade Unions (TCTU)—
that planned activities, analyzed political situations, and reported on industrial relations 
and labor rights problems. I also conducted participant observation with unionists and 
labor organizers as they engaged in their everyday life activities such as organizing 
events, socializing, interacting with partners, participating in training, attending meetings 
with officials during labor disputes, as well as their attendance at several general 
meetings of unions that each hosted over a hundred members. Moreover, I conducted 
semi-structured interviews with over 50 union executive committee members, and 
undertook a series of focus groups and in-depth interviews with over 25 workers. Finally, 
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I supplemented my research with in-depth interviews with an industrial estate official, a 
local supplier of subcontracted workers, a manager in an automobile company, and three 
episodes of participant observation over a period of six months with the extended 
families of four unionists, one male, one female and one couple, in the Northeastern 
provinces of Yasothon, Srakaew, Nakorn Ratchasima, and Sisaket (see map below).  
 
Picture 1.1 Map of Thailand 
Source: adapted from mapoftheworld.com 
I chose to conduct my research with the Eastern Labor Relations Group (ELRG) 
because it was one of the most politically active and militant union movements in the 
Eastern Seaboard. In addition, its leader was well known for human rights and political 
activism on a national scale. Practically speaking, I had previously developed a personal 
connection with the group’s leader—at a level of trust I did not have with other labor 
groups in the region—as a result of my own activism with pro-democracy and labor 
movements in Thailand. Accordingly, one of the implications of this research is that it is 
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not a representative of Thai organized labor as a whole. Instead, it is concerned with a 
group of Thai workers whose experiences, both inside and outside the workplace, are 
closely linked to those Western counterparts subjected to transition from Fordism to Post-
Fordism.  
Building on this personal relationship, I relied on the ELRG leader, who 
introduced me to other active members and their partners. In this sense, the selection of 
most research participants was based on a snowball sampling method. After observing 
active ELRG members, I approached those who fit my criteria—Northeastern workers 
who were active in both workplace unionism and the ELRG. In many cases, they 
consented to my request for house visits, in-depth interviews about their personal history, 
and if relevant, interviews with their partners.  
Over the course of my research, I also collaborated with the ELRG on several 
projects. For example, I served as a Thai-English translator for the ELRG when a 
network of Asian labor activists visited the ELRG office, as well as when the ELRG 
delegates attended the network’s conference in Bangkok. During a one-day field visit of 
the group, I also volunteered to be the main English language guide for the Eastern 
Seaboard industrial estates. In fact, my engagement with international activists in this 
solidarity movement later led me to play an important liaison role in supporting the 
ELRG to file a set of grievances with international labor rights organizations. 
During the first half of field research, I initiated a leadership development 
training, which the ELRG agreed to organize twice during field research. I took this 
opportunity to collaborate closely with several ELRG activists as my co-trainers. By 
doing so, I was able to develop closer relationships with these activists rather than relying 
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solely on the leader. These collaborative relationships subsequently allowed me to 
conduct in-depth participant-observation research on their everyday life and family 
histories.  These training sessions also gave me an opportunity to interact with other 
members and rank-and-file workers, setting the snowball rolling in several directions. 
Most importantly, I had the opportunity to conduct research with a few women-led 
unions—groups that were invisible on the ELRG level. 
The fact that I divided field research into two extended periods (and alternated my 
field research with my wife’s, Emily Hong, who conducted field research at the same 
time in Myanmar) helped deepen my relationship with research participants. As my wife 
also stayed in the field site with me, her occasional presence while participating in social 
activities with workers’ families greatly facilitated my access to women workers. In the 
second part of field research, based on workers’ requests, my wife—a native English 
speaker—and I also volunteered to organize a weekend English class for workers at the 
ELRG office. The classes were an ideal space to talk about ‘non-work’ topics when 
mostly women regularly attended, as it was a safe environment. In addition, women often 
brought their children and sometimes husbands—who were not in the unions—along 
with them. These were excellent opportunities to have conversations about a gendered 
division of labor. Finally, since I always documented ELRG activities by taking notes or 
photos during special occasions, by the end of field research, I became known as the 
ELRG’s photographer. 
Based on these interactions, ELRG members voluntarily shared information, such 
as drafts of their collective bargaining agreement, with me. Women workers and union 
executive committee members were also willing to confide in me regarding problems 
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related to labor organizing.  
I am greatly aware that my unique positionality—as a labor advocate and 
trainer—greatly influenced my interactions with research participants and shaped the 
interpretation of my findings. With this said, during my research, I was also very 
conscious of my differences —as an outsider. My positionality as an activist and 
advocate in many ways further complicated my other identities, particularly as a well-
educated, middle-class person from Bangkok. I argue that most researchers with 
education and class background like mine would not have been able to access 
information from Thai unions, let alone gain their trust—because of class barriers and the 
general mistrust toward outside researchers. Methodologically speaking, I would argue 
that my position as both activist and advocate thus strengthened rather than weakened the 
reliability of the data I collected. 
My research questions and methodology are primarily informed by the traditions 
of feminist and labor geographies, as well as working-class studies. Following the 
Marxian tradition within labor geographies, which views workers as historical and 
geographical agents (Herod 1997, Mitchell 2005), I understand labor activism within the 
sites of production – the struggle not only for wages but also for the fulfillment of basic 
needs – as a form of contestation over the usage (i.e., use values) of the built environment 
for social reproduction (Harvey 1976). From capital’s perspective, labor organizing is a 
threat to the process of capital accumulation and circulation, yet labor organizing is, at 
the same time, indispensable for sustaining workers’ wellbeing and community (Hayter 
and Harvey 1993; Harvey 2006). It is thus the nature of such contradictions, the tension 
between the day-in and day-out reproduction of labor power (and of capitalism) and long-
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term political struggle and community building, which is the main focus of this research. 
While building on Marxian theories, my research pays particular attention to the 
role of households, the sphere of everyday life, and cultural practices of labor activism – 
the importance of which has been stressed by feminist scholars (Cravey 1997, 1998; Katz 
2004; Silvey 2003, 2006). My project draws specifically upon the work of four 
geographers: Rachel Silvey (2003, 2006)’s gendered geographies of labor activism; Cindi 
Katz (2004)’s terminology of resilience, rework, and resistance; Jane Wills (1998)’s 
tradition of trade unionism; and Altha Cravey (1997; 1998). Building on this work, this 
project contributes to understanding the challenges labor activists face when making 
political and personal choices, as well as those they encounter as a result of internal group 
dynamics within a context of organizing, where males are often dominant. Furthermore, 
it contributes to existing knowledge about organized labor in the global labor force by 
showing how industrial estates in Thailand were constructed in ways that rework and 
divide the spaces of production and social reproduction, and shape the dynamics of 
domination and marginality.  
My research seeks to contribute not only to radical research theory but also to its 
activist praxis. Thus far, my findings shed light on some of the critical barriers that 
women labor activists face in both gendered households and masculinized spaces of 
organizing. This research is also part of a larger attempt to refine the theorization of labor 
agency and problematize the notion of resistance. Recently, labor geography has seen the 
‘moral turn’ that has put moral and ethical questions at the center of theoretical inquiry, 
as well as attention to other geographies (McDowell 2015; Smith 2016). I welcome this 
turn, with the realization that labor geography is dominated by ‘Fordist Marxism’. For 
	   9	  
this reason, I heed feminist geographer Winders (2016), who points to the need to de-
colonize geography by moving the experiences of those working and living outside the 
Global North into our main focus. This move also implies decentering the experiences of 
particular workers who have otherwise occupied a prominent place in our theorization 
about production and social reproduction. 
With this geographical lens, I wish to discern the ties that migrant workers had 
with their places of origin—the Northeast region—one of Thailand’s poorest regions, and 
thus understand the disciplinary role that household members play for capital. This 
insight, first developed by the domestic work debate (Dalla Costa 1977 [1974]; Mies 
1994 [1986]), originally applied to waged male workers and their unwaged female 
counterparts within a gendered division of labor. In the context of the Global South such 
as Thailand, working-class households had experienced a sort of spatial reconfiguration 
(Rigg and Salamanca 2011), whereas the unwaged included farm-based family members 
in places of origin. These family members were considered ‘unwaged’ because they were 
normally engaged in the informal economy. Similar to the arguments made by Marxist 
Feminists about waged men and unwaged women, I will show in this dissertation that the 
family members encouraged workers, men and women, to become involved in waged 
labour but because of fears of potential threats to household reproduction, discouraged 
their participation in labor activism.  
 
Highlighted Research Contributions 
My research findings enrich the literature on labor activism by foregrounding the 
internal dynamics of organizing, the roles of gender equality within such dynamics, and 
	   10	  
the broader conditions structuring workers’ participation. Specifically, this research 
complicates theoretical debates around labor militancy, particularly the dichotomy 
between political and business unionism. Labor scholars (e.g., Aronowitz 1973; Edwards 
1979) tend to argue that workplace activism represents the institutionalization of class 
compromise and labor bureaucracy. For instance, Thai scholars have employed such 
views to explain aspects of Thailand’s trade union movement (e.g., Napaporn 2001, for 
example1). Contrary to an essentialist approach that assumes models of ‘true’ class-
consciousness and class-based actions, my research focuses on activists’ personal stories, 
aspiration and tensions within labor organizations and communities, to understand 
conditions that shape the consciousness. 
The literature on labor activism in general has explained workers struggle as 
involving demands for dignity and recognition, while studies of Thai migration from 
rural to urban waged work highlight consumption and modernity as cultural resistance 
(e.g., Mills 1999a). This research contributes to these debates by theorizing consumption 
via a social reproduction framework and so joins sets of concerns that have hitherto been 
disconnected. As a part of production circuits, consumption meets the needs for daily 
reproduction of labor, household reproduction and long-term generational workforce 
reproduction. In other words, from households’ perspectives, social reproduction is the 
primary form of collective consumption. From individuals’ perspectives, consumption 
can also express a quest for social status and self-development. The social reproduction 
framework thus recognizes that workers’ struggle for dignity and self-development are 
both connected and deeply contradictory—although this may not always necessarily be 
the case. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1I follow the tradition of Thai studies, which uses the author’s first name in the reference. 
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Lastly, this dissertation aims to capture the deep sense of injustice felt and 
articulated by workers as their main motive for participating in labor activism. The 
locally embedded concept of justice also helps explain indignation and inter-class 
conflicts at the intersection of class and ethnicity. While such sentiments became social 
and political resources for collective actions, the building of collective agency could also 
be undermined by organizational shortcomings that include gender inequality and 
women’s marginalization. In short, this research contributes to theorization of labor 
agency by shifting the scope of study beyond sphere of production to account for the 
underlying connection between production and social reproduction. Moreover, it enriches 
the concept of labor agency by foregrounding dialects of collective and individual 
agency, its intersectionality (i.e., class, gender and ethnicity) and embeddedness in 
places. 
 
Outline of the dissertation 
In Chapter 1, I offer a comprehensive review of the literature on labor and 
feminist geographies, where theoretical debates around labor agency from geography are 
put in conversation with work on migration and labor activism from other disciplines, in 
particular anthropology and sociology. Methodologically, I enrich the first debate by 
borrowing insights from social reproduction theories and intersectionality, and propose a 
nuanced integrated framework for understanding labor, its social totality, and the co-
constitution of labor, class, gender and ethnic identities.  
The next two chapters start with the historical-geographical settings of Thailand’s 
Eastern Seaboard. In Chapter 2, Introducing Detroit of Asia, I sketch the historical 
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development of the Eastern Seaboard, which started in the 1970s with the conception of 
the Eastern Seaboard as a spatial development project on the regional scale. This chapter 
is divided into two main parts. First, I illustrate the way in which the Thai ruling class 
and foreign capital used geographical concepts such as clusters in the crafting of 
Thailand’s Eastern Seaboard as a spatial solution to declining competitiveness. While 
these geographical concepts provided American capital with economic discourses to push 
forward a laissez-faire agenda, Japanese carmakers emphasized the principles of the 
human resource paradigm to discipline manufacturing workers. Thus, in the second part, 
I focus on the automobile industry and how the Japanese carmakers used a human 
resources paradigm in their effort to produce a desirable workforce.  
In Chapter 3, Labor Geographies of Thailand’s Detroit: Pineapples and 
Powertrains, I illustrate the shift from farmland to factories in the area and how state 
policies, foreign investment, and migration came together to create the stage on which the 
production and reproduction of workers took place. This chapter describes Eastern 
Seaboard’s transformation using stories of local inhabitants who experienced first-hand 
changes in family and career prospects that occurred during the period of economic 
development. By contrast, I also draw heavily on my interviews with a group of workers 
and unionists whose stories show their social and geographical agency—the way they 
creatively made this new place ‘home’.  
In Chapter 4, A View from Above: Labor Politics and Trade Union Movements in 
Thailand, I explore the question of labor’s collective agency through an examination of 
workplace activism. I call into question two seemingly contradictory pre-conceptions 
about labor unions in the Eastern Seaboard: that they are economic unions and 
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conservative, but at the same time more militant than their counterparts in other areas. By 
examining what Autonomous Marxists call ‘class composition,’ I turn the gaze inward 
and look at the ways in which the labor movement has organized and divided itself. The 
intra-class hierarchy created by the Thai political economy shaped how workers’ class 
power—what Harry Cleaver calls ‘the power of workers to resist’—was articulated in, 
but not limited to, the organizational structure, organizing practices, and strategies of 
labor unions such as the Eastern Labor Relations Group. This chapter focuses on a view 
from above—structural and organizational composition— which, I argue, helps explain 
differences and conflicts within Thai organized labor. However, such a view does not 
exhaust an understanding of the ways in which local labor groups such as the Eastern 
Labor Relations Group operated. Therefore, in the next chapters, I switch my vantage 
point to that of activists. 
Chapter 5, A View from Below: Workplace Activism and Limits of Militancy in 
Thailand’s Detroit, is based on two cases of labor dispute that occurred at the sites of two 
global carmakers: American and Japanese factories, which deeply impacted organized 
workers’ personal and political lives. The two cases of American and Japanese factories 
encourage examination of multinational companies’ strategies, responses from the Thai 
states, and local trade unions’ organizing practices. Most importantly, the two cases raise 
the central question of labor’s collective agency, particularly regarding the effectiveness 
of workplace activism and the extent to which activists were constrained by the legal 
framework of the industrial relations regime. I tackle the issue of constrained agency by 
pointing out both the possibilities and limits established by such legal frameworks. By 
showing the creative way in which Thai workers breathe new meanings into workplace 
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activism in the Eastern Seaboard, I underline the opportunities created by the formal 
labor-relations framework. On the contrary, through the case studies of other two labor 
unions in the process of formation, I foreground the real challenges faced by activists and 
workers, from two types of class composition: technical and political class compositions. 
Chapter 6 explores workers’ collective agency at the intersection of class and 
regional ethnicity. Workers’ narratives reveal their prime motivations to be demands for 
bonus payments, a strong sense of injustice, and a need to provide material resources for 
their larger familial networks of social reproduction with material resources. With regards 
to labor agency, I propose the concept of empowerment—lived experiences that inform 
workers’ entitlement to their demands and faith in collective—which is central to, but 
often missing from the theorization of agency in labor geographies. To capture labor 
agency’s purposeful and creative elements, I broaden the concept of work and labor 
beyond capitalist social relations by utilizing a feminist materialist approach that weaves 
together labor agency, subjectivity, and social reproduction. This chapter also explores 
Thai workers’ sources of cultural and political beliefs in equality and fairness by 
examining the meanings of justice in Thai society, before focusing on the structure Isan 
workers’ feelings, in particular. Following Chakrabarty’s (1989) notion of non-liberal 
concepts of equality, I offer a communitarian concept of justice that is embedded in a 
system of class domination and ethno-regional oppression. 
I dedicate Chapter 7 to issues of gender dynamics within labor activism, gender 
norms, and divisions of labor in the context of broader social relations. I discuss the 
distinctive ways in which male and female activists perceived the time and space of 
everyday life, as well as in the different ways they coped with work-related struggles. 
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These differences were embedded in personal historiography and gendered construction 
of life’s work. By broadening the concept of work and labor to include both productive 
and reproductive work, I offer a more encompassing analysis of workers’ participation in 
activism attuned to workers’ gendered, temporal, and spatial experiences. From this 
analysis, it is imperative that we understand labor activists’ agency in the totality of 
production and social reproduction, which is the focus of the final chapter.   
The final chapter, Organizing from Hidden Abodes, thus builds on the insights of 
social reproduction theorists (e.g., Ferguson 2017; Bhattacharya 2018) to conceptualize 
labor’s collective agency at the intersection of migration, social reproduction, and class 
struggle. Against all odds, workers managed to retain their ability to shape the geography 
of household reproduction through reproductive strategies. In Thailand’s Eastern 
Seaboard, for instance, workers negotiated with both their long working hours and low 
pay by stretching the geography of social reproduction over their extended network of 
households. The households and villages thus became a space in which the education of 
children, inter-generational caring work, and reproduction of the workforce were 
organized. In a sense, not unlike corporate strategies, workers outsourced part of the 
reproductive work through the relocation of childcare and social reproductive work. This 
stretching of household reproduction marks a form of collective resilience, not only for 
labor organizations but for the working class as a whole. 
 From this perspective, the main purposes of labor organizing—collective 
bargaining for higher wages or a yearly bonus—were motivated as much by the needs for 
social reproduction—as collective consumption—as by workers’ sense of injustice and 
demands for a fair share. Accordingly, the motives behind the labor struggles were 
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primarily based on conflicts between the interests of production (and accumulation) and 
labor’s goals of consumption—to improve their standard of living—in the realm of social 
reproduction. Looking at workplace activism from the perspective of the working class 
and social reproduction, this chapter attempts to theorize workers’ struggle for higher 
wages and less working time as a form of purposeful and anti-capitalist consumption, 
anti-capitalist because of workers’ desire to retain their labor-power for the non-
productive purposes and labor struggles.  
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Chapter 1. 
Situating Labor Struggle and Social Reproduction in Theories 
 
While geographers view labor migration as a form of geographical agency (see 
Bauder 2006; McDowell 2013), scholarship focusing on the Global North pays 
disproportionate attention to workers and their workplaces, leaving out their places of 
origin. This omission seems to make sense when the focus is on the relationship between 
migrants and work. Nevertheless, as the Marxist-Feminist Mariarosa Dalla Costa points 
out, migration also reveals the relationship between production and social reproduction 
(1977 [1974]),2 highlighting social reproduction as the main pillar of defense for the 
working class. Understanding the relationship between two places bridged by migration 
processes, thus, becomes indispensible when examining workers’ agency and resilience 
during labor struggles. It sheds light on the often-neglected collective support within the 
reproductive domain for labor struggles that occur at the sites of production.  
This dissertation focuses on unionized workers’ individual and collective agency 
as they respond to processes and forces of industrialization through activism and social 
reproduction strategies. In Thailand’s Eastern Seaboard—one of Asia’s automobile 
production centers—migrant workers from the Northeastern region struggled with 
increased work intensification by forming unions and engaging in workplace activism, 
that led to labor disputes and disruption of employment. The research examines how 
unionized workers, constrained by the limited scope of labor-relations regime, drew on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Reproduction and Emigration, translated by Sylvia Federici and Harry Cleaver and published on 
http://zerowork.org/DallaCostaReproductionEmigrationA.html 
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collective resources derived from their regional ethnic culture as well as their own 
familial support, to strengthen labor organization during labor struggles. Conceptually 
then, it connects questions of labor agency with migration and activism, stressing the role 
of working-class households and communities, against the backdrop of labor activism at 
the point of production.   
This research engages with two major methodological debates in labor geography; 
inspired by Marxist Feminism, labor history, and studies of working class’s resistance 
from the Global South. The first debate is concerned with the theorization of labor 
agency and criticism of the overemphasis on trade union agency.  
Conceived as a corrective to economic geography, labor geography examines 
labor’s geographical agency from workers’ perspectives (Herod 1997; 1998). Marxist 
geographers emphasize how labor agency impacts the ways in which geographies of 
capitalism are produced and agency itself is constrained and enabled by such changes 
(Herod 2001; Mitchell 2005). While empirical studies of labor agency are burgeoning, 
scholars argue that the concept of labor agency is theoretically underdeveloped as it is 
based mainly on case studies (Castree 2007; Lier 2007; Hastings 2016). 
While the most recent period in labor geography scholarship has seen an 
advancement and cross-fertilization with other disciplines especially labor history and 
labor relations studies, labor geographers seem to be caught up in new dilemmas, one of 
which concerns nature of agency (i.e., it is either purposeful or consequential). As a 
result, some geographers propose the moral economy as an analytical framework for 
theorizing labor agency (e.g., Hastings 2016). This dissertation joins a group of labor 
geographers (i.e., Hastings 2016; Hastings and MacKinnon 2017) in welcoming such an 
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intervention but maintains that an analytical framework is also required to explain the 
dynamics of the working class, as well as the tension between short-term interests and 
long-term goals articulated in the struggle, to shed light on the conditions shaping the 
workers’ agency. Further, I contribute to this debate by engaging with the literature on 
migration and labor activism from both geography and other disciplines, in particular 
anthropology and sociology.  
The second debate, central to the research methodology, is about social 
reproduction and the conceptualization of analytical categories including class, gender, 
and ethnicity. This research builds heavily on insights and guidance of Marxist Feminist 
geographers, including Cindi Katz (2001; 2004), Linda McDowell (1997), Jane Wills 
(1998), Rachel Silvey (2003; 2006) and Altha Cravey (1997; 1998; 2005). Cindi Katz 
and Linda McDowell in particular argue for embodied, spatially located forms of agency 
without denying Marxist analytical categories of class, as well as gender and race.  As 
will be shown, this dissertation adopts a social reproduction feminist framework, which is 
highly compatible with the dialectic concept of labor and the relational view of agency 
discussed in the first debate.  
1.1 Labor Geography and Labor Agency 
Andrew Herod (1997; 2001) distinguishes between geography of labor—studies 
of how capital takes advantages of labor’s geographical differences, and labor geography, 
how workers attempt to shape the capitalist landscape and spatiality of their lives. 
Building on such a vision, labor geographers contend that labor is not a passive, but an 
active geographical agent (e.g., Herod, 1997). Labor geography is thus a normative 
project that opposes “what portrays as the victimisation script embedded in more 
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orthodox forms of political-economic geography” (Peck 2013, p. 109).  
Labor geographers argue that in the same way as capital produces space, workers 
have an ability to shape spaces (Herod 2001; 2012), jump scales (Herod 1998; Savage 
2006), and make landscapes (Mitchell 2012). Moreover, labor geographers understand 
the significance of place and space to capital and labor relations (Herod 1995; 1997; 
2001). For example, in the series of seminal work in labor geography, Herod analyzes the 
scalar strategies of American trade unions, and how economic globalization both 
constrained and facilitated the workers’ agency (Herod 1992). His work has spurred 
scholastic interests, both inside and outside geography, in examining and theorizing 
‘labor’s spatial fix’ (e.g., McKay 2006).  
In their review, Coe and Jorhdus-Lier (2010) summarize four main thematic 
strands within studies of labor geography: collective organization of workers through 
labor unions and groupings; formation of local labor market and regulation regime; 
intersections of employment relations with workers’ identities; and the material 
landscape’s roles in shaping labor struggle (p. 212). A Marxian tradition of labor 
geography characterized as ‘pro-worker’ or ‘the Left leaning’ politics involving a 
political commitment to tell ‘the stories of labor from their own eyes’ (Herod 1997; 
Castree 2007)—is most concerned with the first of the four themes. Inspired by such 
conscious commitment toward workers’ collective power, geographers often focus their 
empirical attention on organized labor or trade union movements (e.g., Herod 1998, 
Bergene et al. 2010, Wills 1998). As a result, collective labor agency is often equated 
with workers’ organizational abilities to shape and rework geography (Herod 1995; 
Mitchell 1996).  
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The focus on collective agency has been accompanied by the growth of research 
into informal groups of labor and other forms of labor activism. These studies have 
variously focused on public sector workers (see Jordhus-Lier 2012), feminized, low-paid 
unions in the service sectors (see Savage 2006; Tufts 2006, 2007, 2009), community-
based unionism (Tufts 1998; Wills 2001; Savage and Wills 2004), unorganized workers 
in the Global South (Rogaly 2009), and even consumer-based campaigns (Johns and 
Vural 2000). In this work, scholars tend to identify certain types of labor, framed as either 
community-based or social movement, as proxies for workers’ collective agency.  
Since the ‘broadening out’ phase of labor geography that occurred in the 2000s 
(Coe and Jordhus-Lier 2010), new directions in labor geography reflect empirically the 
transformations that have taken place in the structures of global capitalism (especially the 
widespread resort to outsourcing and privatization). Not only in labor geography, but in 
geography more generally, is a fragmentation in approaches, which is in turn influenced 
by post-structural approaches (McDowell 2008; Rutherford 2010). In the labor 
geography, Andrew Herod and Jane Wills have played important roles in advocating for 
an ‘anti-essential’ re-reading of Marx and Gramsci by Laclau and Mouffe (1985), 
Resnick and Wolff (1987) and Gibson-Grahams (1996; 1997). Such approaches have 
challenged the theoretical status of formal workplace and class in labor geography 
(Rutherford 2010). Furthermore, the growing numbers of studies conducted across scales 
and places of labor organizing, as well as the interests on global and local processes and 
interactions (e.g. Global Production Networks and Labor Process Theory), have led to an 
endless documentation of workers’ diverse forms of occupations and agency.  
The debates on labor agency revive some of the long-standing themes in social 
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sciences, most especially questions about the relationships between social structures and 
human agency. For instance, Jamie Peck (2013) has warned that labor geography’s 
progressive mission could lead adversely to a reification of the structure-agency binary—
research program that economic geographers working in the 1980s tried to avoid. 
Similarly, several geographers suggest ways to address such drawback. Mitchell (2005) 
has also argued that the focus should not be on the agency of workers alone but also on 
the conditions that create opportunities and constrain agency. Coe and Jordhus-Lier 
(2010) and Peck (2013) assert a need for a relational view of labor agency, structured 
geographically but embedded spatially in places. Critical of how labor geographers have 
tended to conflate collective labor agency with trade unions, Coe and Jordhus-Lier (2010) 
suggest that studies of labor agency should also address multiple levels of collective 
agency as expressed in other forms of organizations, not just trade unions. Moreover, 
they rightly point out that labor geographers are primarily concerned with “grounded 
processes of reworking and resistance … manifested in (intersecting) social and cultural 
relationships and with institutional forms such as global production networks, the state, 
community networks and labor market intermediaries” (218). Such views echo a call to 
re-engage with the strategies of capital and state by radical geographers (Castree 2007; 
Lier 2007; Tufts and Savage 2009; Herod 2010; Peck 2013). This dissertation follows 
such the call by engaging with the strategies of capital and state as well as the grounded 
processes of workers’ resistance on the local scale. 
1.1.1 Relational, Dialectical, and Class-based agency  
In fact, some labor geographers reiterate Marx’s foundational conceptualization of 
labor in light of the theory of value. According to Postone (1996), labor is both an 
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abstract entity and sentient and social beings forced to sell their labor power in the market 
(Castree 1999; Castree et al 2004; Lier 2007). In this sense, labor is a pseudo-commodity, 
and the contradiction of labor as an abstract and living being is highlighted when ‘put in 
place’ (Peck 1996). Labor geography thus foregrounds the dialectic that exists between 
abstract and concrete labor, structured by the global economy, on the one hand, and 
articulated in place-based differences (i.e. nationality, gender, ethnicity, race), on the 
other. 
This framework emphasizes inevitable tensions and conflicts that arise between 
labor and capital. According to Castree (1999), Postone (1996)’s re-reading of Marx 
offers a possible way to link orthodox with post-modern/ex-Marxist approaches in human 
geography by creating a shift from the project being a critique of capitalism from the 
point of labor to a critique of labor within capitalism. Despite the insights brought about 
by this return to Marx’s work, subaltern and critical theorists questioned the hegemony of 
capital’s universal logics as well as the overemphasis on abstract over concrete time and 
labor (see also Gidwani 2004; McNally 2004). Therefore, it is not sufficient to stress the 
dialectic of abstract and concrete labor, but also to highlight labor’s embeddedness and 
potential conflicts between capital’s interests of production and accumulation and 
workers’ goals of consumption and social reproduction. This dissertation argues that 
these conflicts are primarily the underlying cause of most labor struggles. 
In concrete systems of social domination, the concept of labor is plural (i.e. 
gendered, racialized, etc.) and subject to heterogeneous forms of power (Castree 1999, 
150-151). Castree (1999) argues that this approach advances the political left’s goal that 
promotes both a politics of redistribution/equality and a politics of recognition. By 
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contrast, other, more orthodox Marxist geographers have attempted to enrich the concept 
of agency by reviving the importance of the class project. For example, Raju Das (2012) 
criticizes the post-Marxism-inspired labor geography that reduces class to identity and 
subjective experiences, what he calls ‘subjectivism’. Accordingly, place-based 
differences wrongly outshine class as a shared relation. Das (2012) argues for moving 
away from a narrow focus of labor geography on spatial agency to class geography—a 
“class approach to the study of socio-geographical issues”(30). He is right to point out 
several problems in labor geography approaches, including a lack of focus on materiality 
of labor process in the analyses and being “oblivious of the class character of labor 
organization”. 
Similarly, Rutherford (2010) contends that despite the contribution of post-
structural approaches in questioning the primacy of class, the theoretical status of formal 
workplaces and class in Marxian labor geography remains significant. Das’s and 
Rutherford’s (2010) critiques can serve as important guidance that can be used to 
evaluate the growing number of studies (in the next section), which grapple with 
questions of agency and resistance. Most importantly, the focus on abstract labor should 
not be made primary over concrete labor, but rather held dialectically interdependent, 
with an emphasis on its embeddedness in space and time. 
 
1.1.2 Resistance from Below: Micro-revolts versus Transformative Actions 
One of the most interesting developments from outside labor geography but 
gradually merging into it has been the conceptualization of labor agency found in the 
Local Labor Control Regime (LLCR) and Global Production Networks (GPNs) literature. 
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Based on Jonas’s (1996) concept of Local Labor Control Regimes (LLCR, or sometimes 
LCR – Labor Control Regimes), the literature is inspired by the debate about the politics 
of production (see Burawoy, 1985 and Braverman, 1974) and enriched by regulation 
theory (Peck 1996; Walker 1999). The literature is now growing. For example, Hastings 
and MacKinnon’s (2017) recent study of resistance at the point of production in Glasgow 
call centers exemplifies an attempt to enrich the concept of agency by improving the ‘top-
down’ account of Labor Process Theory (LPT) with resistance ‘from below’ emphasized 
by the LCR approach. It is also a nod to Rutherford’s call on the significance of the 
workplace. Ironically, such an attempt has had the reverse effect of narrowing down the 
analysis to oppositional, everyday resistance (see Ellem and Shields, 1999). Another 
strand of work is the focus on the local labor control regimes in the newly industrialized 
spaces of the Global South (Kelly 2001; Coe and Kelly 2002; McKay 2006; Neethi 
2012). For example, Kelly’s (2002) study of the roles of spaces in labor control of several 
Southeast Asian industrial areas effectively shows the diverse ways in which spatial 
strategies are distinctively used and deployed by local actors at different scales. While 
Hastings and MacKinnon (2016) criticize Kelly (2001; 2002) for underplaying the role of 
worker agency in accommodating, adapting and challenging local regimes (108), their 
focus on ‘resistance from below’ also risks of inflating micro-resistance at the expense of 
an understanding of how agency is constrained. This dissertation aims to find the balance 
between the two approaches. 
 Similarly, Cumbers, Nativel, and Routledge (2008) insert labor onto the GPNs 
and Global Community Chains (GCC) literature, highlighting social relations of 
production and class struggle within the capital accumulation process. Inspired by 
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Autonomous Marxism, this framework is useful in showing the trade union as a site of 
ongoing struggle, as well as explaining divisive and conflicting positionality among 
members of the trade unions. By studying a global union network, Cumbers et al. (2008) 
make the case for nuanced understanding of organized labor movements by presenting 
uneven political and organizational geographies within the trade union movement.  
By contrast, Carswell and De Neve (2013), who work in the same tradition of 
GPNs, propose that labor agency is not only acts of resistance but rather “constitutive of 
particular capitalist regimes.” Using Katz’s classification (i.e. resilience, reworking, and 
resistance), Carswell and De Neve argue for more attention to micro-struggle of 
individuals in everyday, informal practices, in the sphere of both production and social 
reproduction. This line of arguments has recently gained more purchase among labor 
geographers who study unorganized workers whose formal rights are denied (see Rogaly 
2009; Lund-Thomsen 2013; Hauge and Fold 2016). For example, Hauge and Fold (2016) 
attempt to answer the question whether Katz’s classification entails intentions or 
outcomes. By looking at the gaps between intentions and consequences, they propose the 
concept of ‘transformative trajectories’ supposedly attentive to the dynamics of agency. 
However, Hauge and Fold (2016) is one of the growing number of studies that seek to 
capture the elements of agency by riskily resorting to functionality, posing the question 
whether actions are intentional, and hence strategic, or inconsequential. This trend toward 
a more functional approach can be considered a result of what Ellen M. Wood (1986) 
calls the ‘randomization of the history’, and separation of politics and class agency. In 
other words, the study of labor agency is not situated in the historical-geographical 
materialist analyses of class struggle (E. P. Thompson 1963). 
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In the most recent period, Coe and Jordhus Lier (2010) have inspired geographers 
to shift their studies of agency outside the sphere of production across spheres connecting 
production and reproduction and toward other spheres shaping workers’ identities 
(Hastings 2016). Thomas Hastings calls this most recent phase starting from the 2010s 
“labor process and labor history.” In fact, Hastings (2016) and Hastings and MacKinnon 
(2017) encourage a moral turn in labor geography, which seeks to bring moral and ethical 
concerns into theories. Hastings (2016) argues that despite labor geography’s possibilities 
for explaining self-interests-based actions and internal conflicts among workers, more 
recent work often focuses on workers’ inter-class conflicts, ignoring the moral 
dimensions of one group’s domination over others (see also Gough 2010). In fact, labor 
studies scholars have long drawn from the moral economy framework, inspired by social 
theorists including Karl Polanyi, E.P. Thompson, and Antonio Gramsci, to understand the 
impacts of capitalist work process on workers, as well as possibilities for changing 
exploitative and alienated social relations (Bolton and Laaser, 2013). Hastings and 
MacKinnon (2017) comment that the emergence of work in this vein is a welcome 
development for labor geography. Nevertheless, interests in the moral economy should 
not be limited to a narrow focus of explaining discrete disputes and workers’ 
contradictory actions across different geographies.  
In Nancy Fraser’s attempts to reconcile the binary of economic and cultural 
struggle, based on two seemingly distinctive paradigms and conceptions of collectivities, 
she argues that a “false antithesis” is created between the politics of redistribution and the 
politics of recognition (1997; 2005; also Fraser and Honneth 1995). Through examples of 
groups socially located between the two extremes, what she calls a two-dimensionally 
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subordinated group who suffers from both maldistribution and misrecognition, Fraser and 
Honneth (2007, p. 19) show that neither the politics of redistribution nor the politics of 
recognition alone suffices. For her, axes of social division (i.e. gender, race, class, and 
ethnicity) are all two-dimensional social differentiation. For example, gender can operate 
as a class-like division and a status differentiation. In this sense, most social groups 
facing injustice need both redistribution and recognition. In her attempt to fill the gap 
with regard to political injustice, Fraser (2009) later added a third dimension into her 
framework, hence the politics of representation. The concept of misframing is 
indispensable “to interrogate the mapping of political space from the standpoint of 
justice” (p. 7), in which “the ‘who’ of justice is itself unjustly defined, …(thus) excluded 
from consideration” (ibid.). 
 This research examines the labor struggle within the workplace, labor 
organization, and broader network of household reproduction. While the lens of labor 
politics (i.e., a politics of redistribution and recognition) is typically used to explain 
conflicts in the workplace or the labor relations regime (e.g., workers’ strikes), it is not so 
useful to understand worker conflicts within the organized labor movement and working-
class community. This additional dimension—politics of representation—is thus relevant 
in the context of minority workers who contest the rules of the game, as “it tells us who is 
included in and… excluded from, the circle of those entitles to a just distribution and 
reciprocal recognition” (Fraser 2009, p. 17). Not only does this research seek to capture 
material and moral elements of workers’ demands, as in the expression ‘dignity and daily 
bread’,3 which serve as driving reasons activists organize, but it also pays attention to the 
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  The phrase that Rowbotham and Miller (1994) borrowed from the slogan of the Indian women workers.	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political economy of struggle in which workers are excluded and discriminated as an 
ethnic minority.  
1.1.3 Constrained, but Autonomous Agency of the Working Class  
The debate about labor agency reveals a wanting element in the literature, a 
framework which explains the dynamics in agency of labor itself during the ongoing 
process of labor struggle. While moral element is crucial for the analyses, studies of 
agency should aim to explicate tensions and contradictions between workers’ short-term 
interests, on the one hand, and long-term goals of the labor struggle, on the other. In order 
to do so, it implies an approach that captures how working class internally negotiates 
competing material needs, and conflicting political aspiration inside the families, 
communities and labor organization. 
This research project re-centers the roles of working class struggle in the dialectic 
of production and social reproduction. While the historical materialist feminism offers 
methodological skeleton for centering gender, class and social reproduction in the 
research, Autonomia or Italian strand of Autonomous Marxism, lays out several 
analytical concepts to enriching the concept of labor agency and resistance within the 
labor geography literature.  Due to a lack of engagement with Autonomous Marxism 
within the discipline, comprehensive reviews of materials are rare. For this reason, I take 
this opportunity to mention larger arguments and crucial concepts used in the research. 
Autonomous Marxist scholars define labor in the framework of class struggle, 
where capital is always in the process of drawing a part of the labor power (i.e. surplus 
value) into itself through production. Labor is defined as non-capital, representing both 
the objective/dead labor and subjective/living labor (Tronti and Murphy 2010). Two 
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concepts are crucial to conceptualize the materials of this research. The first is the 
concept of autonomy, defined by Marie Mies (1994 [1986]) as “the innermost 
subjectivity and area of freedom, without which [workers] are devoid of human essence 
and dignity, without which they become puppets without an element of free will and 
consciousness … (40).” Such concept of autonomy is commensurable to objectives of the 
research that seek to capture inspiration and aspiration of workers, as well as the material 
and social organization.  
On the fifth-decade anniversary of The Making of the English Working Class 
(1963), scholars attempted to create a dialogue between Thompson-inspired labor study 
and labor geography (see Ellem and McGrath-Champ 2012). Thinking through the 
experiences of labor in the context of urban deindustrialization, Cumbers, Helms, and 
Swanson (2010) borrow E. P. Thompson’s history from below and blend it with self-
valorization class struggle perspective from Autonomous Marxism. Aware of the 
potential weakness of Scott’s everyday forms of resistance, as well as charges of 
romanticizing resistance by autonomous agency, Cumbers et al. (2010) remark that 
“there is a complex ethics and morality to class resistance, with a need to be able to 
differentiate resistance – in a sense of “getting by” within capitalist social relations – and 
the kinds of self-valorisation projects”(p. 60). In other words, a line must be drawn 
between non-transformative micro-revolts and transformative collective actions.  For this 
purpose, they combine Katz’s terminology with Cleaver’s cycle of struggle. A key 
element of the cycle of struggle, Cumber et al. (2010) note, “is capital’s attempt to 
decompose working class unity through various strategies, while labor struggles for the 
recomposition of a united class” (p. 58; original emphasis).  
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According to Cumbers et al. (2010), what Autonomous Marxism and E. P. 
Thompson share is the perspective that puts the processes of production and social 
reproduction together as a social totality, “emphasizing how labor agency and resistance 
necessarily take place both within and outside the workplace” (p.48). As they summarize, 
“a critical element in this approach is to perceive the agency of capital and labor as bound 
up in a dialectical totality” (p. 67). In fact, based on their discussion of different 
campaigns, Cumbers et al. (2010) point to three elements that resonate with research on 
labor struggle and labor organizing: first, connecting production and social reproduction 
(e.g., issues of decent wages and conditions with welfare and public service provision); 
second, grassroots mobilizations, denial of formal party or politics, and appeal to 
alternative ethos of dignity, cooperation, and mutual aids; and third, the inclusion of 
social groups and identities (p. 66-67). 
Featherstone and Griffin (2016) also highlight Thompson’s commitment to 
multiple and political forms of agency as a corrective to static accounts of constrained 
agency proposed by Coe and Jordhus-Lier (2010). According to Featherstone and Griffin 
(2016), such constrained agency is prone to be treated as given, rather than generatively 
practiced, in the sense of antagonistic relationships constantly renegotiated, reworked, 
and politicized (p. 380-381). Moreover, labor geographers could learn from the 
Thompsonian labor history as well as subaltern theories, to think through the ways in 
which agency, space, and political economy are constructed and negotiated. Most 
relevant here is the engagement, first, with contested forms of experience and exclusions 
of the working class shaped through labor struggles and organizing and second, with the 
power relations through which such processes are shaped in spatial terms (p. 389).  
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These multiple and political forms of agency are in line with Jane Wills’s (1998) 
concept of the geographical constitution of workers’ tradition in place. Citing Gramsci’s 
(1977) account of the Turin autoworkers and their empowerment in realizing their 
connectedness with workers in other places, Wills (1998) sketches out the skeleton for 
conceptualizing the spatial and temporal constitution of organizing tradition:  
 
“Although workers’ traditions are shaped by specifically local historical conditions, by 
the actions of local trade union activists, and through the formation of collective 
repertoires, institutions, and memories of resistance, at the same time the external is 
perennially influential. ”  (133)  
 
By external, Wills means the transmission of ideas and people across space through 
different means, including migration, media campaigns, and solidarity making. Wills 
(1998) emphasizes the strike’s role as part of a “tradition” (see Hobsbawm and Ranger 
1983) and ‘collective repertoire of resistance’ which supports the consolidation of unions 
across national space. The tradition of striking, as Wills (1998) argues, exists partly 
because previous generations of workers struck before, and hence the existence of 
supportive institutions. Therefore, the repertoire of resistance is an accumulation of 
experiences, especially sentiments of power and strength derived from successive strikes. 
In short, Wills (1998) highlights the production of scale by unions through the diffusion 
of ideas accumulated in such repertoire (e.g., via communication, demonstration effect, 
and solidarity building) across England. In this purview, Will’s space of collective 
struggle can be understood as places in terms of both locale and locus of identity.  
This dissertation builds on such insights of labor history and geography in 
studying organizing practices of Thai migrant workers who combine Northeastern Thai 
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identities and ways of life transported with them via migration with the tradition of labor 
militancy embedded in the locale. Moreover, the concept of labor agency that 
foregrounds the accumulation of experiences, as well as empowerment process through 
personal realization and collective learning, is attuned to the Autonomous Marxism-
inspired framework that puts labor struggle at the center of analyses.  
 
1.2 Feminist Theories and Methodologies: Centering Social Reproduction  
The dialectic notion of labor, emphasized by Castree (1999) in the first section, 
fits well with feminist approaches. It opens up possibilities for complicating, as well as 
gendering, the concept by clearly presenting how workers are engaged in contradictory 
forces of production and social reproduction. According to Marx, labor works for capital 
by creating value (i.e., profit) in the productive realm, but workers also create use-value 
in the reproductive realm. In feminist terminology, reproductive work done by workers, 
especially women, is known as the ‘production of life’ (Mies 1994[1986]; Luxton 2006). 
This research centers the dialectic concept of labor and takes social reproduction as an 
integral part of labor.  
The concept of social reproduction has a plurality of meanings. Traditionally, 
Marxist theories understood social reproduction as the historical, structural, and long-
term reproduction of capitalist relations or the perpetuation of relations of production and 
class inequality (c.f., Marx 1967; Althusser 2014[1971]). While building on Marxian 
theories, this research takes feminist approaches in both political economy and feminist 
geography, which focus respectively on material and dialectical relations of social 
reproduction and capital accumulation (Picchio 1992; Bakker and Gill 2003; Luxton 
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2006; Bakker and Silvey 2008; Strauss 2012) and household practices and the sphere of 
everyday life (Katz and Monk 1993; Katz 2004; Mitchell et al. 2004).  
The major contribution of feminist political economy is to foreground the 
centrality of gender and social reproduction in reconstituting production and exchange 
relations (Bakker and Silvey 2008, p.1). Social reproduction is often defined as activities 
engaged both on day-to-day basis for reproduction of labor power and in the long term as 
the inter-generational reproduction of labor force (Picchio 1992). The strength of this 
approach is the emphasis on contradiction and correspondences between structures (e.g., 
state-led social welfare), social relations (e.g., class, gender and race), and practices 
(Strauss and Meehan 2015, p.8).  
Nevertheless, more recent work on social reproduction and global political 
economy is diverse in approaches and questions, engendering a variety of definitions, 
overlaps, and murkiness (Bezanson 2006; Luxton 2006; Braedley and Luxton 2015, ix-x). 
Generally, social reproduction refers to biological reproduction, the reproduction of the 
working population, and the provision of caring work (Laslett and Brenner 1989; Bakker 
and Gill 2003). As Braedley and Luxton (2015) recently comment, the reference of social 
reproduction as the reproduction of the working or laboring population is just one 
example of the broadening definition, which leads to its fuzziness.  
By contrast, feminist geographers define social reproduction as placed processes 
in which work and lives reside in a non-binary way (Katz, 2001; Mitchell et al. 2004; 
Smith and Winders 2008). Although both groups share the tendency to generalize 
definition, there is a tension between a geographical approach, which foreground bodies 
and identity, and feminist political-economy scholars, who insist on a production and 
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reproduction dialectic. With a few exceptions (e.g., Breitbach 2007), feminist 
geographers have been more interested in the scale of bodies than other scales, as a 
contested site, in particular women workers’ body (McDowell 1997; Tonkin, 2000 for 
‘in-appropriate’ body; Salzinger 2001), and male workers’ body (Leslie and Butz 1998). 
While the concept of life’s work exemplifies feminist geographers’ focus on social 
reproduction, by emphasizing reproductive work as women’s labor, the way in which 
class, gender, and race intersect are not fully theorized (Valentine 2007; Braedley and 
Luxton 2015).  
 
1.2.1 Feminist Geographies of Work, Migration, and Life’s work 
Feminist scholars have problematized a naturalized binary between public/private, 
work/home, and production/reproduction. Most importantly, they have challenged the 
socially constructed boundaries of ‘work’ making visible the exclusion and devaluation 
of women’s labor (England and Lawson 2005). According to England and Lawson 
(2005), on the connection between work and place, a contribution by feminist 
geographers is the expansion of the concept of work beyond the formal workplace, 
especially in diverse sites where gendered work is performed and gender identity 
constructed and reproduced. The most relevant strands of work include geographical 
studies of scalar politics and studies of migration and activism.  
This project draws specifically on the theoretical and methodological initiatives of 
feminist Marxist geographers, who have offered particularly valuable insights into studies 
of work at the intersection of production and social reproduction, migration, and labor 
activism (e.g., Katz 2001, 2004; Silvey 2003, 2006). First, Cindi Katz (2001) 
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incorporates the realm of social reproduction into relations of production, proposing the 
study of workers as ‘embodied subjectivity.’ In fact, based on her direct engagement with 
ontological question of labor, Katz (2004) offers a way in which agency is conceptualized 
through a grounded theory of resistance.  
For example, Katz (2004) highlights children’s agency in her work by 
acknowledging their creativity and ability to appropriate environmental knowledge 
through everyday life. As Katz (2004) argues,  
“through [the] material social practices, social actors become members of a culture and 
construct their own identities. In these activities, young people (and others) are both 
objects and agents, acquiring cultural knowledge and reworking it through the 
practices—intentional and otherwise—of their everyday lives” (p. 20, my emphasis).  
 
Accordingly, adults and children alike have agency which can be seen though the 
act of resistance—the possibility for the disruption of capitalism (my emphasis). One of 
her aims is, thus, to “problematize the notion of resistance” (p.19).  As several labor 
geographers, including Coe and Jordhus-Lier, (2010) argue, Katz (2004)’s categories of 
resilience, rework, and resistance allow for a conceptualization of labor agency that 
complicates a simplification of agency and overstatement of resistance generally seen 
within labor studies. 
Second, Rachel Silvey (2003; 2006) creatively shows the ways we can imagine 
gender geographies of labor activism by rethinking the linkage between social and spatial 
processes, as mediated by power. As Silvey summarizes, feminist geographers are quick 
to highlight the place-specific meaning of households “through the social practices 
defining domesticity, tensions around the boundaries separating the public and the 
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private, meanings of kinship relations, norms of sexuality, and the relationship between 
various work and caring spaces” (Bondi and Rose, 2003; Mitchell, Marston and Katz, 
2003) (Silvey 2006, p. 68). Feminist scholarship on gender and migration also 
foregrounds the significance of households as units of decision-making in which 
gendered hierarchies of power shape migration patterns (see Lawson 1998; Chant 1992). 
Moreover, feminist geographers have deepened our understanding of the household as a 
socially constructed scale (Marston 2000).  
Third, geographers like Altha Cravey and Melissa Wright who study global 
assembly lines are particularly important in documenting the place-based experiences of 
workers in export promotion zones, showing the complex interaction between the 
everyday scale and global geographies (Wright 1997; Cravey 1997, 1998, 2005).  
Studying working-class household formations in the context of Mexican industrial 
transitions, Cravey (1997) shows that the changing forms of capitalist production have 
dialectical relations with household organization and composition, as well as a gendered 
division of labor. Therefore, she concludes, dynamics of household and gender relations 
are crucial for understanding structural change. Engaged with debates about work and 
social reproduction, Cravey (2005) broadens the concept of work to include women’s 
unpaid work such as cooking, cleaning, childrearing, caring, and emotional work, and 
community upkeep. Her focus on social reproduction helps foreground the analytical 
emphasis of structures such as state provision of social services, its dynamics, and its 
relationships to household formations.  
By contrast, Melissa Wright (2006) contributes to multi-scalar analyses of the 
body and workplace wherein workers are subjected to a certain discourse, allowing them 
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to be seen as social and political agents as well as ideological representations. Her mixed 
approaches are also helpful to foreground the differentiation between workers, such as 
skilled and unskilled, men and women, which often dictate hierarchy within the 
organizing rank­and­file.  
Inspired by Wright (2006)’s theoretical toolkit with Marxism, post-structural 
feminism, and postcolonial theory, Linda McDowell poses a question whether it is 
possible, both theoretically and methodologically, to work through intersectionality with 
multiple perspectives, especially with a focus on complex identities without rejecting 
modern categories including class, race, gender, and ethnicity. In the next section, after 
situating labor agency in the social reproduction literature, I address this question 
contrasting an intersectionality and social-reproduction approach.  
1.2.2 Political economy, Social Reproduction, and Intersectionality 
 For political economists working in a feminist historical materialist tradition, 
Bakker and Gill (2003) offer crucial groundwork. As they explain, their social ontology 
of global political economy integrates the dialectic of structure and agency and of 
power/knowledge as a way to distinguish moments of power, production, and social 
reproduction. Built on Gramsci’s concept of work, Bakker and Gill (2003) explain that 
their “understanding of social ontology involves the analysis of social relations of 
production and the mediation and transformation of these relations” (p.21). Such 
understanding encapsulates the Gramscian notion of human subjectivity and “the ways in 
which this is constituted and constrained by different moments of class formation, 
racialization, sexuality and gender” (p. 21).  
Bakker and Gill’s emphasis on ‘instrumentality’ (the objectification of human 
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creativity and freedom into a means for profit accumulation) seems to put the primacy 
more on capital’s agency than on labor’s. This focus differs from Autonomous 
Marxism’s premise, which goes further than critical theories in seeing instrumentalization 
but recognizes the antagonistic recomposition of the working class (Cleaver 2017, p. 76). 
Despite such difference, this research recognizes congruence between Bakker and Gill’s 
social ontology and the premise of Autonomous Marxism that human activities have 
potential to change and transform social relations, associated with 
production/reproduction.  
Susan Ferguson argues that intersectionality could enrich social reproduction 
feminism, a framework that highlights the social totality within capitalism, as well as 
dialectical relationship between the capitalist whole and its differentiated part (2016). 
Central to this approach is the conception of labor that represents creativity in the broader 
sense of life, not simply economic value (p. 49, original emphasis). Again this is similar 
to what Gramsci calls ‘work,’, this framework points to the centrality of the working-
class family as the social site for reproducing labor power. 
 Ferguson explains that there are two main camps within intersectionality 
feminism (Yuval-Davis 2006). The first is the ‘additive’ or cumulative camps whose 
focus is to locate oppressive social relations that affect marginalized subjects. This 
framework tends to focus on the micro-scale, without investigating larger structures or 
systematic logic conditioning the subject’s experiences. It is also criticized as 
‘essentialist’ in the way it reifies each category of difference (Valentine 2007). By 
contrast, the second camp, the constitutive approach, proposes that oppression is an 
outcome of internally relational processes (p. 43). An example would be the co-
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constitutive nature of class, race, and gender. This approach, contrary to the additive 
model, seeks to theorize the ‘diverse-yet-unified nature of power,’ a framework 
commensurate with transformative politics. With such open-ended conceptions of the 
social, nevertheless, the constitutive model struggles with theorizing the social totality 
and the interrelations within it because power is conceived as diffuse and unknowable 
(Ferguson 2016, p. 44). This research follows social reproduction feminism, with an 
integrative concept of labor closely related to the concept of work, as defined by Gramsci 
(1971).  
However, by claiming an encompassing notion of work, it does not argue along 
the same line as Mitchell, Marston, and Katz (2004), who suggest new forms of 
subjectivity by ‘life’s work.’ While recognize the need to avoid reification of the 
production/social reproduction binary, this research concurs with Barbara Ellen Smith 
and Jamie Winders (2015), who contend that the analytical distinction remains important, 
especially while researching the working class, whose “line between work and life is not 
necessarily falling away, but instead, is constantly negotiated and made manifest in both 
spatial and temporal terms” (105). Similarly in my research, working-class families are 
subject to conditionings that force them to “stretch their labor geographies and fragment 
the space-times of work” (Smith and Winders, p. 105). 
 
1.2.3 Work and Labor Activism in Social Reproduction Framework 
Since Italian Marxist-Feminist scholars including Maria Dalla Costa and 
Leopoldina Fortunati have corrected Marx’s limited vision of reproductive work, 
housework has become recognized as a process of value creation and hence productive 
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work (Dalla Costa 1977 [1974]; Fortunati and Fleming 1995 [1981]). According to 
Fortunati and Fleming 1995 [1981], wage relations have historically affected male and 
female workers differently. Owing to a historical sexual division of labor, in the West, 
men entered waged relations first, while women became indirect waged workers, or non-
waged workers. Therefore, Marx originally viewed male workers as having the capacity 
to produce, hence creating value—exchange value—while women only had the capacity 
to reproduce labor power, or use value that appeared as non-value. In other words, 
women were considered working outside capitalist waged relations and external to the 
working class and class struggle. When male waged workers ‘consumed’ housework 
produced by female house-workers in the process of reproduction, according to Marx, it 
appeared that they consumed only use-value because housework was not presented as 
possessing exchange-value in the market. However, such ‘use-values’ that reproduce 
men’s labor power are subsequently consumed by capital in the process of commodity 
production. 
The implications of a historical gendered division of labor are multiple. First, 
when capital appeared to pay a single male worker at work, capital actually exploited 
both the male worker and the female houseworker. Capital thus directly controlled the 
male worker, while indirectly controlling the non-waged female houseworker (s). In other 
words, a male worker, her husband, mediates her relationship with capital. Even when 
women become an integral part of the labor force, they are still a major force in 
reproductive labor (Fortunati and Fleming 1995 [1981). At work, women directly 
produce surplus labor for capital, while at home they indirectly do so through domestic 
work. Second, as a result of the first point, housework possesses dual and contradictory 
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characters. On the one hand, it appears as ‘natural’ and ‘pre-capitalist,’ while on the 
other, it serves as a pre-condition for value creation in commodity production. Such a 
doppelcharacter conceals housework’s true nature and significance in the process of 
capital accumulation. Third, relying on their husbands’ wages, women become a 
disciplinary mechanism for capital. They urge and encourage men to go to work, while 
they discipline children and prepare them to be future workers. This work is essential for 
making a disciplined workforce. 
Around the same time, along similar veins, Canadian feminists Margaret Benston 
and Peggy Morton published critiques of domestic work, albeit with more liberal 
proposals and a less degree of refinement with regards to Marxist theories (see Chapter 2 
in Vogel (2013[1983]) for a comprehensive review). In fact, as Lise Vogel points out, not 
all socialist feminist scholars agree on the centrality of housework and its relations to the 
Marxist category of mode of production. On these issues, I disagree with Vogel 
(2013[1983]), who argues that domestic work is neither productive nor unproductive and 
that women as housewives are not exploited labor. Instead, I follow Maria Mies, who 
insists on usaging exploitation and oppression, rather than shunning the former as Vogel 
did.  
In fact, housework includes both domestic and care work. While the former is 
mainly concerned with material aspects such as cooking, washing, and cleaning (that 
require tools and machines), the latter entails principally immaterial aspects (i.e., love, 
affection, companionship, and sex). Housework thus produces both material and non-
material use value. For this reason, products of housework by non-waged female 
houseworkers, namely their ‘dead labor,’ become part of surplus labor. In this purview, 
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housework should be seen as social use-value, a source of social productivity (Cleaver 
2017). Marie Mies (1994 [1986]) criticizes the analyses of the domestic labor debate as 
Eurocentric and limited because the debate leaves out non-wage work performed by 
women, especially in the Global South in the so-called informal economy. Mies contends 
that the domestic labor debate could provide an analytical basis for other non-wage 
relations including subsistence peasantry in the colonies and developing countries. In this 
research, I integrate non-wage work provided by the extended family of workers and 
activists as an extension of the concept of reproductive work that complements my 
analysis of social reproduction. 
The discovery of housework as productive, exploitative, and internal to class 
struggle led to a struggle of women against states and male-dominated trade unions in 
developed countries such as Italy, UK, and the U.S (Dalla Costa and James 1971; James 
1973). The women’s movements in the 1970s raised the issues of inclusion and real 
wages (James 1973). In the pamphlet Women, the Unions and Work, Or…What have not 
to be done, Selma James attacked unions that only organized struggles for wages as what 
workers received but not what they could retain, since companies always found ways to 
make workers give some wages back to them through inflation. Moreover, unions limited 
their campaigns around wages, in a narrow sense, and prevented a larger mobilization by 
organizing only waged workers. In this sense, the struggle organized by unions was not a 
real working-class movement. As feminist analyses point out, women as non-waged 
houseworkers are part and parcel of capital’s process of value creation. In this vein, it is 
crucial to organize the struggle with both waged and non-waged workers, hence based on 
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the family not the factory.4 The Western women’s movement in the 1970s advocated for 
autonomous politics, or separate organizing among women only; however, James clearly 
understood that it was not the form of organization that mattered, but the way in which 
women or the working class organized. As she argued, power lies in “the way workers 
get unions formed, organizing together, not the unions” (1973, p. 59). 
By contrast, Tithi Bhattacharya (2017) reconciles the tensions between workplace 
struggle (i.e., demand for higher wages) and class struggle by re-connecting the Marxist 
theory of the value of labor power with a social reproduction framework. Drawing on 
Lebowitz’s (1992) Beyond Capital, Bhattacharya (2017) points out that workers’ 
individual consumption is part of the circuit of capital because the reproduction of labor 
power is both production and reproduction of capital itself (p. 77). As labor is both 
commodity and living being and the value of labor power is determined by the value of 
necessities required to maintain and reproduce labor power (i.e., the means of 
subsistence), labor is unique in the sense that unlike other commodities, it adjusts its 
needs according to changes in its own prices. In other words, when the prices of wage 
goods increase, workers reduce their needs accordingly. Nevertheless, labor’s unique 
nature as both commodity and living being allows capitalists to benefit from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  This argument is best illustrated in Salt of the Earth (1954), a now-classic labor movie—based on the historical 
strike in 1950 of Local 890 of the International Unions of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers (IUMM-SW) in New 
Mexico. In one powerful scene, Esperanza, a miner’s housewife, asked Ramon, her husband and a leader of striking 
miners, why the union did not have decent plumbing in its demands. Ramon first dismissed her question by responding, 
“the demand got lost in the negotiation process.” Pressed for more explanation, Ramon said that they couldn’t get 
everything at once and that there were more important demands, especially the “safety of the men... You are a woman, 
you don’t know what it’s like to be up there [in the mine].” While Esperanza tried to defend the equal importance of 
sanitation, Ramon finished the conversation by saying, “First, we need to get equality on the job [between American 
and Mexican coalminers], then we could work on other things. Leave it to the men.” Later, during the protracted 
miners’ strike, in which the mining company successfully got a court injunction to ban all miners from picketing, 
women in the miners’ families, led by Esperanza, decided strategically to replace their husbands. While Esperanza was 
on the picket line, Ramon first resisted the caretaking of three children, including his newborn baby. However, when 
his wife was finally arrested and put in jail, Ramon had to take domestic work and soon realized how exhausting it was. 
He complained to a male neighbor that it took him three hours to heat up the water for laundry. “If the strike is settled, 
which I doubt, I’ll never go back to work for this company unless they install hot running water for us. It should have 
been a union demand from the beginning”.	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intrinsically reduced value of labor power—always sold at the par value in a labor 
market. In this regard, Bhattacharya (2017) argues that labor’s struggle for higher wages 
is connected with a working-class struggle to improve living standards in the realm of 
social reproduction. Here, based on the historical materialist tradition, Bhattacharya’s 
social reproduction is a totality: namely, the reproduction of society as a whole, not only 
the reproduction of daily labor power and the generational workforce. Moreover, 
Bhattacharya (2017) proposes the second circuit of production, or the production of labor 
power as a distinct process, but one that is integral to the circuit of capital itself. The 
second circuit is as follows: 
 
M—Ac—P—Lp—M       (p. 81) 
 
In other words, the reproduction of labor power is the process in which workers exchange 
money (M) with articles of consumption (Ac). As domestic work scholars have pointed 
out (e.g., Mies 1994 [1986]), such a process is itself value creation—an integral part of 
the process of production—that results in labor power (Lp) to be exchanged for money 
wages (M). According to Bhattacharya, workers’ consumption in the second circuit is 
purposeful in the sense that workers consume commodities as use-value (e.g., food, 
clothing, housing, education), for self-development, or even self-transformation, not for 
capital. Such purposes in the reproduction process contradict the capitalist’s goal of 
capital accumulation in the first circuit (M—C (Mp, Lp) —P—C’—M’).  
This research re-centers the roles of working-class struggle in the dialectic of 
production and social reproduction. While historical materialist feminism offers a 
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methodological skeleton for centering gender, class, and social reproduction in the 
research, social reproduction theories lay out several analytical concepts to enrich the 
concepts of labor agency and resistance within labor geography.  Therefore, I combine 
two key concepts: empowerment, inspired by the concept of self-valorization from 
Autonomous Marxism, and self-development from Social Reproduction Framework 
(SRM), to enrich the conceptualization of agency and resistance.  
In the context of Thailand’s Eastern Seaboard, although wage relations and the 
workplace remain central to its labor geography (Rutherford 2010), it is crucial to 
establish that the conditions that create opportunities and restraint for agency have a 
larger scope than the workplace itself. By saying this, I follow feminist geographers and 
scholars who highlight the importance of ‘extra-workplace’ relations (McDowell 2006, 
2008, 2015; Wills 2008; Smith 2016), including home and communities of workers. 
McDowell (2008) suggests that the focus on class should include overall ways of 
living and social relations within the home, community, and workplace (p. 21). In this 
respect, the meaning of working class must expand. The working class encompasses both 
waged labor and unwaged workers who are part of workers’ family and community. 
Similarly, as Wills (2008) suggests, labor geographers need to be more attentive to the 
‘extra-workplace’ dimension of class, which includes the organizational and societal 
conditions in which workers find themselves. In fact, focusing on women’s labor in the 
service sector, McDowell shows that the geographies of work and social relations are 
more complex than ‘moving away from the workplace’ (2015).  While new kinds of work 
now take place in ‘amorphous spaces,’ women who perform care labor are moving back 
into formal workplaces (McDowell 2015, p. 5). In a sense, McDowell proposes a 
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different labor geography—small-scale geographies encompassing home and community, 
while at the same time questioning the ‘end of working class’ thesis.  
On the same vein, feminist sociology Barbara Ellen Smith (2016), who has 
closely engaged with labor geography, reflects that the sub-discipline is dominated by 
what she calls ‘Fordist Marxism’—studies based on experiences of white, waged workers 
in manufacturing. According to Smith (2016), the issue is also concerned with the 
overemphasis of production and formal workplace, at the expense of ‘the others.’ Fordist 
Marxism implies problematic, neat conceptual boundary between work and non-work, 
workplace and home, and hence space of production and social production. As a result, 
feminist epistemological transformation is needed. By this, she means the epistemology 
that conceptualizes class and gender in the way that does not prioritize class at the 
expense of gender and other analytical categories, especially race. In this purview, labor 
geographers are better off doing two things: studying labor agency in the multiple 
settings of spaces and social relations and reconceptualizing gender and class. This 
dissertation takes these two tasks seriously. 
 
Conclusion 
  This dissertation heeds a group of labor geographers, who point to relational, 
dialectical, and class-based view of labor agency (McDowell 2008; Wills 2008; Coe and 
Jordhus-Lier 2010; Das 2010; Rutherford 2010; Peck 2013). It also follows hints of 
certain geographers, including Castree (1999), Cumbers et al (2008), and Cumbers et al 
(2010), who suggest an introspective approach: rethinking the concept of labor with 
regard to the labor theory of value. Theoretically, this route leads to an underexplored 
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strand of Marxism in labor geography, Autonomous Marxism, which brings class 
struggle back to center stage. Epistemologically speaking, as Autonomous Marxism is 
historically guided and enriched by the history of labor struggle in places such as Turin 
and Detroit, this partnership is fortunate and appropriate.  
The debate about labor agency reveals a wanting element in the literature, a 
framework which explains the dynamics of labor agency itself during the ongoing 
process of labor struggle. While the moral element is crucial for the analyses, the studies 
of agency should aim to explicate the tensions and contradictions between workers’ 
short-term interests, on the one hand, and long-term goals of labor struggle, on the other. 
In order to do so, it requires an approach that captures how the working class internally 
negotiates competing material needs and conflicting political aspiration inside the family, 
community, and labor activism.  
 
Chapter 2. Introducing Detroit of Asia: 
Japanese-American hybrids made in Thailand 
 
During one of Thailand’s biggest floods in 2011, aerial images of newly 
assembled cars submerged in dark water made global news. The scale of production and, 
hence, the extent of damages were astonishing. One famous image published by the 
Economist (see Picture 2-1.) resembled a post-modern painting: a black surface dotted 
with a pattern of silver rectangles. As the Economist stated, “it made for interesting 
pictures, but for the Japanese carmakers it was a catastrophe” (2013).  
For many observers, as the article 
remarked, the floods revealed “something not 
widely known: Thailand is the Detroit of the 
East” (ibid.). Detroit of the East was a 
nickname that industrial estate developers gave to Thailand, suggesting its importance as 
one of the Japanese hubs of the global car production. The floods in 2011 actually 
reduced automotive output significantly, lowering Thailand’s world ranking from 10th to 
the 15th (International Organization of Motor Vehicles Manufacturers 2012).  
The article argued that the floods in Thailand had significantly disrupted supply 
chains of automotive parts, with cascading effects regionally and globally (Vaidya 2011). 
A halt in production in Thailand held up assembly lines in Japan and even North America   
(Montblake 2011; Mayne 2011). These reports underscore the fact that Thailand’s 
automotive industry is now integral to global car production.  
Picture	  2-­‐1	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The floods’ impacts on carmakers also disclosed the unfamiliar geography of car 
production in Thailand. For example, Honda, located in the worst flooded area of central 
Thailand, suffered most from assembly-line disruption (Vaidya 2011). By comparison, 
Toyota, Mitsubishi, Isuzu, and Auto Alliance (a Ford and Mazda joint-venture), located 
in the Eastern Seaboard, were only indirectly affected because of interruptions to the 
supply of parts (ibid.). Their production was halted for a period of few weeks, rather than 
months as in Honda’s case. Further, based on the government’s promotions, the Eastern 
Seaboard houses not only multinational carmakers but also a multitude of small and 
medium auto-part factories that are part and parcel of the Thai automotive industry.  
The Economist’s report situates Thailand in the regional and global economy by 
portraying the global economy as if it was an abstract space. This narrative is not 
uncommon among policy documents and analyses, which generally focus on economic 
growth and regional planning as well as business and industrial strategies—a focus of this 
chapter.  
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that in this chapter, the role of business and 
political elites, both Thai and foreign, in development planning is central to the analysis. 
The chapter’s first half illustrates how the Thai ruling class and foreign capital used 
geographical concepts like the cluster as organizing principles and discourse in the 
development of Thailand’s Eastern Seaboard. Hence, I use a bird’s-eye view as the main 
perspective. By contrast, the second half focuses on automobile industry’s political 
economy and how Japanese carmakers used a human-resources paradigm to produce their 
desired workforce.  
This does not mean that working people play passive roles in shaping economic 
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and labor geography. Central to this dissertation is the argument that the more business 
and political elites attempt to mobilize capital and the state to create a stern and secure 
regime of capital accumulation, the greater potential workers have to disrupt the process 
of capital accumulation. In short, workers’ ability to disrupt capital accumulation is 
inherently and dialectically related to the stakes of capital therein (Cleaver 2017). One of 
Italian Marxism writers, Mario Tronti, argues that workers once organized as working 
class, possess ‘the power of attack’ while the capital has ‘the power of resistance’ (Tronti 
and Murphy 2010). To understand potentials and limitations of labor’s power of attack, 
as well as capital’s power of resistance, this chapter introduces the concept of social 
factory, which requires an elaborate and larger scale planning, as a central concept. 
In this chapter, I divide my chapter into five main sections. In the first three 
sections, I sketch historical development of Thailand’s planning processes that have 
structured Thailand’s economy, especially since the 1990s, around the conception of 
Eastern Seaboard Development Plan (ESDP). As I show through the terrain of 
development planning, from the late 1980s to 1990s, the Eastern Seaboard became a 
highly contested spatial development project where American liberal hegemony and 
Japanese developmental ideologies competed for influence. In the third section, I 
illustrate the way in which, against the backdrop of Thailand’s economic crises, a 
partnership of Thai and American think tanks played a crucial role in shifting labor 
disciplining regimes from treating workers as producer to consumer. In the fourth section, 
the emphasis shifts to the automotive industry and the way in which Japanese 
industrialists imposed a Japanese-style labor process and work ethos in Thai factories 
through discourses of human-resource development. In the final section, I discuss how a 
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process of social factory is contingent on a growing middle class and technical class re-
composition in Thai labor force.  
 
2.1 Thailand’s Uneven Development and ‘Decentralization’ 
Against the backdrop of Thailand’s uneven development, the Thai state has 
constantly shaped the country’s economic and labor geography by means of its 
industrialization promotion strategies (Parnwell 1992; Rigg 2003)5. Beginning in the 
early 1980s, the Thai state started to focus on decentralization by developing industrial 
estates outside the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR) and Central region (Glassman 
2004). During the third plan of Thailand’s social and economic development (1977-
1981), the Thai state officials began to realize that rural development alone was 
insufficient for tackling regional disparity, particularly in view of the growing influx of 
migration from the Northeast to the BMR. In 1982, as part of the promotion of regional 
growth centers and secondary cities, the Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand (IEAT) 
began the construction of the first industrial estate outside the BMR and Central region 
located in the Northern province of Lamphun (Vutthisomboon 1998: Glassman 2004). 
With light industries such as textiles, garments, leather, and food processing concentrated 
around the BMR and the Central region, the Northern Region of Industrial Estate was 
promoted as a site for the production of electronics and hard disk drives in the 1980s 
(Glassman 2004). Although rationalized as a decentralization initiative, industrial estates 
are de-facto development strategies designed to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  As Jim Glassman (2004) argues, uneven development and social imparity have long histories tracing back to the uses 
of urban industries as counter-insurgency tactics in the post-WWII period. The consequence was the concentration of 
urban and industrial activities around the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR: Bangkok and five adjacent provinces) 
and the Central Region.	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often resulting in widened geographical inequalities and class divisions (Glassman and 
Sneddon 2003). 
As noted by Glassman (2004), the Thai state encouraged decentralization by 
motivating, rather than disciplining, capital by, for example, institutionalizing low-wages 
alongside tax incentives for foreign investment. Central to this ‘de-concentration process’ 
was migration out of poor regions, which played a ‘functional dualism’ role (c.f., De 
Janvry 1981, cited by Glassman 2004, p. 118), where rural working families subsidized 
urban industrialization processes. This subsidy allowed workers’ households living on 
less-than-subsistence level at the places of origin, to participate in the social reproduction 
of the workforce at the subsistence level (Jamaree 1996; cited by Glassman 2004). 
Decentralization processes are not possible without disciplining workers via control of 
the minimum wage rates which varied from province to province (Glassman 2004). For 
these reasons, two geographical processes — migration and industrial relocation — 
became essential mechanisms that abetted the perpetuation of low-wage, labor-intensive 
industrialization in what Glassman calls a “sweatshop’ regime.”6 One of the main results 
of these processes is the constant-but-varied socio-spatial shifting of class structure 
across regions, with the general trend of increasing the working-class populations in all 
regions (Glassman 2010).  
Starting in the 1990s, the Thai economy faced declining competitiveness in 
international markets for its agricultural and primary produce (Mieno 2013). As a 
solution, the Thai state accelerated the replacement of its import-substitution policies 
with export-led, labor-intensive industrialization, targeting particularly the Eastern 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  The way in which Thai states used labor-disciplining measures during the post-war period to the end of 1990s in 
transforming Thailand’s agrarian-based society into a modern social factory is well documented in Glassman (2004).	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Seaboard region (Shimomura 2013). From the state’s perspective, the Eastern Seaboard 
had two major locational advantages. First, as the Gulf of Thailand was a main source for 
natural gas and the location of deep-sea ports, the Eastern Seaboard had secure access to 
energy and a means of transportation. Second, due to its relative proximity to the 
Northeast region, the Eastern Seaboard region was also guaranteed access to an enormous 
pool of reserve labor (Mieno 2013; Shimomura 2013). For these reasons, Thailand’s 
National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) explicitly promoted the 
Eastern Seaboard as the main hub for heavy industry, including automotive and petro-
chemicals. 
 
2.2 Planning of Thailand’s Eastern Seaboard7 
An international law firm, which recently organized a conference on investment 
opportunities in Thailand’s Eastern Seaboard, advertised that: 
The Eastern Economic Corridor is the enhancement of the former Eastern Seaboard, … 
[n]ow Thailand moves from the “Detroit of the East” to the manufacturing paradise of 
Asia. The Eastern Economic Corridor will see investments of US$ 43 billion during the 
next five years, mostly through foreign direct investment.  
 
The EEC could be seen as part of the Chinese geo-economic doctrine for OBOR (One 
Belt, One Road) the transnational connectivity project to connect China with Asia, 
Europe, and Africa through the land corridor (SREB, Silk Road Economic Belt) and the 
sea corridor (MSR, Maritime Silk Road) to augment global trade and economic 
cooperation.8 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  This section draws heavily on two chapters, Mieno (2013) and Shimomura (2013) in Aid as Handmaiden for the 
development of institutions by Nissanke and Shimomura (eds). Shimomura (2013) notes that the World Bank insisted 
that the Thai government utilize the already-existing port in Bangkok.  
8 Thailand aims to create the manufacturing paradise of Asia, Pugnatorius, https://pugnatorius.com/eec/ accessed 20 
Sept 2017. 
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Therefore, for many foreign investors and international developers, Thailand’s Eastern 
Seaboard area now represents a global scale of economy. It is becoming a world-class 
powerhouse and location for manufacturing and trade.   
In mid-September 2017, more than 500 Japanese firms, led by Japan’s Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Investment (METI), met with the Thai government to discuss 
Eastern Economic Corridor’s significance.9 In fact, Japanese investment has long been a 
major influence in the crafting of Thailand’s industrial policies, especially those 
concerning the Eastern Seaboard. This section discusses the influence of Japanese capital 
in shaping development of the Eastern Seaboard. 
Since the late 1970s, Thai policymakers and foreign investors have viewed 
Thailand’s Eastern Seaboard Development Plan (ESDP) as a solution to the decline in 
Thailand’s competitiveness. The World Bank conducted a feasibility study in the late 
1970s; and in 1981, under the chairmanship of General Prem Tinsulanonda,10 then-Prime 
Minister, the Eastern Seaboard Development Committee was established. In fact, the 
Japanese state was heavily involved from the outset — via the feasibility study — and in 
planning through several agencies and programs, especially the Japanese International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) loans 
program. As Japanese foreign assistance and loans were designed to promote its own 
private companies operating aboard, the Thai government had to hire Japanese 
consultants for the construction plans (Hatch and Yamamura 1996). The World Bank also 
participated in the finances of the ESDP’s Master Plan jointly with the British 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  “Japanese executives to meet Prayut in September,” Bangkok Post (Aug 29, 2017) 
10	  According to Glassman (2004), Prem Tinsulanonda’s policies represented a major break in the Thai political 
economy when the Japanese quasi-hegemony and more diffuse global neoliberalism replaced US Fordism as the 
dominant accumulation scheme (p. 97). As a contrast to US interests in its geopolitical influences, Japanese interests 
were restricted to narrower economic interests such as competitiveness (i.e., production costs and prices).  
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government through a British contractor (Shimomura 2013). The Master Plan was then 
incorporated into Thailand’s fifth five-year development plan (1982-1986). As Thailand 
was heavily affected by the global oil price shock in the late 1970s, the Thai government 
received the first loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1982, under the 
terms of a structural adjustment program. Through structural adjustment loans, the World 
Bank, as discussed below, pressured Thailand’s government to scale down the ESDP, by 
cancelling the construction of two deep-sea ports, Laem Chabang in Chonburi province 
and Map Ta Phut in Rayong, with an industrial complex inside each projects. However, 
the Thai government wanted to promote the two major industrial projects to be the key 
economic revival plans. 
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Apart from these two projects, the ESDP was also to be equipped with 
infrastructure networks including roads, water supply, and other supporting facilities. 
Moreover, due to the discovery of natural gas in 1973 in the Gulf of Thailand, the Map 
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Ta Phut Industrial Project was set to be promoted as the first large-scale petro-chemical 
industrial project in Thailand. It was in the Map Ta Phut site, where a National Fertilizer 
Plant was originally planned as well. However, in the early 1980s, when the program first 
began, the World Bank constantly raised concerns about Thailand’s budgetary status, 
especially in light of the huge investment that would be required in the Laem Chabang 
and Map Ta Phut ports as well as the National Fertilizer Plant. This led to a revision of 
the ESDP, which was followed by a three-year suspension of the whole project. 
In the late 1980s, a Thai newspaper reported a corruption scandal associated with 
concession of the port construction.11 In fact, this scandal involved Japan’s attempts to 
block other national interests, especially South Korea’s, from gaining access to the 
development project.12 Nevertheless, Japanese influence increased sharply after the Plaza 
accord, which resulted in the Japanese Yen’s appreciation, and hence, an influx of 
Japanese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into Thailand. Armed with a flood of capital, 
Japanese investors successfully pressured the Thai government to push the ESDP 
forward, and ignore the World Bank recommendations (Shimomura 2013). Yasutami 
Shimomura (2013) argues that foreign industrialist interests successfully convinced the 
Thai state to resume the Laem Chabang project by framing their concerns around the 
issues of infrastructural bottlenecks and inefficiencies in the BMR. In light of the 
drastically appreciated Yen, Japanese industrialists also had to ensure that they could 
secure a production location abroad. This influx of Japanese investment led East Asian 
investors to follow en masse. In the first half of 1986, FDI from Japan increased 50 
percent (ibid., p. 112). The Thai state also facilitated the influx by a series of de-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11Concession Scandal (in Thai), The Manager 1989	  
12	  It is somewhat ironic that Yasutami Shimomura (2013) comments, “it is remarkable that […] the project was done 
without serious scandals.” It is quite possible that the scandal was not reported in foreign media. 	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regulations and liberalizations in the financial and capital sectors. In the next decade, 
however, Thailand would experience one of its worst economic crises, largely attributed 
to such financial liberalization.  
The ESDP scheme strengthened Japan’s grip over the Thai economy as 
Thailand’s share of borrowing from Japan rose tenfold. Average net FDI from Japan rose 
from $510 million in the 1980s to $5,418 million annually in the 2000s (Ghazali et al. 
2011). Since its initiation, the Eastern Seaboard region has received $40 billion worth of 
FDI and created at least 460,000 jobs (Ariga and Egima 2000, cited by Hill and Fujita 
2012). Due to the operation of the Laem Chabang port as an export base, the massive 
influx of FDI into the Eastern Seaboard inland industrial estates accelerated in the mid-
1990s and peaked in the end of 1990s (Mieno 2013). While FDI continued to flow into 
the Eastern Seaboard in the late 1990s, most FDI originally planned for the Map Ta Phut 
project gradually moved to the inland area, Bowin district in Chonburi and Pluak Daeng 
district in Rayong, at the expense of Chonburi city and the Leam Chabang Area. Toward 
the end of the 1990s, new factories that followed the foot-loose FDI were mostly small-
scale, downstream suppliers that catered to the demands of large corporations, which 
were, in turn, lured by the BOI investment incentives to locate in the area. Compared to 
the coastal ones, these newer industrial estates were similar in sizes in terms of total area. 
They concentrated in auto and parts manufacturing but were managed by private 
developers.  
It is worth noting two important facts here. First, despite claims of industrial 
upgrading in petrochemicals, the employment contribution, such as new job creation, was 
low (ibid., p. 101). Second, the analysis of actual factories establishment recorded by the 
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Department of Factories shows that, throughout the 1990s, only a few large 
petrochemical factories developed clustering near the coastal Map Ta Phut industrial 
complex. By contrast, light industries and basic metal production factories began to be 
concentrated in Chonburi city. In short, beginning in the late 1990s, labor-intensive 
industries such as electronics, medical and optical machines, and motor vehicles began to 
attract increasing numbers of migrant workers to the area (Mieno 2013). 
According to Shimomura, the Thai state successfully maneuvered conflicting 
interests between the Japanese and World Bank with two main strategies.13 First, the Thai 
state de-politicized the ESDP and contained it within the scope of the technical realm 
(i.e., interpreting the issues as simply economic and fiscal problems). Second, a group of 
technocrats — led by then-Finance minister Sommai Hoontarakool — played a major 
role in directing Thailand toward a compromise solution guided mainly by Japanese 
interests (Shimomura 2013, p. 123). It is worth noting that Sommai Hoontarakool studied 
economics in Japan and started his first professional position at the Japanese Bank in 
Thailand.14 I highlight these two points to reiterate that, rather than being a natural 
process, the success of the Eastern Seaboard is a product of major interventions, through 
the partnerships of foreign capital and Thai elites. 15 This is one of the central arguments 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Shimomura (2006) suggests that the share of Japan’s development aid to Thailand in the 1990s increased while 
loans from the World Bank’s Thailand decreased (cited by Hill and Fujita 2012, p. 273).	  
14	  By contrast, Sanoh Unakul, the Secretary General of NSDB who wrote a note to PM Prem Tinsulanonda for 
suspending the plan, was a Columbia University alumnus. Pasuk and Baker (2002) note that Sanoh Unakul was a leader 
who gathered a group of Thai technocrats, all strong believers in the free-market credo, in a planning group. This group 
included Kosit Panpiemrat, Suthy Singsaneh, Narongchai Akrasanee, and Nukul Prachuabmoh, the former head of the 
central Bank—who were all students from US universities “during the time of US patronage of Thailand in the 1960s 
and 1970s, and were affected by the prevailing enthusiasm for market liberalization (p. 165).” Most of these 
technocrats also played important roles in policymaking in the late 1980s, as well as the currency devaluation in 1984-
1985.	  
15	  An institutional analyst, who focused on Overseas Development Assistance, explained that Japan chose Thailand 
because of its strong and centralized government, flexible decision-making system, supporting export technocrats, and 
ultimate goals of economic growth (Ohno 2003a and 2003b, cited by Hill and Fujita 2012). However, such factors were 
historically specific to Thailand’s quasi-democratic regimes, in which political and civil rights were suppressed.  As 
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made by Italian Marxist writers such as Mario Tronti. In the next section, I show how 
several important players: World Bank, USAID, Thai and American think tanks, and a 
partnership of Thai and American business, mainstream the cluster concept in Thailand. 
As a result, the concept has become a major part of Thai industrial policy in the 2000s. 
 
2.3 Clusters Competitiveness as a State’s Policy 
  
Starting at the end of the 20th century, the concept of cluster competitiveness 
became the dominant economic and geographical discourse. In a pamphlet published by 
Thailand’s Board of Investment (BOI), a cluster is defined as a “concentration of 
interconnected business and related institutions that operate within the same geographic 
areas (BOI 2015).” Further, the National Board of Economic and Social Development 
drafted the ninth five-year plan (2002-2006), which highlighted the areas of human 
resources, competitiveness, and science and technology.  
During Thaksin Shinnawatra’s administration of (2000-2006), the government 
identified five strategic sectors to be promoted for the Thai economy, articulated 
aspiringly in geographical or locational terms: Kitchen of the World (food), Detroit of 
Asia (automotive), Tropical Fashion of Asia (fashion and textiles), World Graphic 
Design and Animation Center (software), and Tourism Capital of Asia (tourism). To 
order to restore Thailand’s comparative advantages on international market, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
certain political economists (Pasuk and Baker 2002; Ockey 2004) argue, the so-called bureaucratic polity, in which a 
military-bureaucrat alliance controlled policy-making, gave way to parliamentarian politics in the 1980s and early 
1990s, when the state became more susceptible to demands from autonomous social groups. At the turn of millennium, 
the country’s new constitution brought a powerful business tycoon, Thaksin Shinnawatra, and his one-party 
government into power. Despite his promises to reduce the country’s dependency on exports, during Thaksin’s 
administration, the dual-track economy (e.g., expansion of exports alongside the internal market) strengthened the FDI-
based export economy even further. 
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government emphasized, through a series of policies and plans, the concepts of 
innovation, industrial clusters, and a knowledge-based society (Intarakumnerd 2011).  
As many scholars (e.g., Looney 2004) have observed, Thaksin Shinnawatra 
invented a unique realpolitik,16 where he turned the country into a corporation, and 
himself a CEO, with layers of managers spiraling down the administrative hierarchy. In 
his economic approach, known as Thaksinomics, he set policy goals and charged state 
agencies to follow his directives to achieve those goals. His policies were generally well 
received by many because they were strategically driven by dual-track populist objectives 
that aimed to increase both the international competitiveness of business and purchasing 
power of the population. Thaksin Shinnawatra developed a reputation for applying 
fashionable and accessible ideas such as the clusters to his policy campaigns. 
In 2003, Thaksin met with Michael E. Porter, who had been commissioned to 
prepare a report on the competitiveness of Thailand’s five strategic sectors (Bangkok Post 
2003). Accordingly, the BOI designed incentive packages, targeting investment in 
designated strategic industrial clusters. In terms of industrial policies, the cluster concept 
was applied on national, regional, and local scales. For instance, Thailand was divided 
into 19 geographical areas for the planning and implementation of its own cluster strategy 
(Intarakumnerd 2011, p. 47-48).  
Ten years following the coup d’état against Thaksin Shinnawatra with the 
military’s prolonged effort of cleansing his influence, his policy legacies remained.17 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Following a fact-finding mission in Thailand, Vietnamese delegates from the Ministry of Industry reported that 
Thaksin Shinnawatra’s administration significantly changed the way Thai state agencies operated (2005). Even though 
Thailand still relied on state agencies to formulate industrial strategies, they argued, Thailand was not a developmental 
state per se, as Thaksin Shinnawatra was less interventionist and committed to the integration of the global economy, 
which boded well for the mandate of international organizations such as the World Bank and IMF (MOI-VDF 2005).	  
17	  Like most of the programs initiated during the Thaksin’s administration, the repackaged policies were simply 
renamed. Not many changes had been made by the coup makers and the reformist government to these so-called 
	   62	  
Most recently, the BOI repackaged the cluster policy into two main programs, Super 
Cluster and other targeted clusters. The Super Cluster applied, according to the BOI 
pamphlet, to ‘advance technology and future industry’ including (1) Automotive and 
Parts Cluster; (2) Electrical Appliances, Electronics, and Telecommunication Equipment 
Cluster; (3) Eco-friendly Petrochemicals and Chemicals Cluster; (4) Digital-based 
Cluster; (5) Food Innapolis, and (6) Medical Hub. The Cluster (3) was targeted to locate 
in Chonburi and Rayong of the Eastern Seaboard, while Cluster (1) and (2) are to cover 
seven provinces; three in the Eastern Seaboard, its neighboring Prachinburi, Nakon 
Ratchasima (connected to Prachinburi), Ayutthaya, and Pathum Thani.  
The investment incentive offered by Thailand’s BOI for the Super Cluster has 
included both tax and non-tax incentives. Tax incentives covered an 8-year corporate 
income tax exemption and an additional 5 years of 50% reduction afterward as well as 
personal income tax exemptions for international specialists working in specified areas. 
Non-tax incentives included permission for foreigners to own land and special 
consideration for permanent residence granted to the leading specialists.  
2.3.1 The Cluster concept and Free Enterprise Ideology  
Michael E. Porter’s concepts of the cluster and the competitive diamond have 
received significant interests, not only from Thaksin, the Thai state agencies and 
industrialists, but also from policy makers and politicians all over the world. Economic 
geographers Ron Martin and Peter Sunley (2003) have commented that this attention was 
a result of many factors, including Porter’s focus on competitiveness and the concept’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
criticized ‘populist’ programs. It is also worth noting that Dr. Somkid Jatusripitak, who had been in charge of the 
cluster policy under Thaksin, was reappointed after the 2015 coup as the deputy Prime Minister and in charge of the 
Super Cluster.	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association with the so-called knowledge economy. More importantly, owing to its 
ambiguity and conceptual elasticity, the cluster is more an ideology than a concept per se. 
Most relevant to the case of Thaksin Shinnawatra and Thai policy makers is that the 
notion of cluster “sits well with the current preoccupation with micro-economic supply-
side intervention, and especially with the policy imperatives of raising productivity and 
innovation” (Martin and Sunley 2003, p. 8-9). 
In fact, the cluster concept is not entirely new. The idea of the cluster resembles 
Alfred Marshall’s (1890) triad of external economies: availability of skilled labor, 
supporting industries, and different firms’ specialization of at different stages (Martin and 
Sunley 2003; Intarakumnerd 2014). By comparison, Porter proposes that the national 
competitive diamond, comprising four sets of factors: (1) firm strategy, structure and 
rivalry, (2) factor input conditions, (3) demand conditions, and (4) related and supporting 
industries, provides decisive elements for the success of a nation’s exporting enterprises. 
As Martin and Sunley note, the competitive diamond is essentially a way of decomposing 
a national economy – that is, turning it into a spatial metaphor – as the key is the 
interaction within the competitive diamond and how it is enhanced in view of 
geographical concentration or clustering (p. 7).  
However, the cluster concept itself is problematic in a number of respects. First, it 
lacks clear industrial and geographical boundaries, with the very idea of geographical 
proximity appearing to be “highly and ridiculously elastic” (p. 11). Second, the concept is 
deficient in any explanation concerning the geographical range or scales. In other words, 
as Martin and Sunley explain, it is not clear “whether and in what ways different 
clustering processes operate at different scales” (p. 12). Most importantly, the theory of 
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the cluster treats clusters as self-contained and separated from the rest of the economic 
landscape (p. 17). It is as if the cluster within the neatly bounded location can be 
developed in isolation from its surroundings. Lastly, the theory of competitiveness is 
inherently problematic, as in reality, nations do not essentially compete in the same way 
that firms compete. Nevertheless, Porter reinforces this problem by using ‘competition’ 
interchangeably with ‘productivity’ (p.15).  
2.3.2 Institutionalizing the cluster concept via development assistance programs 
However problematic the concepts are, Washington Consensus organizations such 
as the World Bank and the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), quickly took up the concepts. By the late 1990s, they were champions of its 
application to international development. Between 1998 and 2003, with support from the 
World Bank, USAID extensively funded cluster-based competitiveness initiatives around 
the world, spending nearly $60 million in 26 developing countries, including Lebanon, 
Sri Lanka, Mongolia, the Dominican Republic, Uganda, Croatia, Mexico, and Thailand 
(USAID 2003).18 As a report prepared by a Texas-based consulting firm to the USAID 
highlights and clarifies, key elements of a competitive initiative is to re-position the 
industry toward niche markets, greater value-added products with the strategies devised 
and implemented by cluster members — business entities themselves (vi). The report also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  In fact, Glassman (2004) documents in great breadth and length the influence of US hegemony on Thai society 
during 1945 to1980. To name the most tangible influence, the major Thai development agencies (e.g., NESDB and 
BOI) were mostly created commensurately with World Bank recommendations, following its 1957-8 mission. In the 
1960s and 1970s, anti-communist missions in the region tremendously increased American involvement with Thai 
politics and, hence, security and economic policies. Until the late 1980s, Thailand received a substantial amount of aid, 
assistance, and funding, in both financial and technical terms. In sum, the roles of US hegemony in general (as well as 
the US- Thai counter-insurgency and anti-communist alliance) had largely contributed to the creation of many 
conditions, including the proletarianization of the Thai peasantry, paving the way for the current industrialization and 
accumulation regime. 
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emphasized cluster members’ central roles in the decision-making that guides strategic 
reforms of policies, laws, and regulations. 
 USAID founded the US-Thailand Development Partnership (US- TDP) which, in 
1990, commissioned a group of contractors from Chulalongkorn University, the North 
Carolina-based Kenan Institute of Private Enterprise (KIPE), 19 and the Brooker Group, 20 
a Thai consulting company. The group’s aim was to  
demonstrate new, more private sector-oriented ways of assisting development through 
support for US-Thai partnerships; … [and] develop an institutional arrangement that 
would provide ways to contribute this sort of assistance after the closure of USAID bi-
lateral mission (KIAsia website). 
 
Due to an unexpected Congressional budget cut, the US-TDP was short-lived. However, 
aided by a group of Thai elites, the USAID mission finally succeeded in founding the 
Kenan Institute Asia, a Thailand-based non-profit organization, and an offshoot of KIPE, 
to continue the work of promoting belief in free enterprise in Thailand.21 A central figure 
in this group was Anand Panyarachun, a former Thai Prime Minister.22  
During his administration, Anand appointed many likeminded technocrats, 
including Sanoh Unakul (as mentioned earlier, who was responsible for the ESDP’s 
success) who was appointed as the Deputy Prime Minister in economic affairs, as well as 
Kosit Panpiemrat and Suthy Singsaneh who received ministerial appointments. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  KIPE is part of the Kenan-Flager Business School at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, named after 
Frank H. Kenan, the main benefactor of the university, who also founded the Business School. Kenan, himself a strong 
advocate of free enterprise, created his family business around oil and transport businesses (New York Times 1996). In 
the U.S., the KIPE is engaged with scholars and executives who collaborate “for the good of the free enterprise system 
(KIPE website).”	  
20	  Similarly, the Brooker Group is a financial and real-estate consultancy and capital management company. Since 
2003, the firm has been headed by Chan Bulakul, a Thai “pioneer in promoting foreign institutional investment in the 
Thai stocks in the early 70s” (Bloomberg 2017).	  
21	  Private funders, including Citibank and JPMorgan, had also financially supported KIAsia.	  
22	  Anand Panyarachun was invited by the military to serve the position in 1991 and 1992. He was also an ex-diplomat 
and Thailand’s Ambassador to many countries, including the U.S. in the early 1970s. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
when he retired from the civil service, he was heavily involved in the private sector, as chair of a textile conglomerate, 
as well as chair of the Federation of Thai Industry.	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retrospect, these liberal technocrats and their free-market zeal were responsible for the 
liberalization of Thai financial and money markets in the early 1990s, developments that 
paved the way for the Tom Yum Kung crisis—Thailand’s worst economic crisis which 
ravaged the economy in 1997 (Pasuk and Baker 2002, p. 166- 167).  
 Anand Panyarachun has since played an active role as the founding chairman of 
KIAsia while KIAsia became a major platform for Thailand-US corporate participation in 
the cultivation of a free-enterprise culture. Following the Asian financial crisis, Anand 
Panyarachun and Henry Kissinger co-chaired the American Corporations for Thailand 
(ACT) 23 that fundraised 1.7 million USD from American enterprises (led by Unocal and 
AIG) to support Thai economy’s recovery.24 Between 1998 and 2005, via KIAsia’s role 
as the fund manager, 700 Thai trainers and 27,000 trainees went through 50 training 
projects focusing on human resources development. According to Anand Panyarachun, 
“corporate support has been particularly important for the Institute because it 
substantiates our central premise that the most effective long-term development depends 
on an enlightened and well-balanced free-enterprise system” (KIAsia website, my 
emphasis).  
Begining in 1999, USAID simultaneously used KIAsia as a primary mechanism 
to channel and manage its funding under a regional program called “Accelerating 
Economic Recovery in Asia (AERA).” Over the next decade, KIAsia would use 23 
million USD to implement numerous projects, including the diffusion of and public 
outreach advocating for the concept of cluster competitiveness in Thailand. Under the so-
called Thailand Competitive Initiative (TCI), USAID funded capacity-building training 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  https://www.unc.edu/news/archives/mar98/usthai.html	  
24	  Interestingly, American corporations, led by Unocal and AIG, were also interested in giving financial support to 
Thai students and professional studying in the U.S. after the financial crisis.	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for KIAsia staff and created a ‘competitiveness team’ with coaching from a Virginia-
based consulting firm led by a “Harvard Business School’s guru on developing 
countries.”25 For several years, KIAsia’s competitive team produced materials on cluster 
competitiveness and engaged with a network of professionals, including business 
journalists from at least 23 media institutions (USAID Final report, 2004). One objective 
was for “Thai media to publish at least 25 articles or television programs on cluster 
competitiveness. (ibid.)” As a result, the number of articles on cluster competitiveness 
swiftly increased from 24 articles in 2002 to 71 in 2003 and 66 over a period of only 
seven months in 2004 (ibid.). Moreover, during the project period, the competitive team 
organized several conferences with the aim of targeting personnel from NESDB, the 
Federation of Thai Industries (FTI), the Industrial Finance Corporation of Thailand 
(IFCT), and the Thai Chamber of Commerce. In 2003, the National Competitiveness 
Council selected KIAsia to be an advisor for the Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinnawatra.  
2.3.3 Corporate Social Responsibilities and the making of disciplined labor 
With funding under the Thailand Competitive Initiative (TCI), KIAsia has also 
promoted its central premise of free enterprise through other programs, including the 
provision of business coaching services to Thai small and medium enterprises via the 
Business Advisor Center. Since 2009, however, KIAsia has shifted its focus to the other 
Southeast Asian countries, especially Vietnam, Cambodia, and Myanmar. In Thailand, 
KIAsia has most recently promoted the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
in collaboration with multinational corporations such as Chevron, Boeing, and CITI 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  J.E. Austin Associates, Inc. claimed to have completed 650 projects in 120 countries. Their main focus was strategy 
and management consulting for “the development of emerging and developing economies” in  “increasing business 
competitiveness and growth, increasing and enhancing public-private dialogue the process developing mechanisms in 
the public and private sectors to improve their competitive advantages…(J.E. Austin, 2017)”	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Bank. One of the most recent programs (2017) is financial literacy training, in which 
KIAsia has partnered with the Federation of Thailand Automobile Workers Union 
(TAW) and the Department of Skills Development within the Ministry of Labor. The 
objective is to provide ‘semi-skilled’ workers with financial literacy skills. In fact, this 
project showed how KIAsia was deeply interested in micro-managing the way in which 
autoworkers plan their monthly budget as well as their savings. For example, KIAsia 
developed a mobile application called ‘Smart Workers Smart Money’ which, according 
to KIAsia’s own words, “[targets] a vulnerable group of semi-skilled factory workers” 
and “provide[s] practical financial knowledge tailored specifically to the factory workers’ 
lifestyle” (KIAsia website). Moreover, KIAsia has worked to mainstream financial 
literacy curriculum on the national level.  
 As the evolution of KIAsia programs suggests, there is a genealogy that links the 
way in which the cluster concept and the tenets of human resource development are 
individually and complementarily used as both scientific and technological management 
tools in manufacturing a disciplined workforce. As a political vehicle, the cluster concept 
provides business interests with entry points through which they can influence industrial 
policy-making and bring about policy changes. In this case, the changes were made to 
industrial policy conducive to foreign direct investment, such as tax exemptions, land 
ownership, and access to non-unionized labor. Similarly, framed as a scientific and 
management technology, the human resource program was a tool that private enterprises 
have used to both directly and indirectly intensify work in a labor process. As the next 
section demonstrates, through human resource departments, companies have been able to 
control workers in the production process by monitoring their productivity and efficiency. 
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Moreover, the example of Smart Workers Smart Money program shows how companies 
have also been able to indirectly discipline workers by managing their spending 
behaviors. This is similar to what Henry Ford did with the enforcement of the five-dollar 
a day program26. Along with the wage increases, the investigators from the company’s 
Sociological Department regularly monitored how the workers spent their wages and 
behaved outside of the factory. It is striking how the rhetoric of ‘vulnerable’ workers and 
the paternalism inherent in the program, as shown by KIAsia, are very similar to Ford’s 
initiatives. As scholars argued that one of the results of Ford’s five-dollar deal was the 
company’s better control over its flow of work (Beynon 1973, p. 21), as well as the 
making of a consumer (Pizzolati 2013). 
 
 
2.4 Japan-dominated Automotive Industry: Working with Japanese Ethos  
In 2015, Thailand was ranked globally as the twelfth largest producer of 
automobiles, producing almost two millions passenger cars and commercial vehicles 
annually, of which more than half were exported (Oxford Business Group 2016; Hananto 
2016).27 In Asia, it was the fifth largest automotive producer, after China, Japan, Korea, 
and India, albeit without any national car development project of its own. In fact, the 
absence of national car development is one of the main factors for it being chosen as the 
regional production hub for Japanese carmakers, which are Thailand’s largest producers 
(Kohpaiboon and Jongwanich 2013).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  In 1914, Ford introduced the five-dollar day, a package deal that applied only to qualified workers, usually men over 
the age of twenty-one, who were considered to spend their wages in appropriate ways (Beynon 1973).	  
27	  This rank is lower than in 2014, when Thailand was ranked 10th producing more than 2.5 million vehicles. 	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Apart from the main car assemblers, there were around 709 tier-1 and 1,100 tiers -
2 and -3 suppliers (Thai embassy 2015). The tier-1 producers were Japanese suppliers for 
the assemblers, mainly Japanese carmakers, while tiers -2 and -3 were locally owned 
factories that supply replacement parts (Ghazali et al. 2011). According to Natsuda and 
Thoborn (2013), among the tier-1 suppliers, around 47 percent were foreign majority-
owned, 30 percent were Thai majority-owned and 23 percent were Thai owned. While 20 
assemblers employed around 100,000 workers, tier-1 employed around 250,000 workers 
and tiers -2 and -3 employed around 175,000 workers, respectively (Thailand Automotive 
Institute 2013). In general, the Japanese assemblers dominated around 80% of the sector 
while the Thai parts sector has been unable to develop its own knowledge base (Doner 
2009; McNamara 2009; Doner and Wad 2014)28. Although there are no accurate official 
statistics, there have been reports about increasing rates of flexible employment in the 
auto sector, including temporary and subcontract workers, in individual firms. For 
instance, Wad (2017) notes that in one of the Toyota-affiliated plants, the proportion of 
salaried to subcontract workers was as high as 50:50 (p. 54).  
 
State - Capital Alliance versus Labor  
The automotive industry in Thailand has developed over five decades. Beginning 
in the 1960s, protectionist and inconsistent policies left the Thai automobile industry 
underdeveloped over the following two decades (Busser 2008). However, the automotive 
industry was one of the first sectors to which the state applied the liberal approach: 
delimiting foreign land ownership as well as offering incentives such as tax exemptions, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  In 2006, vehicle and parts imports from Japan worth $2.5 billion, far surpassing the export to Japan of $500 million, 
while Japan imported only 15% of the Thailand’s export (McNamara 2009, p. 118).	  	  
	   71	  
tariff reductions, and other benefits. The growth of import-reliant production and 
resulting trade deficits then prompted the state to promote a policy mix of localization 
and rationalization, where minimum local content requirements, along with economies of 
scale (i.e. limits on the number of assemblers, makes and engine sizes), were enforced 
(Doner 2009, p. 236). According to Richard Doner, during the period 1961-1977, the 
contradictory character of the Thai political economy—what he calls the ‘Janus-faced 
nature of Thai clientelism’ resulted in an influx of assemblers and parts producers, on the 
one hand, and obstacles to economies of scale on the other (p. 237). Through the 1980s, 
the agglomeration of parts interest groups clustered around the Bangkok Metropolitan 
Area, became more organized, and were represented via the Thai Automotive Parts 
Manufacturers Association (TAPMA). As Doner remarks, “the institutional strengths of 
this network in autos exceeded anything seen previously” (243). Over time, the Thai state 
supported the industry by instituting many programs and units, including the Board of 
Investment Unit for Industrial Linkage Development (1991), the National Supplier 
Development Program (1994), the Metal Industries Development Agency (1995), the 
Automotive Development Institute (1999), and the Automotive Human Resource 
Development Project (2006) (Kohpaiboon and Jongwanich 2013). 
 Following the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the Global Financial Crisis in 
2008, exports and market forces have shaped the trajectory of the Thai automotive 
industry (Doner and Wad 2014). Doner and Wad (2014) suggest that the two crises 
demonstrated the weakness and weakening of domestic auto interests in Thailand. 
Internally, the establishment of the Thailand Automotive Institute (TAI) in 2001 totally 
altered the direction of the industry. Modeled after their Japanese counterparts, TAI has 
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since served as a coordinator and promoter of sector interests, shaping the direction of the 
industry through the joint crafting of the industry-specific master plans (Busser 2008; Hill 
and Fujita 2012). One of the main consequences was that, under the guidance of the TAI 
and its master plans, the Thai state has shifted its approach to the industry from ‘laissez 
faire’ to one of closer state and capital alliance, where Japanese enterprises have played a 
central role in shaping the policy environment.  
In practice, the Thailand Automotive Institute (TAI) has worked closely with 
Thailand’s Ministry of Industry (MOI) to draft a five-year master plan, called the 
Automotive Master Plan. Three industrial associations—TAPMA, TAI and the 
Federation of Thai Industries (FTI)—have also collaborated to provide overall support 
for the industry. The current Master Plan (2012-2016) specifies four major ways of 
ensuring sustainable development for the Thai automotive industry: (1) favorable 
government policy to promote investment and domestic market expansion through 
systematic integration; (2) accommodate technology changes; (3) increase domestic value 
creation through productivity improvement for parts and manufacturers; and (4) 
quantitative and qualitative human resource development. Applying TAI’s areas (3) and 
(4) together, for example, in 2017, in partnership with MOI, TAI provided coaching and 
training on Just In Time Manufacturing to local parts makers.  
During 2006-2011, Automotive Human Resources Development Institute Project 
(AHRDIP) had trained 233 small and medium enterprises, and 7,000 employees, with 
modules and curricula developed by the four biggest Japanese firms in Thailand: Toyota, 
Denso, Honda and Nissan. As a product of the Japan –Thailand Economic Partnership 
Agreement, AHRDIP became the main mechanism through which Thai state agencies, 
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private enterprises and industrial associations, and Japanese state agencies, industrial 
associations and private enterprises, have shaped the auto and parts production and labor 
relations.  
Toyota Motor Thailand and Denso Thailand have long played predominant roles 
in shaping labor relations in the Thai automotive sector. With a market share of car sales 
around 32 percent in 2016, Toyota is by far the most dominant Japanese carmaker in 
Thailand (Marklines 2017)29. The central role of Toyota in Thailand is such that its 
history offers a chronicle of the local industry development (McNamara 2009). As the 
CEO of Toyota Thailand is also head of the Thai – Japanese Chamber of Commerce, 
Toyota has played an important role in mainstreaming the model of lean production (e.g. 
just-in-time) and defining the nature and practices of human resources in Thailand. As for 
Denso, Toyota’s main supplier and close partner in promoting Thailand as a regional hub 
for Japanese assembly, the emphasis on its core ethos ‘Monozukuri is Hitozukuri’, 
making things through making people, became a main tenet in the auto parts industry. For 
example, one of the AHRDIP training courses, based on Denso’s module, consists of two 
main elements: Mind Management and Manufacturing Skills. The Mind Management 
element included topics such as Total Quality Management for management and problem 
solving, Training within Industry: how to relate person (sic.), and how to instruct work, 
etc. (Thailand Automotive Institute 2013). 
 In one of the studies conducted with chief executives of five major car 
manufacturers in Thailand, including Toyota, Nissan, Mitsubishi, Honda and Suzuki, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  The market share of Toyota in commercial and passenger cars were around 32% while 1-ton pickups and SUVs 
were higher, 37.7% and 60%, respectively. 
(https://www.marklines.com/en/statistics/flash_sales/salesfig_thailand_2016) 
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author presented the concept and strategies of each company’s human resource 
development as follows:   
Toyota and Honda  – “The company has practiced on the philosophy of ‘intellectual 
capital’ human resource development as its human resource is the most valuable asset in 
the organization.” 
 
Nissan – “The organization has taken the philosophy of ‘business cost’ human resource 
development in use. The company views its workers as a type of cost that requires 
effective management.” 
 
Suzuki and Mitsubishi – “The organization values human resources as ‘asset’ or ‘asset’ 
human resource development like other financial and other physical resources” 
(Phutrakhul 2014, p. 3220). 
 
In Japanese auto parts factories in particular, the dominance of human resource 
tenets, especially views that equated labor as human capital and assets, was so pervasive 
that labor unions in these companies tended to view their work as supporting the 
development of human resource. Starting in the mid-1990s, Thai autoworker unions in 
the Japanese transplants and affiliated factories started to develop cordial partnerships 
with the management, “in favor of the competitiveness of the company and the 
employment conditions” (Wad 2017, p. 53). According to Peter Wad (2017), following 
the Asian financial crisis in 1997, two structural forces appeared to contribute to the 
‘evolution of responsible unions’ in the Japanese automakers: a shift from the domestic 
market focus to an export orientation, and increasingly flexible labor employment in the 
auto and parts makers. In 2008, around 14 percent, or 50,000 out of 350,000 people, were 
subcontract workers in Thai automobile production (Serrano 2014, p. 133, cited by Wad 
2017, p. 48).   
Based on auto production networks and supply chains formed by the Japanese 
transplants, regionally, and by the local Thai suppliers nationally, Thai autoworkers 
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unions had been organized around domestic supply chains (Wad 2017). Recently, there 
has been a reorganization of unions along nationalist as well as political lines. In other 
words, when the Automobile Labor Congress of Thailand (ALCT) organized in Japanese 
plants unions, such as the Toyota Thailand Workers Union, the Denso Thailand Workers 
Union, and the Honda Labor Union, the Federation of Thai Auto Workers (TAW) has 
organized GM Thailand Workers Union, Ford, and Mazda Thailand Workers Unions 
(ibid.). As a side note, Wad (2017) has observed that, “the Japanese auto workers’ unions 
seemed to have shifted sides toward the more royalist-oriented unions including ALCT 
following the accelerating political conflict between Thaksin and anti- Thaksin supporters 
in the second part of the 2000s into the first military coup in 2006-2008 and again in 
2014” (p. 53).  
Human resource development programs have also contribute to reconfiguring the 
technical composition of the working class, as ‘skilled’, ‘semi-skilled’, and ‘unskilled’ 
workers. As a result, the concept of human capital has promoted hierarchy and cleavage 
within the workforce. This has created internal dynamics conducive to the regime of 
labor disciplining through the lean production system. In fact, as will be discussed later in 
this thesis, such disciplining regimes, both inside and outside of the production process, 
has caused frustration and anger among workers, and has led many to seek redress 
through activism. In a sense, the rise of labor militancy in the area has a direct 
relationship with the intensification of labor disciplining in the Eastern Seaboard 
Industrial Estates and in the automotive industry in particular.  
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2.5 The Social Factory and Cycles of Class Struggle  
 Glassman (2004) has documented the roles of American liberalism in 
modernizing Thai labor laws in the post WWII via USAID, the UN, and the ILO (see 
Chapter 3 in particular). As one of the residues from American hegemony, the 1975 
Labor Act represented the changing ways in which international capital and the Thai 
states disciplined the workforce, as well as declining influence of the US in the region 
(Glassman 2004). The 1975 Labor Act has laid the foundation for workers’ collective 
bargaining that the labor unions still benefited.  
As Glassman wittingly observes, “the development of a more complex industrial 
society requires more complex methods of disciplining labor and ensuring not only its 
subservience to capital but the quality of its work performance (2004, p. 87).” By 
complex methods, he refers to the use of labor laws and labor unions as a mechanism to 
control “venues for expression of worker grievances (ibid).” Such change of strategies 
was a way to response to “pent up pressures” that had been accumulated especially from 
the higher cost of living that “added a new dimension to the workers’ difficulties (the 
emphasis is mine; Halm 1973, cited by Glassman (ibid.).” Such enactment of the formal 
labor law ensued the establishment of the minimum wage in 1972, also recommended by 
the US official. In short, the co-optation of organized workers worked alongside the 
creation of labor aristocracy by the American labor movement in Thailand. In other 
words, the Thai economy became a social factory. 
The notion of social factory explains the scope of capital’s control that reaches 
beyond the factory’s realm. In Reading Capital Politically, Cleaver (2000 [1979] loosely 
defines capital as social control, or social factory: “social system based on the imposition 
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of work through the commodity-form” (Cleaver 2000 [1979], 82). According to Peter 
Bell (1978), social factory is a form of capitalist society that encompasses “the entire 
process of social reproduction” involving “all of the social institutions at the disposal of 
the capitalist class (53).” Writing about cycles of class struggle in Thailand between 
1940s-1970s, Bell (1978) highlighted the influences of American imperialism through the 
roles of international institutions such as the World Bank, ‘think-tanks’, and government 
agencies in the development planning—as a response to the working class power. Peter 
Bell was actually inspired by the core premise of Italian Autonomists including Mario 
Tronti, who argues that the capital’s planning has become an important tool for the 
capital to exercise control over the workers. Highly relevant to the central premise of this 
dissertation is Bell (1978)’s emphasis on class struggle as cycle of offensive and defensive 
strategies employed by capital in response to the resistance of the working class, 
particularly their demands for higher wages and less work. 
Domestically, after the 1960s, the rapid urban industrialization had given rise to a 
new cycle of class struggle, what Peter Bell (1978) called a political re-composition of 
the working class, symbolically epitomized by the popular uprising and the triumvirate of 
workers, peasants and students alliances in 1973. Correspondingly, the same capitalist 
development process led to realignment and internal conflicts within the Thai ruling 
class, hence the capital’s counter-offensive in the form of renewed violent repression and 
heightened social control in the 1970s (Bell 1978, p. 66). This cycle appeared to end in 
1980 when the Thai state succeeded to put an end to the political insurgency, by means of 
military and intelligence. With the surrender and return of the insurgents, mostly young 
students, to the city, the head of the counter-insurgency operation, Gen. General Prem 
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Tinsulanonda went on to become the Prime Minister in 1980, and as mentioned already, 
skillfully oversaw the implementation of the Eastern Seaboard Development Plan during 
the transition from the US imperialism to Japanese quasi-hegemony. Interestingly, 
another cycle of class struggle in Thailand was not observed until 1991, when the 
military coup was faced with the popular resistance, this time led by the urban middle-
class instead.  
Meanwhile, over the next two decades, the organized labor movement had found 
themselves even weakened and fragmented further by the new regime of labor 
disciplining—a combination of wage disciplining, antagonism of Japanese corporations, 
global neoliberal order, and diversification of the working class (Glassman 2004, p. 97). I 
believe that what Glassman calls ‘diversification of the working class’, and what Kevin 
Hewison would explain as an emergence of “the new social forces” (Hewison 1996; 
Hewison and Rodan 1994), were two sides of the same process of class re-composition in 
Thailand. It was in this period of transformation that the Thai state mobilized all social 
sectors to reach the goal of becoming so-called Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs). 
One of the results of such policies was that a large section of technician and managerial 
workforce emerged. In Chapter Four and Five, I explore the implications of such the re-
composition further, in the context of technical or ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ class-
recomposition, respectively.   
  Over such the period, the capital as a class was better organized in the forms of 
business associations (Hewison 1996). Moreover, in the Marxist viewpoint, the 
emergence of the Thai middle class reflected the maturation of the capitalist production 
process, which demanded a larger pool of professionals, including managers and shop-
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floor supervisors, and hence the human resources skills (ibid.). It is also worth noting 
that, during this period, most of the working class was not in the formally bounded wage 
work, but rather the unorganized, informal sector (i.e. street venders, cab drivers, 
sweatshop workers and sex workers, etc) (see Bell 1997). In other words, this particular 
cycle of class struggle starting in May 1992, better understood as ongoing process, rather 
than a one-off event, was complicated by the dynamics of maturing capitalist production, 
coupled with the early democratization process30.  
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter provides some background to the development of Thailand’s Eastern 
Seaboard. The Eastern Seaboard Development Plan is an excellent example of what 
geographers call a ‘spatial fix’—a spatial solution to the declining competitiveness faced 
by Thailand. This development was buttressed by a geographical discourse that 
emphasized cluster competitiveness and was crafted in a particular political economic 
conjuncture where important roles were played by groups of Thai elites and bureaucrats, 
who represented competing visions of American and Japanese capitalist development. 
‘Detroit in Thailand’ is a unique product of American liberalism, Japanese production 
models and Thai export-oriented industrialization. The chapter has also discussed the 
distinctive ways in which American and Japanese capital exported and institutionalized 
their ideal types of labor disciplining measures. Through USAID development assistance 
programs, KIAsia in Thailand worked closely with government agencies and Thai 
industrial associations to construct a Thai workforce of ‘disciplined consumers’. As 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  For an extensive analysis of the cycle of class struggle after the 2000s, see Giles J. Ungpakorn’s A Coup for the Rich 
(2007).	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shown in this chapter, despite competition and transition from American to Japanese 
influences, there has been similarity and continuity in terms of free market ideology. By 
contrast, Japanese carmakers emphasized the making of ‘disciplined workers’ through the 
promotion of particular kinds of production and work ethics. These differing objectives 
are crucial to an understanding of the conflicts and struggle that emerged in the two 
major cases studies presented in following chapters.  
Chapter 3. Labor Geographies of Thailand’s Detroit 
: Pineapples and Powertrains 
 
3.1 From Pineapples to Powertrains 
At the entrance to my apartment building,      
a pineapple as tall as a human stood on top of an 
aluminum gate. I only noticed it after I had moved 
in; I was surprised to see the pineapple, sculpted 
to look as if it sprung right out of the concrete 
structure. To the left of the gate was a big hall, decorated in a traditional Chinese style. 
Only when standing inside the hall could one tell it was an ancestral shrine. The spacious 
hall contrasted sharply with the small space of each apartment, evoking ethno-class 
distinctions between the well-to-do Sino-Thai middle-class landlord and her migrant, 
working-class tenants.  
While the shrine symbolized gratitude for wealth, the pineapple sculpture spoke to 
the area’s past abundance, when the land still produced the famous Sriracha pineapple. 
The sale of land, previously filled with pineapples, has allowed many landlords to start 
new businesses under favorable circumstances. Owned currently by the family of a 
Chinese-Thai woman, the plot of land now houses rows of simple buildings which are 
rented by workers who are employed in an hinterland area the Eastern Seaboard where 
Chonburi and Rayong provinces meet.  
Since the late 1990s, the Inland Eastern Seaboard has seen the site of a growing 
number of factories and apartments. In fact, just a few-minutes’ drive from my 
neighborhood to the main highway, lines of pineapples are still grown among the sprawl 
Picture	  3.1 
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of massive factories. Over the past three decades, several farmers and landowners have 
accepted enticing proposals from private developers who have, in turn, transformed the 
green fields into barren landscapes made available for industrial estates. 
 
Close to the Pineapple apartment compound, where I 
stayed during the second half of fieldwork, there was a 
local community. A public school, founded in 1962, 
laid to the south of the apartment compound. There 
were signs that the community around the school had 
expanded, with old, wooden buildings surrounded by many newly constructed 
townhouses (see Picture 3-2.). The buildings’ forms and functions were indicative of the 
differences between locals and outsiders. In other words, the old-fashioned wooden 
houses were mainly residential; by contrast, 
new townhouses were commercial buildings 
where merchants typically rented the ground 
floor for their business, while living on the 
upper floors. These businesses included 
convenience stores, mobile phone shops, or 
food parlors selling everyday necessities to working families. To the west of the 
apartment, there was a police station and a Thai temple that bore the same name as the 
school. In fact, when one uses the topography and natural boundary of hills and 
watershed located next to the temple as the frame of reference, the temple seemed to be at 
the center of the community. However, from an outsider’s perspective, using major 
Picture	  3.2	  
Picture	  3.3 
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highway no. 331 as a reference, the community continually appeared buried in the land 
located next to the industrial town of the Eastern Seaboard Industrial Estates situated in 
the immediate East.  
 Highway no.331 is a major highway that connects Sattahib district, Chonburi with 
Phanom Sarakham district, Chacheungsao Province. This road was previously known as 
a ‘strategic route’ because it was built 
and opened in 1974 as a major route for 
the U.S. to transport weaponry and 
equipment from Sattahib to Air Force 
bases in the Northeast region, a major 
strategic hub for the US military during 
the Vietnam War.31 In the Eastern 
Seaboard, the U.S. built the deep-sea 
port in Sattahib for supply ships and 
installed a sophisticated system of 
communication for military intelligence (Pasuk and Baker 2002, p. 294). Years later, 
instead of military convoys, 10-wheeled trucks and buses now used highway 331 to 
transport auto parts and workers in and out of the Eastern Seaboard region. Thus, the 
same road that transported American weaponry to Northeast Thailand now brought fresh 
labor back from the Northeast to the Eastern Seaboard. Ironically, some of those workers 
would go to work on the assembly lines of American car companies.	   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  During the Indo-Chinese war, the U.S. used Thailand as a main strategic post for anti-communism missions in 
Southeast Asia. In return, the U.S. funded the construction of road networks, especially from Bangkok to the Northeast 
region, which the Thai state would use to access the hideouts of Thai communists and conduct sweeps through 
sympathizers’ ‘pink’ villages. Moreover, the U.S. offered material, financial, and technical support to the Thai army 
and police, which the Thai dictatorial regime also exploited to suppress political dissidents.	  
Map	  3.1 
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I opened this chapter with an excerpt from my field notes, to provide a contrast 
with the story of the 2011 Thai floods published in The Economist mentioned in the 
preceding chapter. With its main concern being the accumulation travails of Thailand’s 
automotive industry, the narrative in The Economist adopted a top-down perspective of 
capital and the state. The problems experienced by workers were largely absent. Such a 
perspective reinforces the abstraction of production and social relations from the voices 
and accounts of material changes concretely experienced by local communities. In 
contrast to this abstracted top-down and birds-eye view, I began this chapter with a 
bottom-up perspective—in this case, my own—which takes the micro geography of a 
community as a point of departure. I believe that such a micro-geography of the 
community offers a window through which we can understand larger processes of change 
that have occurred in the Eastern Seaboard region. Moreover, it seeks to set the tone for 
the rest of the chapter, which aims to highlight the central role of community in 
mediating the agency of labor, vis-a-vis capital and the state, through the process of the 
social reproduction of labor power.  
Chapter Two introduces the concept of social factory, which explains the process 
of development planning in Thai society as well as the state’s central roles. Actually, the 
Thai state is not the only actor in this development planning, what Tronti calls 
rationalization process. This chapter highlights the roles of other players, especially local 
state agencies and labor unions on the local scale. Further, it introduces the concept of 
social capital, which elucidates the way in which individual capitals represent the 
collective capital on the class terms. The social capital is essential to connect the macro 
analysis in the previous chapter with the micro and meso ones in this chapter through the 
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process of labor-power socialization (i.e. production process) and workers subjectivity 
(i.e. work process and capitalist social relations). This chapter shows how state agencies, 
private developers, foreign and national capitals, and local politicians form a coalition 
that facilitates interests of their social capital. Moreover, they do so by turning a science 
of human resources into practices and cultivate division among workers. 
 
3.2 Industrial and Labor Geography in Thailand’s Detroit 
One early morning in the midst of Bangkok’s financial district, a group of Asian 
foreigners were excitingly stepping on a bus, one by one, with small backpacks on their 
shoulders. For a passerby or street vendor familiar with the area, the group could just be 
ordinary business tourists who, after long and tense days of business meetings, were 
embarking on a casual day trip to one of the famous beaches located on the coast of the 
Gulf of Thailand. As it was an early Sunday morning, the bus cruised through the light 
traffic of the capital to the highway, heading eastbound. 
The eight-lane highway has been open since the end of 1990s and forms part of a 
larger infrastructure network of the Eastern Seaboard region, now a major platform that 
connects the Thai economy to regional and global markets (Hill and Fujita 2012; Mieno 
2013). The highway connects two major ports, an International Airport, and several 
Industrial Estates to the nation’s capital within a radius of 100 miles.  
 
 
 
 
	   86	  
After fewer than 30 minutes on the road, the scenery gradually changes from high 
rises to big-gated houses, small warehouse buildings, and, finally, patches of green. 
Along the route, inserted between spaces are commercial billboards, one of which reads, 
somewhat ironically, ‘Green Industrial 
Park’. As this was not my first trip to 
the Eastern Seaboard area, I was 
accustomed to the contrasting 
character of the place. In fact, having 
already been involved in field research 
for a few months, I had been tasked to act as a tour guide for the group. My ‘clients’ 
comprised a gathering of Asian labor unionists, labor right-organization activists, and 
workers. The group convened biannually to discuss future plans for their network as well 
exchange information and ideas about the situation of labor rights in the region. In 2016, 
they organized a conference in Bangkok and a solidarity visit to a labor group in 
Thailand’s Eastern Seaboard, one of the most vibrant regions in Thailand in terms of 
labor activism.  
 When the Asian NGOs activists 
and workers arrived at the Eastern 
Seaboard industrial estates, the tall 
chimneys from one of the local steel plants 
welcomed them. Situated by highway 331, 
Picture	  3-­‐4 
Picture	  3-­‐5 
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the plant, with a production capacity of 800,000 tons of steel per year, cannot be missed. 
Owned by one of the world biggest steelmaking companies, this plant was the first steel 
plant in Southeast Asia that produced hot metal from iron ore. To many, the view of the 
chimneys represents the symbolic entrance to one of the Thailand’s most industrialized 
areas. It has a dual impact, as it stands across from the giant sign of the Eastern Seaboard 
Industrial Estates, which lists the automobile and part makers located inside the estates. 
The list is long and is intimidating rather than informing: one cannot finish reading the 
list, despite the sluggish rush hour traffic (see Picture 3.7).  
 	  
Picture	  3.6	  and	  3.7	  
	   88	  
From the sign, it was another six miles before we actually arrived at the industrial 
estates. One and a half miles before we arrived, signs indicating the internationalized 
character of the area began to appear: a high-end service apartment with a gym and 
swimming pool, a stylish coffee shop, a Japanese restaurant, and Italian restaurant. 
Before we passed the entrance, marked by a security booth and roadblock, I did not 
forget to tell my guests to notice the giant sign: ‘Welcome to Eastern Seaboard Industrial 
Estate’. Below it, in even larger emphatic letters, the sign read “the Detroit of the East.”32  
The name elicited both laughter and awe. 
    	  
Picture	  3.8	  and	  3.9	  
    
Once we passed through the security gate, everything inside the industrial estate 
looked otherworldly, clean, and orderly. In fact, its physicality was instrumental to 
opening up discussion about movement and control within the place. For example, some 
activists asked questions about surveillance and labor control from the estate itself. The 
visit also prompted comparative accounts of local situations witnessed or experienced by 
participants in their own contexts. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  While some analysts speculated that the phrase was coined by Thaksin Shinnawatra, it is more likely that David 
Nardone, the CEO of Hemaraj Land and Development, was the one who invented it.	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3.3 Eastern Seaboard Industrial Estates as Space of Labor Control  
 
Most multinational carmakers are concentrated in and around the Detroit of the 
East, as industrial estates in the area accommodate 165 multinational companies, 
including nine of the world’s top ten. It resembles an industrial town (Hill and Fujita 
2012). This is where global and regional players interact with the local labor control 
regimes, admixtures of local developers, state development agencies, local politicians, 
and security officers, not to mention workers and local inhabitants. 
State agencies and private developers have actually relied on local networks of 
political leadership in the development and operation processes of the estates (Shatkin 
2004; Hill and Fujita 2012). Decentralization plan promoted by the Thai state has offered 
local bosses with new political and economic gains related to infrastructure and industrial 
estate development (Sombat 2000; Shatkin 2004). Comparing Southeast Asia with the 
U.S., Shatkin (2004) highlights a set of features in the Southeast Asian context: the 
national government’s active roles in deepening the globalization in the local economy as 
well as local political leaders’ presence in development processes (p. 15). Moreover, 
Sombat (2000) discusses local politicians’ roles in the Eastern Seaboard by facilitating 
the consolidation of land for the development of real estate and industrial estates. In fact, 
apart from mobilizing resources, such as land and labor, leading political leaders have 
also played a vital role in suppressing local resistance and labor militancy (see also Sidel 
1998).  
In a study conducted at a factory in the Eastern Seaboard Industrial Estates 
(ESIEs), Hill and Fujita (2012) further observe that a multinational corporation has 
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actively participated in the conceptualization of the ESIEs in Rayong by working closely 
with the Industrial Estates Authority of Thailand. This close collaboration among state 
agencies, private developers and foreign companies accordingly raises issues of their 
shared interests and exclusion of workers.  
Due to their relative physical 
proximity and centralized governance in the 
ESIEs, companies coordinated and shared 
their information concerning industrial 
relations through Human Resource Clubs 
(known as HR Clubs). According to workers, local HR Clubs played an active role in 
facilitating a local regime of labor control by working closely with local government 
officials, including the labor officers, judges, and security officers.33       
In the ESIEs, estate developers organized training centers, human resource 
departments, and social clubs within their spaces. The HR Clubs dealt with both 
conventional and non-conventional human resource issues, including labor organizing 
and union activities. In fact, developers, not the carmakers, promoted the formation of 
HR Clubs. In 2010, the land and industrial estate developer organized the Roundtable on 
Labor Management at a local golf course and resort, which then became a regular venue 
for meetings. Over time, activists came to view the resort as ‘the headquarters of the HR 
Clubs.’ The agenda of the first Roundtable included analyses of the local industrial 
relations situation, updating information about labor laws and regulations, lessons-learnt 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Personal interviews	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  3.10 
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from the effective labor relations management, and a session on the establishment of the 
Employers Association in the ESIEs. Speakers included executives from the human 
resource department of an American carmaker, from Japanese carmakers and suppliers, 
local officials from the Labor Department, Labor Court, and private law consultants. This 
Roundtable actually set a precedent for the agendas and forms of seminars that would 
subsequently be organized by the HR Clubs, focusing on information sharing about labor 
unions’ strategies and tactics, as well as ‘best practices’ in terms of management’s 
responses. Moreover, HR Clubs became known for sharing information and ideas about 
three major issues: collaboration with local officers, strategic responses to labor unions’ 
militant strategies, and negotiation techniques used during collective bargaining. A 
document from the first Roundtable contained presentation slides titled ‘Labor Dispute 
Prevention and Resolution Measures for Factories in Rayong,’ prepared and presented by 
a local police chief. The presentation was in English and Thai, and it was likely that staff 
of the industrial estate developer had translated the presentation beforehand. Below is an 
excerpt from the presentation, exactly as it was written. 
“Measures for Employers  
Step 1: Employers’ measures (prior to police operation): 
1. Organize regular meetings and trainings to inform (workers about) company rules 
and regulations, labor laws and as well as information about wages, compensation 
and benefits  
2. Set up regular meetings to share information and exchange ideas (with workers) 
3. Inform the local police immediately if the employer is to reduce wages, 
compensation or benefits so the proper preparation and coordination steps can 
take place. 
4. Have in place the CCTV system to enable the monitoring and recording of 
occurrences inside and outside of their facilities  
5. Set up a security guard team and assign a team leader to oversee the situation as 
well as to coordinate with and assist the police as necessary. 
6. Set up a central command center to facilitate the monitoring of the situation. 
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Steps 2: Employers’ measures (during police operation) 
1. Inform the police in their area immediately in case of disruptive events. 
2. Set up a team to remedy the situation. The team should consist of a legal counsel 
or representative from Legal department, a negotiator with decision making 
authority and a coordinator to work with the police. 
3. Check the status and background of the worker and those joining the rally 
4. Set up a central command center to closely monitor the situation 
5. Summarize the background of the demands, leaders, demands and conditions, 
behaviors 
6. If there is the blockade of the entrances and exits of the facilities or roads and 
disturbs the general public, the company must assign a legal counsel and provide 
supporting documents and coordinate file a petition to the court 
 
Step 3: Employers’ measures (following police operation): 
1. Provide evidence and supporting information 
2. Provide a team of non-uniformed police officers or a mobile team to monitor the 
situation more closely on the ground 
3. Conduct a preliminary assessment of loss or damage in case there is a loss or 
damage to property as a result of the rally… 
 
The document also specified the steps to be taken by police officers, and relevant 
laws that striking workers might violate. It is worth noting that there was no advice to 
workers suggested by the local police chief. The purpose of this presentation was to 
prepare employers for the actions taken by labor unions and activists, but similar 
assistance was not given to workers. It is clear from the presentation that advice and 
support was framed in the language of warfare and strategies, where employers and 
police officers viewed workers and their labor unions as enemies. In other words, labor 
unions’ actions were viewed as disruptive and criminal, regardless of legality of their 
actions. 
HR Clubs were routinely run by a committee consisting of delegates from human 
resource departments of the major companies. Since 2015, the HR Clubs have used social 
media to publicize their activities, illustrating that local labor officers and human 
resources personnel from the companies regularly met and discussed labor dispute cases. 
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The close collaboration often translated into a salient form of pro-business partnership, 
which sometimes included labor unions’ executive committee members from major 
companies as well. 
At one seminar on labor relations organized jointly by the local labor office and a 
few big labor unions, a high-ranking labor bureaucrat opened the seminar by stating: 
Now we might not be aware, but our government is restructuring the economy of our 
country. Therefore, I would like our activities to be constructive and conducive to the 
direction and ideas… I don’t want to say, to the government’s guidelines. But we need to 
look at the big economic picture, which is the global economy, how it impacts work, 
employment, national economy as well as economic prospects of Rayong province. Here, 
the Prime Minister states clearly that everyone needs to walk together toward change. 
For the provincial office, we have a lot of strategies on that. But for all of us, we (read: 
workers who participated) may be a small jigsaw and might not see the big picture. If we 
learn, and try to understand, that we are not simply in a small society of our workplace, 
for example, we are meeting our friends here who have different ideas and ways of doing 
things. Anyway, we are all under the currents of this change, and as we are like a partner 
that the plant cannot do without. At the same time the plant cannot do without us either. I 
would like us to really think about this, and pay attention to the direction that national 
economy is going34 
   
 In this seminar, the trainers were mostly executive committee members of labor 
unions from major Japanese car-markers and auto-part suppliers. The key messages were 
concerned with what one would call ‘industrial relations peace.’ Therefore, apart from the 
HR Clubs and local labor officers, some labor unionists, especially those from major 
carmaker companies/factories, have increasingly played an active role in mainstreaming 
the notion of industrial peace and eschewing labor activism.  
 
Social Capital and Collective Capital 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  I transcribed this speech from an audio recorded and given by a worker. 
	   94	  
The notion of social capital helps us understand the roles of state agencies, private 
developers, carmakers and suppliers as well as the HR Clubs in the larger process of 
normalizing social control. Among the concepts proposed and developed by Italian 
Autonomist writers, nevertheless, social capital is perhaps one the most ambiguous. 
Although it is closely linked to the concept of social factory, when writers such as Mario 
Tronti wrote about social capital, they put much more emphasis on the movement of 
capital and value in cyclical process of capitalist production. In one of his seminal work, 
Workers and Capital (Operai e Capitale), for instance, in a chapter titled “social capital” 
Mario Tronti never defines what social capital really means. Nevertheless, Tronti 
suggests that individual capitals in the society transform into only “a part of the total 
movement of social capital (1973, p. 98).” Further, he wrote, “(h)ere, social capital is not 
just the total capital of society: it is not the simple sum of individual capitals. It is the 
whole process of socialization of capitalist production: it is capital itself that becomes 
uncovered, at a certain level of its development, as social power (original emphasis; 
p.105).  
By “socialization of capitalist production,” Tronti means social organization of 
capitalist production. As a result, individual capitalist is personification of the capitalist 
social relations, in the sense that, although behaving in accordance to personal interests, 
he/she always acts at the behest of the capital—as a social class. In other words, 
individual capitals become managers of the social capital, as a collective, and its wealth a 
part of the social wealth (1973, p. 109). Moreover, and it is through this process of 
socialization that materially necessitates ‘a rational organization of society’ (ibid.)—
when the whole society turns into a social factory. 
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Tronti’s and Autonomia’s work, as a group, resonate with the experiences of Thai 
workers for several reasons. First, the Autonomia developed their theories on the actual 
experiences of Italian workers, themselves internal migrants who moved from the pre-
industrial South to the industrializing Northern Italy. Albeit from different times and 
places, these two groups of internal migrants and waged workers were similarly 
grappling with intensification of work, increasingly antagonizing class relations, as well 
as bureaucratization of the labor unions. Like Thai workers, the Italian counterparts came 
from pre-industrial and rural backgrounds, and thus were not familiar with the tradition of 
labor’s workplace activism. Moreover, they also subjected to work process and work 
intensification in the car factories like the Thai workers.  
In the next section, I describe the industrial landscape as well as the labor 
geographies in and around the Eastern Seaboard Industrial Estates. I discuss the 
transformation of place through personal and familial stories, emphasizing how workers 
do not simply passively respond to structures and forces imposed from the outside. In 
following sections, the discussion will focus on the ways that the industrial estates have 
become sites where the companies deploy human resources as a mechanism for labor 
disciplining.  
 
3.4 Transformation of Eastern Seaboard hinterland  
As indicated in the previous sections, multiple forces and processes combine to 
structure the lives and labor of industrial workers in the eastern seaboard area. The 
industrial estates are filled with multinational corporations, mostly American and 
Japanese, whose headquarters are situated outside Thailand, as well as with joint venture 
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companies. These multinational corporations operate on a global scale, coordinating with 
branches and suppliers located across several regions and time zones and regulated by 
different sets of national and international laws. The economic and political structure that 
shapes the relations of production is thus multi-scalar by nature. However, from workers’ 
experiential perspective, their lives and labor are embedded in the local scale. In the 
following section, I turn to the local, so as to focus on the personal and familial histories 
of workers and the people who live around the Eastern Seaboard inland area. Through 
field research conducted in the area between 2015 and 2016, I participated in strategic 
meetings, social activities, as well as the daily lives of Thai union activists involved in 
the Eastern Labor Relations Group (ELRG). At the time, ELRG consisted of around fifty 
male-dominated trade unions from automobile and auto-parts manufacturing. With a few 
exceptions, men accounted for the majority of union executive committees and were 
disproportionately represented amongst the leadership.  I start with the story of Virachai, 
a worker from Surin in his early fifties who was the president of a labor union in a 
Japanese parts supplier, because of the vivid memories he has about the area. 
3.4.1 Virachai, a union veteran and amateur boxer 
Virachai (pseudonym) was sitting in a pickup, looking out the window. His 
driver, Pong, who owned the pickup truck, was several years younger. They both came 
from the same village in the Surin province, locatedon the southern border of the 
Northeast, or Isan, region. Virachai worked at a local factory producing electronic 
equipment for a Japanese company. He had finished his night shift a couple of hours 
earlier; however, he was willing to forgo some sleeping time and came with Pong to the 
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Labor Protection and Welfare Office in Rayong. It was an exciting day for Pong as he 
was going to register his labor union today. 
When Virachai first came to the area in 1995, it was mostly covered by thick 
trees. As he recalls, it was still a two-lane, red dirt road, where cars only occasionally 
passed. Local modes of transportation were limited; the only regular transport was the 
songthaew – a red pickup equipped with two rows of seats – running between Pluak 
Daeng district and Siracha town in Chonburi. There were not many factories, so food and 
other services were hard to find. When he first opened a bank account for his paycheck, 
he had to take the songthaew to Sriracha, 10 miles away.  
Looking out the window now, Virachai reflected on changes the area now so 
crowded with vehicles – personal cars, company buses, private vans, and container-
loaded trucks. It was now easier to travel around. There were two major companies that 
operated passenger vans which ran every half an hour between Bowin/Pluak Daeng and 
Bangkok.  
Back then, it depended on your luck. If you were lucky, you got a job right away. For 
some people, it took a month or two. Isan people came with a sack of rice from home, just 
like that. In a year time, they might finish the rice, and still didn’t find a job.  
 
One of the first buildings he remembered was at Pak Ruam intersection, where a 
fresh market and a modern gated village had opened in 1996. There was a fair on the 
weekends, during which Virachai and friends went to see boxing matches. Although he 
and his pals generally liked to go fishing in one of those reservoirs in the area, he boxed a 
couple of times and made some pocket money. Due to the hinterland’s geography, many 
workers fished at one of many reservoirs that had been built for irrigation purposes. For 
Virachai and his northeastern comrades, fishing was a pastime activity associated with an 
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Isan way of life; they fished for food at home. Now fishing was one of the only ways 
workers could interact with nature after long hours of work inside the enclosed factory. In 
his early thirties and still single, also Pong fished almost every weekend.  
we all went fishing together on the weekends. We went to the green, harvested vegetable, 
and dug for mice. These are common food for Isan people, in the water, we caught fishes, 
in the jungle, vegetable, mice and bamboo shoots. 
 
[today] I still go fishing sometimes. But it is different today, hard to get any fish. It used 
to have a lot of fishes, and I only needed a fishing rod, some time with no bait even. You 
threw it in and you got a fish. Some time I sat there for a couple of hours, and I got four 
to five kilos of fishes. I remember that no one fished back then. I would give them away to 
my friends at the apartments. We shared what we got, that was the Isan way. In Surin, 
our neighbors had something to eat everyday. Now it had all changed. 
 
Pong and Virachai used to work in the same factory. Pong was working at a new 
factory that produced hardware and cutting tools for a global Japanese brand in the Pin 
Thong industrial estate. His current employer used a lot of subcontracted workers and did 
not treat them well. Having known that Virachai was involved in forming the union in the 
workplace, Pong contacted Virachai and discussed forming a union with colleagues in his 
new workplace. To assist, Virachai introduced Pong to the Eastern Labor Relations 
Group (ELRG). 
 Virachai was one of the first ‘pioneers’ who came to the area when there was 
only one industrial estate. Without direct public transport at the time, he came from his 
hometown in Surin on a motorcycle. Now with a regular paycheck and currently 
available consumer credit programs, Virachai, like Pong and other workers, had an 
opportunity to own a pickup truck. Virachai could also afford to rent a bigger place, 
where he shared one room with his wife and the living space with a friend who stayed in 
another room. When he first arrived, Virachai stayed in a small room with seven other 
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workers, all single men from the same hometown. Two shifts of four men would take 
turns using the mattresses during the day and night.  
Sometimes, a lot of people stayed together; within a month we could finish rice. So 
someone needed to go back home and get a new sack. 
   
In the past, the apartment-sharing arrangement was a common way to save on rent 
expenses for most workers. Additionally, the rice supply from home was a way that the 
family or community could support migration. Rham, another worker who was also the 
president of a union in a multinational tire maker, told me that when he first came to the 
area, he was surprised by the scarcity of food and apartment options, as well as the high 
costs of living. He came to the area almost 10 years after Virachai, but it was still not 
easy to find a place to eat and to stay. When he finally found an apartment, the rent was 
too high and he could not afford to rent it alone. Finally, another worker whom he did not 
know offered to share a room with him. Rham himself did not come from the Northeast 
Thailand, but Samut Prakarn, an industrial province located close to Bangkok. Rham 
came alone to the Eastern Seaboard because he knew the local factories usually shunned 
locals and preferred outsiders.  
Virachai was a trained welder, so he had skills that were always needed in the 
area. In the mid-1990s, he changed jobs a few times, mostly following his pals who told 
him about better opportunities. This occurred before the economy was hardest hit by the 
1997 financial crisis. After the crisis hit, Virachai went back home to “grow rice (tham 
na)” for two years, before coming back to the Eastern Seaboard. Despite the slump in 
domestic demands, Japanese assemblers and parts makers somehow used their 
international positions to trim the lost and managed to export even more cars (Busser 
2008). The post-crisis recovery of Thai economy was driven first by exports, which made 
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up almost 70 percent of the GDP, and second by FDI that increased 10 times in the post-
crisis period (Ghazani et al. 2011).  
Beginning in 1990, when facilities in the Eastern Seaboard Development Plan 
began their operation, manufacturing sectors in the two provinces started to expand. 
Between 1995 and 1999, the borders area of Chonburi-Rayong provinces, Bowin and 
Pluak Daeng districts, where Virachai came to find work, received a lot of BOI-approved 
investment, at the expense of the coastal area (Mieno 2013).  
Within these larger transformations in the Eastern Seaboard, the experiences of 
migrant workers from the Northeast, such as that of Virachai, Pong, and Rham, remain 
largely undocumented. To highlight the changes in historical geography experienced by 
both migrants and locals, here I offer accounts of my interview with a local woman and 
her husband. The woman, Ann (pseudonym), was born and raised in the area, and when I 
met her, she was working at a construction company, the family business, as an 
accountant. I chose her personal account principally because her family history is deeply 
intertwined with the locale’s transformation. For example, her maternal grandfather went 
from farming to the apartment business, while her mother took several service jobs that 
catered to workers. Growing alongside the local economic growth, she and her sibling 
even experimented with an outsourcing business, which supplied temporary and 
subcontract workers to factories in the ESIEs. Moreover, she subsequently married an 
engineer from Bangkok, who had been working for more than 10 years at one of the 
biggest carmakers, a joint venture of Japanese and American multinationals. I was 
introduced to her through someone I met at a local environmental NGOs meeting I 
attended with a worker from the ELRG.  
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3.4.2 Understanding the transformation of geography  
Ann was born and raised in Bowin. She left for Bangkok when she was seven 
years old and returned at seventeen. I interviewed her at a local construction company 
located by highway 331. As noted above, she worked as an accountant for the company, 
owned by her uncle. Most of the company’s work was from public construction 
concessions for which the company tendered.   
For Ann, childhood was a time of freedom and happiness. She recalled her 
grandfather’s house at the footstep of a hill, surrounded by pineapple, cassava, and rice 
crops. She would go swimming in a small stream that coursed behind the house. In 1996, 
when she was twelve, the inauguration of the Eastern Seaboard Development Plan 
changed her family’s path. Her dad, a civil engineer who worked in Bangkok, was 
involved with the construction of the Hemeraj Bowin Industrial Estate, the first in the 
Bowin area. Five years later, when she was seventeen, Ann’s grandfather sold his land, 
moved closer to the highway, and used the money from the sale as a seed fund for his 
children to start their business. The maternal uncle started a construction business with a 
few trucks that factories hired for landfilling. According to Ann, her grandfather shifted 
from growing cassava and pineapple to “growing apartment buildings (pluuk hor pak)” to 
house the influx of workers. During this time, she also remembers that three other 
industrial estates suddenly appeared like mushrooms in the area: Eastern Seaboard, 
Amata City, and Siam Eastern Industrial Estates.  
Ann’s grandfather exemplified stories of many locals whose wealth came from 
the sales of land to developers. Although it was a familiar story to locals, the sales did not 
always ensue long-lasting wealth. During my research, I had a chance to talk to another 
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local business owner who explained that selling land did not necessarily benefit locals, 
especially the future prospects of their families. Traditionally, when the locals sold their 
land, they divided the money equally between their children. The owners of the land 
would use a part of the fund to buy a plot of land further away from the industrial estates, 
say, for small farming. According to this informant, money that easily comes easily goes. 
This is because the younger generation tends to use up the money in a short period, 
sometimes through gambling or drinking. They then become dependent on the older 
generation, who struggles to make ends meet selling produce in unstable agricultural 
markets. For these reasons, the arrival of industrial estates and real estate developments 
were not always beneficial to locals. This informant was lucky that his older sister used 
the money from the land to invest in real estate. The Golden Sea Plaza Project, which she 
owned, was a location for a local market, night food market, and commercial buildings. 
While I was dining with this informant at the night market for the interview, he pointed to 
a building, and then another building with large billboard displaying a brand for ball 
bearings. 
We just sold those two buildings next to the 7-11 to an office for ball bearings sales, so I 
moved my coffee shop to my own house. 
 
He had an ice factory at the night food market, near the Paak Ruam intersection. 
Coming along highway 331 from Ann’s construction firm past the entrance to the Eastern 
Seaboard industrial estate, the Golden Sea Plaza night food market is located on the left. 
With Amata City and Eastern Seaboard industrial estates to the South and Southeast, two 
major golf courses in the West, and one in the East, it occupied a central location where 
people were always seen eating at one of the street-food sellers. The food vendors paid 
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fees to the landlord to use the space. The night food market area was also known for its 
bawdy nightlife, where late night passersby find sex workers standing outside one of the 
massage parlors waiting for customers cruising by.  
3.4.3 The factories needed workers more than the workers needed them 
After Ann finished junior high school in Bangkok, she moved back to the area 
and continued her studies at the local college. At the time, Ann’s mother ran a small 
grocery in front of the grandfather’s apartment building. Sales were not great because 
there were not enough customers. Later, following advice from relatives, Ann’s mother 
turned to selling food for workers inside factories in the Industrial Estates. However, due 
to her mother’s health problems, Ann decided to leave school and help her fulltime. For 
many years, Ann and her mother sold food to workers in several factories. They generally 
woke up at three o’clock in the morning to prepare ingredients for three meals and came 
back home after nine o’clock in the evening. 
Catering was still profitable, because gasoline, cooking gas, and eggs were not as 
expensive. The factories also had lots of money to subsidize workers. We would cook for 
three meals. For the night shift, the workers would come and order food when they 
arrive. Around 8 or 9 pm, we would prepare the ordered food and tag their names, so 
they would come to eat around midnight, but we would pack our stuff and leave around 9 
pm. 
 
Back then, there was high demand for workers, so the factories had to please them. The 
factories really listened to the workers, not us, whatever the workers wanted. Every 
couple of years, we would move to a new factory, because workers got bored of our food. 
 
The unions did not yet exist; I didn’t hear about it until Ford and Mazda (AAT) workers 
protested. In the first years, they would walk out and shut down the whole industrial 
estate. Around this time, you would hear a lot about unions. The following year, GM 
workers also protested, demanding for more bonuses. I think it was around 2005-2006. 
When they had the union at Somboon, nothing really changed for us, except for a new 
guy who would really swagger and tell us about our food cleanliness. Before that, we 
only dealt with the management. 
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 This routine went on for eight years until both of them felt that the lifestyle was 
taking a toll on their health. Around 2012, the mother opened her own food business at 
home instead. Owing to the house’s location, and the growing population, her business 
attracted a large clientele. However, she was eventually too sick to work. During this 
period, Ann worked alongside her mother, making it possible for her younger brother to 
finish his studies.  Although the younger brother originally wanted to study logistics, he 
chose to be a civil engineer, as suggested by his uncle who sponsored his education. 
From 2012 to 2013, Ann and her cousin began a new business. Because of her familiarity 
with how things worked in the factories, Ann saw an opportunity in the labor demands of 
the factories as well as their urge to avoid unions. She and her cousin opened an office to 
supply temporary and subcontract workers to the factories. 
The local factories needed workers, but labor unions got in the way. At one point, we had 
300-400 workers. We supplied workers for big companies such as M (a Taiwanese tire 
factory), N (a Japanese parts factory), and small parts factories that would say that they 
need hands for packaging for a few weeks. 
There were hundreds of suppliers like this. We would send someone to one of those 
recruit centers at Paak Ruam intersection. We would approach and tell workers who 
cannot find a job about the work. The other place is the internship program at vocational 
schools. The students would get the same amount of payment, but these students are high 
maintenance because we need to take care of the buses for them. But they work really 
hard, and they are disciplined to finish the course, especially those from the other 
provinces. Anyway, we didn’t make much profit, because we didn’t want to exploit 
working people. But we used to get a lot of applications, because they knew we didn’t 
deduct much commission from them. We just didn’t want to continue like that. 
After a while, both Ann and her cousin realized that they would feel more 
comfortable conducting business with customers in the traditional sense.  
We finally quit because it was living off the backs of the workers (tham na bon lang khon: 
growing paddy on a person’s back). I felt really bad because it was not fair to them. 
Maybe I did not have desire to make a fortune by such means. Normally, the factories 
would share 27% of commission with us, but that was not feasible, with all the tax and 
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social security burdens. We just could not make it. Other people can do it, because they 
give out loans with high interest to workers. They would charge the workers twice for the 
uniforms, or deduct half of the shift payment. You could make it, if you are willing to do 
all of this. 
Ann’s male cousin was running a car-care business at the time that provided 
cleaning and maintenance services. This was business that appeared suited for the society 
that saw expansion in the wealth and rising middle class. In 2000, Thailand was 
reportedly “going car crazy” when domestic sales tripled 1989 sales reaching 571,580 
units (Wards Auto 2000). However, this number paled when compared to the historic 
peak car sales in 2012, when sales more than doubled the 2000 ‘crazy’ rate, reaching 
1,436,335 units (Headlight Mag 2017).35 The main factor driving this rapid growth was 
the consumer subsidy program introduced by the Thaksin administration.  
In 2011, the World Bank upgraded Thailand from ‘lower middle income’ to 
‘upper middle income’ status, with the country’s gross national income per capita almost 
doubled (World Bank 2011).36 Thailand has recently become one of the world’s most 
unequal countries37. The Bangkok Metropolitan and Eastern regions were the richest in 
terms of gross regional product, while Rayong, Bangkok, and Chonburi were the three 
richest provinces, respectively, in terms of gross provincial product (NESBD 2013). 
Interestingly, on a national level, the number of deadly road accident was highest in 
Rayong, while Chonburi and Chacheungsao, the other two provinces in the Eastern 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  http://www.headlightmag.com/sales-report-december-2016/	  
36	  Thailand now an upper middle-income economy, World Bank (August 2, 2011).	  
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2011/08/02/thailand-now-upper-middle-income-economy	  
37	  Thailand third most unequal country in the world, Bangkok Post (Nov 29, 2016). 
https://www.bangkokpost.com/learning/advanced/1147468/thailand-third-most-unequal-country-in-world	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Seaboard, ranked fifth and sixth.38 This was attributed to both the quality and size of the 
roads and the growing number of cars and motorcycles in these provinces. 
 
3.4.4 Workers as both customer and producer 
The arrival of the ESIEs had given opportunities to locals like Ann to become 
involved in business related to supply and upkeep of workers. As noted above, Ann built 
two side businesses, one related to construction and the other catered directly to workers’ 
sustenance. Apart from scaffolding she rented to local factories, Ann also invested in 
building an indoor soccer field near her own house. As she expressed during her 
interview, she preferred to treat workers as customers, rather than simply an input 
provided to factories. Over the past few years, indoor soccer fields have become a 
popular business because soccer is very popular among Thai men. It becomes a side 
business that Ann wants her husband, Ek, to take over in the future. Ek was born and 
raised in Bangkok. He trained as a mechanical engineer and worked for 12 years at one of 
the biggest car assemblers in the area. Like other managerial or white-collar workers 
from outside, Ek stayed near the urban center of Chonburi and commuted daily to the 
Eastern Seaboard.  
From Ann’s perspective, Bowin and the Pluak Daeng area used to be places of 
temporary stay, but not any more. The fact that her husband, who used to be in Bang 
Saen, a local beach town thirty miles away, now settled in the area testified this shift.  
In the past, it was like a gateway town. It was a place where people stopped by, people 
who were looking for a job. It was like a rest stop, before they left for somewhere else 
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  Isra News 2015 (https://www.isranews.org/isranews-scoop/39304-isranews_39304.html)	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again. Some people worked here for a year or two, when they had more money, they 
bought a house in the gated village and they move away. 
Right now, you only meet the locals when there is an ordain or merit making event, but 
we hardly talk. Personally, I don’t like it because development comes with danger. In the 
past, you were not afraid of theft. When I was seventeen, there was a burglary at my 
grandma’s house, so I thought to myself why it happened. I went to a market once, and I 
saw someone was taking a woman’s necklace, so I am afraid. We have four-lane street, 
and the land price hikes. When my grandpa bought the land, it was a few hundred 
thousand baht per rai (0.6 hectare), now it costs fourteen million. There was no car in the 
past, nowadays when my son bikes just outside of the house, I am worried. I think there 
are a lot of downsides. I’d like the old way better. Now when I give my son a ride to 
school, it takes an hour. We used to take five minute to Pak Ruam, now we need more 
time. It is worse than Bangkok. Traffic jam in Bangkok is not like this. 
 
As a result of this transformation, the simple life Ann experienced in her childhood was 
lost. Now the area was filled with strangers and outsiders, and Ann only saw risk and 
danger. 
The traffic jam is like in Bangkok, and there are many accidents, that happen daily.  
Once two company buses crashed right in front of my house, and we saw big fire. 
Driving in Bangkok is easier. I feel better when I go to Bangkok. We bought two 
apartments in Bangkok, and my mom was surprised. Everyone else wants to buy a house 
outside Bangkok, in Khao Yao or Hua Hin. But I bought two condos on the outskirt of 
Bangkok, where there is a skytrain station nearby. 
It doesn’t look anything like before; it looks more like Map Ta Phut, surrounded by 
industrial estates. If you didn’t grow up here, you wouldn’t know what it was like before. 
We are going to have eight-lane street soon, how are we going to make a u-turn, I don’t 
know. 
  
In 2010, Ann was involved in a local campaign against the construction of industrial 
waste dumps in the neighborhood. It was then that she realized that in the three villages 
where she was involved, three hundred residents out of a total of five hundred came from 
elsewhere. The local environmental group led by her uncle had been very active in 
monitoring the environmental and health impacts not only from industrial waste, but also 
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the processes of industrialization as a whole. Because of this environmental activism, 
Ann’s younger uncle had to move to a nearby province for security reasons. To Ann, like 
a lot of locals, industrialization brought about livelihood and material gains, especially 
because of the arrival of outsiders. However, no longer did the opportunities and potential 
gains outweigh the intrusive impacts, environmental and social, of industrialization.  
I interviewed Ann at her office on one afternoon, before she had to pick up her 
son from school, which is located less than 10 miles away. At the school her son 
attended, most of parents were outsiders who came looking for work in the area.  Around 
a week later, I met with her husband at their house in the evening. We had a conversation 
in the living room, where Ann, her mother, and their three-year-old son were also there. 
The interview was often interrupted by questions from the boy, who was playing with a 
toy helicopter. 
Ek: the [Eastern Seaboard] Industrial Estate grows a lot. Two or three years ago, the 
traffic jam was critical that people couldn’t make it to work on time. This problem led to 
companies overlapping their working time. When I stayed in Bang Saen, I got on the bus 
around 6.15-6.20, now I heard that it is moved to 5.45-5.50 
 During my time here, the factory had gone from hiring 3,000 to currently 8,000 
employees, mostly working in production. This is one of the best performing factories. 
You heard that they talk about declining sales everywhere, but here we still have 
overtime almost every week. Lucky that it is good timing in our product development, so 
we have good sales. 
 
The cycles of economic crises and industrial growth have had profound impacts 
on the dynamics of power between capital and labor, as mediated by the national and 
local states. For example, the period of growth in car production was favorable for 
workers, and enabled the emergence of labor union movement in the area. Many people 
including Ann and workers such as Rham still remember an early mass strike by 
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unionized autoworkers that happened in the mid-2000s. However, when car production 
reached its peak in 2012 and thereafter began to decline, labor unions started to confront 
major difficulties following the introduction of flexible and lean production. In the next 
chapter, I discuss the history of local trade union movements, and that of the Eastern 
Labor Relations Group in particular. I highlight two labor struggles that occurred in two 
multinational carmakers in the ESIEs. In the next chapter, I also examine labor 
organizing practices and the dynamics of activism, as informed by the material, 
discursive and ideological factors. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter offers accounts of the Eastern Seaboard’s transformation, from the 
perspectives of economic and human geographies. From an economic geography 
viewpoint, the Eastern Seaboard Industrial Estates are the sites in which networks of 
capital, state agencies and local actors converge to create a social factory—a regime of 
local labor control in which workers are treated as one of the factors of production. 
From a human geography viewpoint, by contrast, the economic transformation 
translates into personal stories of migration, employment opportunities and familial 
challenges. Through the stories of labor migration and livelihood changes, this chapter 
also shows how local workforce played an important part in shaping the Eastern 
Seaboard’s social geographies. Further, it shows how the local business took part in the 
making of social factory through its ambivalent relations with migrant workers. As 
consumer, workers are presented mainly as a source of economic gains to the local 
business. Nevertheless, the workers’ accounts which demonstrate the ways they 
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creatively made their new place ‘home’ show that they are not far from being simply 
victims in this transformation. 
 
Chapter 4. A View from Above: 
Thai Labor Politics and Trade Union Movements  
 
 
This chapter addresses issues of labor movement’s fragmentation, militancy and 
class-consciousness. It offers an overview of Thai political and economic processes as 
well as the structural and associational power of the Thai workforce in the past decade. 
Rather than being the backdrop, such context serves as pre-conditions that shaped the 
nature and characters of labor activism—issues that are underexplored in Thai labor 
studies. The chapter is divided into five sections. The first section begins with a political-
economy analysis of the labor movement, a conventional strand among Thai scholars. 
While the political-economy approach is useful to explain the processes that shape the 
strength and limitations of labor movement on a national scale, as the second section 
shows, it is insufficient to explain internal divisions, political differences, and conflicts 
within the organized labor movement.  
For this reason, the third section introduces and uses the concept of class 
composition to elucidate hierarchy and domination within the labor movement. By doing 
so, it calls into question claims made by labor scholars about Thai trade unions’ lack of 
class-consciousness as well as growing conservatism. This section also discusses the way 
in which the state regimes of political accommodation worsen polarization and 
fragmentation within the organized labor. By using examples of conflicts around 
minimum wage rates, I argue that trade unions’ different focuses can be better understood 
as its distinctive positions in class composition and hierarchy, rather than their ideology 
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and deliberation. Finally, the last sections discuss history and militancy of trade union 
movements in the Eastern Seaboard. 
 
4.1 Political economy of Thai organized labor  
Organized labor in Thailand is small in both scope and scale. It is estimated that 
in 2015, out of 37.8 million in total workforce, only around 616,169 workers were 
members of labor unions (Ministry of Labor 2015, cited by SERC 2015). Therefore, 
organized labor represented only 1.6 percent of the total workforce (SERC 2015). Among 
waged workers entitled to unionize according to 1975 Labor Relations Act (LRA), 
approximately 14 million workers, only 4 percent, were organized.39 However, the 
majority of the workforce, 24 million workers, was in the informal sector, without access 
to codified legal protection. Among unionized workers, 70 percent were in the private 
sector and 30 percent in state-owned enterprises (ibid). In early 2016, there were slightly 
less than 1,453 private unions (as opposed to over 2 million companies), 47 public-owned 
enterprise unions, and 21 labor federations registered with the Ministry of Labor (ibid.). 
Most unions (97%) were in small businesses, employing less than 15 workers, and 
concentrated in the Bangkok Metropolitan Area.  
As Glassman (2004) argues, the process of labor institutionalization is deeply 
embedded in the history of Thai internationalization and democratization. Historically, 
economic expansion and state intervention shaped the early development of labor’s 
organizational forms. In the post-war period, as political space ebbed and flowed, the 
Thai state alternately used repression as well as co-optation to contain labor’s struggles to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  A labor historian, Sakdina Chatkul Na Ayudya, had an estimate in 2010 that only 330,000 workers (3.7 percent) in 
the private sector were unionized. The MOL had a more recent estimate of 616,169 workers in 2015. Given the total 
number of 15,000,000 in the private workforce, the estimate was around 4 percent.	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organize (Napaporn 2002; Brown 2004; Glassman 2004). Often denied the rights to 
openly form trade unions, workers often had to organize as informal groups and 
economic and cultural associations, which were often linked into broader political 
movements. It is worth emphasizing that, up until the mid-1970s, elite hostility and 
repression had been a defining feature of the experiences faced by urban workers who 
attempted to organize themselves (Brown 2004; Brown and Sakdina 2013). However, the 
1975 Labor Relations Act40 formally recognized and granted workers the right to forms 
trade unions, labor federations and labor councils, albeit these rights have been severely 
constrained in practice (Brown 2004). Thus, during the 1980s and 1990s, as political 
economists have observed, a significant gap opened up between labor’s formal rights and 
the everyday actual practices of Thai industrial relations (Brown 2004; Brown and 
Hewison 2005). This gap between theory and practice needs to be understood in relation 
to the character and timing of Thailand’s capitalist development as well as political 
regime dynamics (Brown 2004; 2007; 2016).  
The Thai labor movement’s various organizational forms and the differing arenas 
of its activism, underscore its diversity as well as the tensions that exist within it. In a 
strictly legal sense, the labor movement comprises labor unions, labor federations, labor 
congresses (sometimes known as ‘peak council’), as well as state enterprise labor unions. 
Within the movement some leaders of labor federations have used the formal tripartite 
system as a vehicle to achieve social status or engage in rent seeking practices (Napaporn 
2002; Brown 2004). At the outset therefore it is useful to distinguish between the forms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  The first Labor Relations Act was in fact promulgated in 1957 but shortly cancelled afterward by a coup d’état 
staged by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (see Napaporn 2002, p. 38; Brown 2010 [2004], p. 66-67).	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of labor organizing or organizational structures from the political goal of labor organizing 
and activism. 
 
4.2 Diversity and Complexity in Thai Labor Movement 
 
Apart from trade unions which are formally recognized in law, the Thai labor 
movement also comprises a number of civil society-based organizations that have 
emerged as a result of broader political struggles. The latter included informal 
associations, national coordination centers such as the Thai Labor Solidarity Center 
(TLSC), labor-related NGOs, other labor groups, as well as area-based labor collectives 
(see Napaporn 2002, chapter 4; and Sakdina 2010). Unlike the trade unions, these 
relatively independent labor groups occupy no formally legal space within the industrial 
relations system but have nonetheless managed to carve out political spaces to advance a 
labor related agenda.41 
 While organizational forms are rather static, it is crucial to note that relationships 
between formal and informal labor organizations are highly dynamic and shift over time. 
As studies of the Thai labor movement have noted, workers who have been effectively 
excluded from the industrial relations system have developed informal organizing 
vehicles to mobilize members outside of formal legal provisions (see Napaporn 2002). 
There are, however, few studies that explore the ways in which activists creatively use 
both formal and informal organizations, to deal with changing local and wider political 
circumstances. Rather, the focus has been on collaboration and conflicts between the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  Since 2003, Thai Labor Solidarity Center (TLSC) and State Enterprises Workers Relations Confederation (SERC) 
organized a May Day event separately from the official one, organized jointly by the Ministry of Labor, and state-
sanctioned labor confederations, led by Confederation of Thai Labor (CTL) and State Enterprises Workers Federation 
of Thailand (SEWFOT). 
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formal and informal labor organizations, with a particular bias shown against the former. 
For example, Napaporn (2002) conducted a comprehensive study of collaboration that 
occurred between the State Enterprises Workers Relations Confederation (SERC)42, and 
three main area-based labor collectives43, which had emerged as a political force in the 
1980s. These interactions illustrated some of the creative ways in which unions and non-
unions forms of organizing were able to engage together in political campaigns. 
Nevertheless, the extent to which formal and well-endowed organizations such as the 
SERC were able to dominate and dictate the political agenda of informal labor groups has 
been underexplored in these studies. While formal labor organizations, such as the State 
Enterprises Workers Relations Confederation (SERC), were more prone to state sanctions 
and curtailing of their activities, they were able nevertheless to mobilize mass bases of 
support from informal labor groups in political campaigns in exchange for providing 
financial or institutional assistance. Moreover, in a context where state agencies control 
most of the funding for capacity-building and organizational support, labor-related non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) have also been able to play a role in financing 
independent unions, as well as non-union labor groups44.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  As an umbrella organization of state enterprises workers, State Enterprises Workers Relations Confederation 
(SERC) is one of the most powerful organizations within the Thai labour movement. In the 1980s, SERC was a leading 
force that supported independent labor groups and helped voice their concerns, especially non-union labor area groups 
that were organized within pockets of industrial areas.  
43 Historically, industrial zones around the periphery of Bangkok Metropolitan Area including Samut Sakorn, Samut 
Prakarn, Nakorn Prathom and Pathum Thani provinces were strategic sites for feminized light industries, which were 
important hubs for militant labor activism in the 1980s and 1990s as well. For studies of feminized labor activism in 
these industrial areas, see Mills (1997; 1999a; 2003; 2005) and Pangsapa (2007).	  
44	  While research funding on the labor movement in Thailand has often been sponsored by NGOs themselves, it is no 
surprise that there is a lack of research conducted on the roles of these NGOs in terms of their contribution to 
strengthening and/or weakening the labor movement. It is also worth noting that Thai anti-democratic movement has 
recently used ‘NGOs interference’ to undermine some NGOs working with the labor movement. On May Day 2007, 
Somsak Kosaisuk, a leader of SERC and State Railway Workers Union Federation of Thailand, claimed that some 
NGOs activists were responsible for political divisions in the labor movement (Prachatai 2007). 
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 Within such a complex landscape two caveats for the study of the labor 
movement need to be noted. First, it is easy to confuse network of NGOs mobilized 
around the same funded agenda with social movements. Second, the fact that NGOs that 
control funding system often assume the leadership roles in organized labor should 
always be explicitly stated or even explored. The insight we gain from such perspective is 
that labor networks or coalitions themselves can be crucial sites of political contestation. 
The complex composition of the Thai labor movement (or organized labor) highlights the 
conflict and contestation associated with organizing workers—organized labor is a site of 
conflict between contending social forces and interests—within which there are 
significant political divisions that need to be recognized and explained. The positions that 
different labor organizations take on different issues and the conflicts that occur within 
those organizations (i.e., about which issues should be tackled and how they should be 
tackled) thus require careful investigation and explanation.  
  In this chapter, I take these two neglected points as my points of departure. 
Accordingly, I call into question the political economy analysis that generalizes the Thai 
organized labor movement by taking the decisions made by TLSC and SERC at face 
value as those of the whole labor movement (see in particular Napaporn 2005; and Brown 
and Sakdina 2012). By doing so, I argue that more attention is needed to investigate the 
ways that decisions made by the leaders of these groups at various times and in relation to 
certain problems have been resulted in further divisions/splits within the movement.  
 
4.3 Labor hierarchy and class composition 
 In 2001, the Thai Labor Solidarity Center (TLSC) was established by a number of 
trade unions as well as a ‘complex and dense network of alternative organizing vehicles’ 
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(Brown and Sakdina 2012, p. 8)45. Although the TLSC has no formal legal status as either 
a trade union or NGO, affiliates hoped to be able use it as an independent vehicle through 
which they could voice their concerns about industrial as well as broader social and 
political matters. Over the past 15 years the TLSC has become a central organizational 
site through which political differences between its member groups have played out. 
While TLSC has relied on the hierarchical networks of the labor movement, its members 
especially the independent labor unions were more reluctant to engage with the state 
agencies. The literature on the Thai labor movement tends to focus on the analyses of 
larger political polarization (i.e. conflicts between Red Shirt and Yellow Shirt 
movements), rather than the internal dynamics within the movement that appeared to find 
expression in the polarized political conflicts. Thailand labor scholars tend to focus on 
how the labor movement became entangled in wider political conflicts between red and 
yellow, but have not paid enough attention to the internal conflict dynamics within the 
labor movement. As I demonstrate through my analyses of class composition below, 
these internal dynamics are crucial to explain why different labor groups supported 
different sides of the political divide.  To better understand these internal dynamics we 
need to focus on issues of class composition.  
 In principle, an expansion of wage labor should increase labor’s power, as the 
growing number of waged workers increases their structural significance on the Thai 
economy. However, as the statistics on the Thai labor force suggest, the existence of a 
dual economy (i.e. between formal and informal sectors) has engendered at least a two-
tier strata within the working class. On the one hand the Thai workforce is composed of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  See Brown and Sakdina (2012) for detailed discussion of TLSC.	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large informal sector with a majority of, often skilled, non-organized workers. On the 
other, the institutionalization of labor rights through a series of labor laws allows for the 
formation of labor unions in medium and larger enterprises where better skilled 
employees can, theoretically at least, exercise their collective bargaining rights. 
Accordingly, on the upper tier, skilled labor and those working in medium and large 
enterprises, associated with Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), have been able to use their 
unions to achieve better wages and conditions within the workplace46. On the lower tier, 
those who labor in small family-owned business and the informal sector—especially 
home-based, domestic workers, and migrant workers — have had to rely heavily on 
minimum wage mechanism, controlled by national and provincial wage committees, to 
improve their wages. Within this latter group, moreover, there are four to five million 
migrant workers who do not have the right to establish trade unions. Between 2013-2015, 
amidst political debates around the national, single minimum wage rate revealed some of 
the tensions that exist between these two major components of the working class: 
workers who enjoyed formal legal coverage and had access to workplace collective 
bargaining rights and those informal, flexible and disenfranchised workers who enjoyed 
no such advantages.  
In the next section, I illustrate the nature of tensions between formal and informal 
workers over the minimum wage rates by discussing how political processes within the 
periods of two administrations: Thaksin Shinnawatra (2000-2006) and Yingluck 
Shinnawatra (2011-2014) accommodate demands from formal and informal sector 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  Since the end of 1970s, labor relations mechanisms including labor courts and tripartite bodies have emerged and 
proliferated, as a response to increasing labor dispute cases (see Napaporn 2002, p. 138-140).	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workers. Before doing so, I define the two important concepts of class composition: 
technical and political class composition, as proposed by Italian Autonomous Marxism. 
 
4.3.1 Class composition and recomposition  
Class composition generally consists of technical composition and political 
composition of the class—“two interrelated processes of decomposition and 
recomposition (Bowman 2012).” Similar to other concepts of the Autonomous Marxism, 
they are not explicitly defined, but rather “taken, by analogy, from a heretical reading of 
Marx’s Capital (ibid.)”. Paul Bowman (2012) explains the two concepts as follows: 
“The analogy the Operaisti took from [Marx’s Capital] is the distinction between 
the objective composition of the work class – i.e. on a macro scale, how many people 
work in agriculture, manufacturing, public sector, housework, etc.; on the scale of an 
individual enterprise, how many people work on particular production lines, … etc. This 
represents the technical composition of the class, which changes according to changes in 
production methods, increases in productivity, etc, along with changes in the differing 
amount and types of goods produced and circulated within a given society.  
In contrast to the technical composition, the political composition of the class 
consisted of the “subjective” element—i.e. people’s awareness of being part of a wide 
social group, their identification as workers, or people subjected to work, their 
identification with or antagonism to their immediate bosses, and groups of bosses or 
representatives of the state in a wider social context. As well as purely subjective 
elements of beliefs, cultures, values and habits and practices of either collective or 
individual resistance or compliance, there are also elements of organizations—the 
creation of both formal and informal organizations to pursue distinct class goals whether 
of self-defense or attack (my emphasis, Bowman 2012)” 
 
In short, the class composition comprises two main elements: objective/ technical 
composition, and subjective/ political composition. In this chapter, the distinction 
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between the two compositions is key to understand the shifts in objective labor force 
composition and the resulting political recomposition and differences within the Thai 
labor movements. 
As previously mentioned in the Chapter Three, labor as non-capital is internal, 
rather than external, to capital. Accordingly, the workers’ power to attack and struggle 
are integral to the production process. Cleaver (2017) explains that, based on such the 
labor’s counter-power, labor struggle not only causes capital to adjust its strategies, the 
struggle also recomposes the internal divisions of the working class, and hence the 
balance of power vis-à-vis the capital. In the processes, the organizational forms change, 
and so the characters and demands of the working class (p. 58).  
 
4.3.2 Economic restructuring and class recomposition 
Following the 1997 financial crisis, economic restructuring led to an 
intensification of manufacturing activities and a geographical relocation of production 
from the Bangkok Metropolitan Region to the Eastern and Central Regions (Glassman 
2007). As a consequence, there was an explosive growth in investment and hence 
employment in these regions (ibid). In the Eastern Seaboard, these shifts increased the 
concentration of workers, many of whom came to rely on workplace collective 
bargaining to lift their wages rather than relying on nationally determined minimum wage 
rate mechanisms.  
In the early 2000s, Thaksin’s government further influenced the recomposition of 
the working class by pursuing broadly neoliberal strategies (Brown and Hewison 2005; 
Hewison 2005). According to Brown and Hewison (2005), Thaksin’s administration 
(2001-2006) used two main strategies with regards to labor: facilitating the creation of 
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flexible and skilled labor in the market, and mobilizing broad working-class bases 
electoral support through a ‘new social contract’. This new social contract supposedly 
replaced a previous one, which had been marked by three main elements: a system of 
minimum wage fixation, partial benefits from a workplace compensation scheme, and 
promises that workers lives would improve through the trickle-down effect (Hewison 
2003, cited by Brown and Sakdina 2012). Drawing on Portes (1997), Hewison (2005) 
called this a ‘developmental social contract’, whereby the Thai working class—workers 
and peasants —contributed to economic growth but without a say in the economy which 
remained the preserve of state (military and civilian governments) and capital (domestic 
and foreign).  
By contrast, the new social contract established by Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai 
(TRT) government offered welfare provisions via various schemes that especially 
targeted the rural poor (Hewison 2005). These schemes included, for example, a basic 
universal health care program called thirty-bath cure all, and a cheap-loans program 
made available to villagers across the nation through local administrations funding 
system. Effectively, Thaksin was trying to establish an accommodation where workers 
and the rural poor would benefit through increased growth but where they would also 
receive better protection from ‘market failure’. In return, they would work hard, be 
entrepreneurial, as well as support him at the ballot box.	   In this sense, the roles of the 
working class were to vote for the TRT and enjoy the expansion of the domestic market. 
Interestingly, it is argued that such strategies also sidelined domestic capital, and 
accordingly pushed the local business to seize the state power in the following decades 
(ibid).  
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 Initially organized labor movement was lured into supporting Thaksin’s TRT 
through false promises given prior to the 2001 elections. According to Brown and 
Hewison (2005), the TRT party invited labor representatives to discuss their concerns and 
drafted a ‘Policy for Developing Human Resources and Social Welfare Structure’, which 
promised to meet a list of labor’s long-held demands (p. 363). State enterprise unions, in 
particular, supported TRT because it promised to scrap privatizations plans initiated by 
the incumbent Democrat-led government. After TRT won the 2001election and formed a 
single-party government, the labor movement’s concerns were only superficially included 
into its policies (ibid). TRT failed promises alienated leaders of the Thai Labor Solidarity 
Center (TLSC) as well as leaders of the State Enterprises Workers Relations 
Confederation (SERC). Subsequently both these groups became supporters of the anti-
Thaksin movement. For many, the tipping point was the policy u-turn of the TRT-led 
government that launched its own privatization plan, which provoked significant hostility 
from state enterprise workers unions47. During the 2006 anti-Thaksin campaign, a broad 
social and political movement joined forces with People’s Alliance for Democracy 
(PAD)—urban elites and middle class-led alliance—to oust Thaksin, leading finally to a 
military coup d’état in 2006 (see Brown and Sakdina 2012; Pye and Schaffer 2008). PAD 
later transformed into the Yellow Shirt (YS) movement, among which the leadership rank 
were Somsak Kosaisuk and Sawit Kaewwarn—both men coming from leadership within 
the State Railway Workers Union (SEWU) and its umbrella organization, the SERC.  
 
4.3.3 Political polarization and fragmentation of the labor movement  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  TRT announced anti-privatization stance during election campaigns, but later reserved its stance when it was in 
government. For detailed discussion see Brown and Sakdina (2012).	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Somsak and Sawit assumed highly influential roles in the Thai organized labor 
movement during this period. was known publicly as one of the leading forces in the past 
mass anti-privatization campaigns, while Sawit Kaewwarn wore many hats in powerful 
organizations: he was a leader of Confederation of Thai Appliances, Electronics, 
Automobile and Metal Workers (TEAM), and very active in both TLSC48 and 
automotive-based union movement in the Eastern Seaboard. Actually, Napaporn (2002) 
is right to notice a transition in the characteristics of organized labor, especially among 
those workers on the upper tier—from the more socially and politically vested positions 
to the narrower self-interests. Nevertheless, her social movement unionism (SMU) 
framework is insufficient49 to explain an increasingly contradictory nature of the leading 
organizations such as the State Enterprises Workers Relations Confederation (SERC), 
which actively participated in the conservative politics but firmly maintained the rhetoric 
of the traditional left. 
As Brown and Sakdina (2012) note, the decision of the TLSC and SERC 
leadership to support the PAD and Yellow Shirt movements have at least two 
implications. First, despite its liberal rhetoric50, during 2006-2011 the leadership of 
TLSC51 had been in alliance with factions of elite and the conservative right (p. 113). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  Sawit has later been elected the president of TLSC in 2017, which makes TLSC male-dominated because all the 
main leading positions (the president, vice president and secretary) have now occupied by men.	  
49	  According to Park (2007), social movement unionism (SMU) theory is inherently deficient in three major ways. 
First, SMU theory falls short of explanation regarding SMU type union’s desired social change: whether it is a change 
of or in the capitalist system (Park 2007, p. 316). Second, SMU theory is ambiguous about what autonomy means, 
especially SMU type union’s relationships with political parties. Third, SMU advocates tend to romanticize militant 
unionism (ibid).	  
50	  On Labor Day 2011, Sawit announced that SERC ‘is defecting from the PAD’. See Unions, PAD and 
‘undemocratic’ royalist elite. https://thaipoliticalprisoners.wordpress.com/tag/sawit-kaewwan/ (accessed 24 Oct, 2017).	  
51	  It is important to note that some labor leaders, not all, did support the Yellow shirts, at least initially, while some 
leaders who opposed Thaksin did not support the Yellow shirts. Likewise, other leaders who supported the Red shirts 
may not necessarily become Thaksin’s supporters. Andrew Brown notes that there was significant debate within the 
TLSC both among its leadership as well among its members groups as to what to do or what not to do (personal 
communication). 	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Second, this alliance placed such labor activists and organizations in opposition with a 
large section of the working class that became mass supporters of Thaksin under the 
banner of the Red Shirt Movement (ibid). Without examining decision-making processes 
within the TLSC; however, scholars tend to confuse political choices made by the leaders 
with decisions of organized labor as a whole. It was the leadership of the TLSC and 
SERC, especially Somsak, Sawit and others, who forged an alliance with the 
conservative movement, despite oppositions from other members within the TLSC. I 
want to argue further that, as a result of the hierarchy, non-democratic and patriarchal 
domination within the labor movement, their involvement led to a labor movement’s shift 
towards conservative politics.  
During the last decade of political upheaval, fissures within the independently 
organized labor, particularly between the national coordinating body Thai Labor 
Solidarity Committee (TLSC) and pro-democratic and radical labor groups have 
widened. For example, in May 2007, independent labor groups calling themselves Labor 
Assembly 155052 held a separate May Day event from the independent labor movement, 
led by the TLSC and SERC. Since 2003, the TLSC and SERC53 had organized alternative 
May Day events so as to separate themselves from some labor councils that enjoyed close 
ties to state and capital. In 2007, Labor Assembly 1550 organized a third alternative. Led 
by radical political activists and unionists who had organized independent unions in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52The group explicitly demanded for restoration of democracy through electoral politics. Its members include Labor 
Congress Center for Labor Unions of Thailand, Textile and Garment Workers Federation of Thailand (TWFT), Paper 
and Printing Workers Federation of Thailand (PPFT), Bangkok Iron Workers Union, Union of Democratic Labor 
Alliance (chaired by Somyot Prueksakasemsuk, a political prisoner and main supporter of Thaksin, charged with Lese 
Majeste law), People Coalition Party (headed by Giles Ungpakorn, a dissident in exile). See “Labor divided to organize 
3 May Day marches: walking separately on parallel” (in Thai). https://prachatai.com/journal/2007/05/12565 (accessed 
25 Oct 2017).	  
53	  On May Day 2008, TLSC and SERC were reportedly dressed in orange. This choice seemed appropriate, given that 
the state-funded labor groups were dressed in yellow, while some supporters of Labor Assembly 1550 were in red.	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light industrial hubs of the Bangkok’s periphery in late 1980s and early 1990s, the Labor 
Assembly 1550 had been vocal in opposing military regimes and supporting democratic 
political processes. Rangsit and Nearby Area Unions Group (RNAUG), who would 
normally have joined the TLSC and SERC, withdrew from the celebrations at the last 
minute in protest as their representatives had been denied the right by TLSC and SERC 
organizers to criticize the military junta openly on the May Day stage. It was reported 
that, subsequently, some of the workers from the RNAUG appeared on the stage of the 
Labor Assembly 155054.   
4.3.4 National organized labor versus the working class  
The politics of accommodation during Yingluck’s administration had further 
deepened the internal division within the formal labor movement. In the national arena, 
the history repeated itself again when the leadership of the Thai Labor Solidarity 
Committee (TLSC) and State Enterprises Workers Relations Confederation (SERC) 
mobilized some affiliated labor organizations to support the anti-government movement 
that led to the military coup in May 2014. This time led to further fragmentation in the 
union movement.  
From 2010 to 2013, the TLSC and SERC led the labor movement in attempts to 
reform the social security system by proposing the introduction of a new Social Security 
Act. The labor movement’s draft sought to restructure the Social Security Fund in a 
number of ways, especially by subjecting fund committee members to election, as well as 
increasing the proportion of labor and experts representatives on the committee. It was 
so-called ‘people’s draft’ was signed by over 14,000 citizens.  The process of drafting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  See ‘Labor Divided’, ibid.	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this act involved a wide range of independent labor groups, including informal sector 
workers such as home-based and agricultural workers. The campaign was primarily 
mobilized around achieving independence and transparency of the social security fund, 
increased labor participation in decision-making, and inclusion of informal workers55. It 
is worth noting that this was the first draft of a law proposed by citizens after the 1997 
constitution opened up a channel for bottom-up (i.e. non-parliamentary) law-making 
processes. Given the democratic and inclusive drafting process, and the widespread 
support for the draft, the TLSC and SERC had high hopes that the law would be enacted 
by the parliament.  
In 2010, the TLSC had begun lobbying relevant Ministers and politicians from the 
then Democrat Party government to pass the law. However, the process was so protracted 
that when TLSC and SERC finally submitted the draft to the legislature, the Pheu Thai 
Party (formerly Thai Rak Thai) had replaced the Democrat Party. When the draft was 
turned down by the legislature under the Pheu Thai government, labor groups who had 
participated in the process were infuriated. In April 2013, the TLSC organized a protest 
where workers dressed in black and staged a mourning ceremony for democracy. In the 
ceremony, workers burned coffins with photos of the four politicians— one of whom was 
the then Minister of Labor from the Pheu Thai Party56.  
 As Sawit Kaew-warn, one of the TLSC and SERC leaders, was the Secretary of 
the Confederation of Thai Appliances, Electronics, Automobile and Metal Workers 
(TEAM), which has a strong membership bases in the Eastern Seaboard.  Both TLSC and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  Wilaiwan Sae Tia, explaining the needs for pushing forward the new social security act draft in the parliament 
https://prachatai.com/journal/2012/03/39797 (accessed 16 Oct, 2017).	  
56	  Labor protesting the parliament’s play-acting, scamming labor in 3 years of ‘participation’ that was dismissed 
overnight https://ilaw.or.th/node/2719	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SERC relied on mass mobilization from the Eastern Labor Unions Group (ELUG) to 
support PAD and the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) rallies in 
Bangkok. However, since 2010 a group of unions inside the ELUG that had strong ties 
with the farmers’ movement in the Northeast region (i.e. Assembly of the Poor) had 
opposed supporting first PAD and subsequently PDRC. They claimed that unionistss 
should instead be free to express their political opinions on an individual basis, rather 
than being constrained by the leading unions and larger federations. That initial 
opposition eventually caused an internal rift and saw the ELUG split into two: the ELUG 
and the Eastern Labor Relations Group (ELRG). The ELRG formed out of an umbrella of 
labor unions that identified themselves more with the pro-democratic side of the Red 
Shirt movement.  
In November 2013, again the TLSC and SERC leadership officially joined the 
People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), the anti-government movement—an 
offshoot of PAD—to protest against the Yingluck Shinnawatra’s government57. Similarly 
to 2006, this move was caused by the disappointment and anger fueled by the blatant 
disregard of Yingluck’s administration for the demands of the labor movement. 
 
4.3.5 Not only the big P-political differences, but also the small p 
In January 2013, based on campaign promises made during the 2012 electoral 
campaigns, Yingluck Shinnawatra’s government increased the minimum wage to a 
uniform rate of 300 baht across the country. This raise increased the wages on average by 
35-39.5 percent. Apart from the substantial increase, it was historic for many reasons. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  The overall mobilizing cause was the opposition to the passing of an amnesty bill. See 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/11/thailand-protests-amnesty-bill	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First, it was the first time, since the establishment of the minimum wage fixation system 
in the 1970s, that a political party, during an electoral campaign, played a role in 
unilaterally setting the wage rate. Second, it was also the first time that the minimum 
wage rate in the whole country was set at a single rate. In 2010, Thailand had officially 
32 geographical minimum wage rates, ranging from 5.48USD - 7.62 USD/day. Scholars 
argued that the state has used this spatial differentiation to attract Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) into some zones targeted for promotion (Mabry 1979; Glassman 2004). 
Despite similar costs of living across Thailand, it was difficult to alter the system of wage 
fixing because of inertia within the hierarchical and bureaucratic system where minimum 
wages were determined. Technically, wages rates were first proposed by each of the 76 
provincial sub-committees and, then, ultimately approved by the central committee58.  
Between 2013 and 201659, the 300 baht minimum wage had practical implications 
for the composition of the working class in a number of important respects. For example, 
the raise radically changed the way in which migrant and guest workers viewed 
relationships between their status and the political system. After the raise, migrant 
workers who were legally allowed to work in certain sectors discovered ways to negotiate 
for a higher minimum wage. For instance, studies (Lathapipat and Poggy 2016) have 
found that migrant workers and Thai workers in small business and agriculture gained 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  The provincial sub-committees were introduced in 1997 after the Thai government requested the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) to review the minimum wage fixation system. In fact, the ILO recommended that Thailand should 
have a ‘two-tier’ system which comprises (an existing) central national wage committee and industrial-based 
committee, both determining ‘base wage’ and ‘industrial base wage’, respectively (Peetz 1996).  In principle, the base 
wage represents a fair wage that serves as a poverty safety net, while an industrial base wage can act as ‘fair wage’ that 
allocates a fairer share of economic development to workers, according to wealth in each industry. Not only did the 
Thai government refuse to acknowledge the ILO’s initiative of creating a base wage and fair wage (i.e., mixture of 
safety net and fairness), it put into practice the additional provincial sub-committees instead. The insertion of provincial 
sub-committee adds another layer of bureaucratic unit, which basically diffuses the entry point in which workers 
advocate for higher minimum wages.	  
59	  After the Coup D’état in 2006, the military-backed Government ended the uniform wage rate regime by endorsing 
the increases of minimum wage rates by groups of provinces, similar to pre-2013 practices.	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greater benefit from the wage rise, than did waged workers in medium and large 
enterprises who generally relied on from workplace collective bargaining for pay rises. 
The campaign to raise the minimum wage sparked heated public debates about 
living costs of the working class and appropriate wage levels Against the backdrop of 
these debates, tensions surfaced between independent labor groups, especially between 
the radical and progressive labor groups. For instance, in 2015, an independent labor 
group led by the Textile and Garment Workers Federation of Thailand (TWFT) proposed 
a minimum wage rate of 421 baht ($14), higher than 360 baht ($12) proposed by the 
TLSC and SERC. Moreover, Rangsit and Nearby Area Unions Group (RNAUG) strongly 
questioned the minimum wage rate proposed by the leader of TLSC, arguing that the rate 
was actually the product of a compromise deal made between the TLSC and the military-
backed government60. This dispute underscored growing differences between the trade 
union movement located in the heavy industries, represented by SERC and TEAM which 
relied largely on workplace collective bargaining, and those unions in the light industries 
(such as the RNAUG) and informal sectors, which gained more from the national tri-
partite system.  
Focusing inwardly on its their political leverage at workplace level, labor unions 
in the state enterprises and heavy industries including automotive, chemical and metal 
viewed the minimum wage rate campaign as a distraction to workers.  It is worth noting 
that, despite their political differences, the Eastern Labor Relations Group (ELRG) was 
more aligned with unions in state enterprises and heavy industries rather than with their 
counterparts in the light industrial and informal sectors.  
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  Apparently, the divergence first appeared on political scene during the peak of political polarization. On May Day 
2007, the independent labor group ‘Labor Assembly 1550’ was reported to announce a different rate of desired minimum 
wage rate from TLSC and SERC, which was considered as representative of the Thai labor movement (Prachatai 2007).  	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The fragmentation and divisions of the organized labor is a result of both the labor 
politics and the politics of wages (small p politics). Such understanding demystifies the 
conventional idea that the Thai organized labor is a singular social movement, united 
under the same banner of progressive demands (i.e. the universal provisions of state 
welfare and high minimum wages), or simply divided into progressive and conservative 
fractions. The ELRG exemplified an outlier, which could be seen as radical and pro-
democratic but simultaneously attached to the state-sanctioned tripartite system. While 
the political economy studies alone fails to explain the diversity and complexity within 
the labor movement, the class composition analysis, which focuses on the technical and 
hierarchal divisions within the working class, proves to be a complement to the structural 
analysis. Both approaches together explain how and why different segments of labour 
adopted different political stances during the period under review. In the section I turn to 
a closer inspection of positions adopted by the Eastern Labor Relations Group.  
 
4.4 Brief history of the Eastern Labor Unions Group 
Due to the timing of economic development, labor activism in the Eastern 
Seaboard is distinctive in its history and characteristics. In 1975, the Eastern Labor 
Unions Group (ELUG) was established by a group of labor unions led by oil refinery 
workers61. The workers in the oil refinery were motivated to organize by the treatment 
they received after the previously Taiwanese-owned plant was bought and restructured by 
an American oil company. The new owner imposed much stricter workplace regulations 
(Peeraphong 2016). Although ELUG was not geographically located in the BMR, its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Workers at Esso and Thai Oil, and a variety of workplaces including a golf course, matches production, sugar plant, 
and hotel.	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strategic industrial enhanced its organizational power. During the1970s, several ELUG 
representatives held important positions in the Labor Confederation of Thailand (LCT) 
which played a leading role in the broader pro-democratic movement (Napaporn 2002).  
During the 1990s, as development in the Eastern Seaboard region accelerated, the 
numbers of labor unions, as well as labor disputes, increased significantly. In response, 
the ELUG divided its structure into five geographical areas: Laem Chabang, Bowin, 
Chacheungsao, Amata, and Rayong. Beginning in the late 1990s, the American Center 
for International Labor Solidarity (ACILs) sent two organizers to survey the area, and 
became involved in educating, training and organizing workers employed in the newly 
established industrial estates (Voicelabor 2017).62 As mentioned earlier, as a result of 
broader political conflicts approximately 30 labor unions broke away from the Eastern 
Labor Unions Group (ELUG) in 2010 and established a new labor council, the Thailand 
Congress of Trade Unions (TCTU). This group of unions was specifically affiliated with 
the Bowin area labor group, formerly a subgroup under ELUG, which was led by one of 
ACIL’s organizers who worked with a local activist to establish the Organizing Labor 
Union Center (OLUC).   
Drawing on the organizing model of the ELUG and Bowin group, within the first 
two years, some TCTU activists established the Eastern Labor Relations Group (ELRG), 
which was an informal and voluntary-based group that acted as a worker organizing 
center long the borders of Chonburi and Rayong industrial area. While the TCTU was a 
formal organization, legally registered with the state and thus regulated by the formal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  An account of a veteran organizer, Seminar on the History of the Eastern Labor Groups, organized by the Thai 
Labor Museum. See summary of the seminar at 
http://voicelabour.org/%E0%B8%AA%E0%B8%A3%E0%B8%B8%E0%B8%9B%E0%B8%81%E0%B8%B2%E0%
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labor-relations framework, ELRG operated in a similar fashion to non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). Because ELRG was an independent group working that aimed to 
promote educational and social activities for union members in the Eastern Seaboard, it 
received funding from civil society organizations through its network of social and 
political activism. In this next section, I shift my focus to the organizational structure and 
practices of the Eastern Labor Relations Group itself. 
 
4.5 Introducing the Eastern Labor Relations Group 
Since late 2010, the ELRG has supported activists organizing new labor unions as 
well as workers experiencing hardship, whether they were affiliated with labor unions or 
not. It has also offered organizational support for affiliated union members involved in 
legal disputes with employers. In the following sections, I use two cases of labor struggle 
one in an American and the other in a Japanese company to illustrate the way in which 
labor unions became an important vehicle for workplace resistance in the Eastern 
Seaboard area. By connecting labor struggle in the workplace with networks of labor 
activism, I intend to raise two fundamental question concerning the nature of the 
relationship between the formal labor relations framework and labor activism; and the 
choice and agency that workers and the ELRG activists have. In the next chapter, I 
attempt to answer these two questions through a closer examination of the organizing 
practices of the ELRG activists, and their relationships with rank-and-file workers. 
 
UM Workers Union: resistance for non-working time  
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A placard with the word ‘Headquarter’ written by hand hangs between two poles. 
On one pole was the national Thai flag, while a union flag in red was on the other. The 
sign informed striking workers where to contact the union staffers. To highlight the 
purpose of the gathering, the bottom of the placard read, ‘against slavery contract’. 
Underneath this sign, a larger banner in blazing red stated ‘The Universal Motors 
Thailand Workers Union’63. 
UM is one of the major American carmakers, beginning their operations in 
Thailand in the early 1990s. In early 2000s, the company expanded production into one 
of the Eastern Seaboard Industrial Estates. With Thailand serving as its main production 
base for the Southeast Asia market, UM began building its own powertrains plant in the 
mid 2000s. In February 2013, 64 around 2,000 workers walked off the factory floor. 
According to a Detroit-based newspaper, despite the massive walkout, 3,000 workers 
stayed on duty. The 3-day strike was reported to have cost one American supplier $15 
million. The UM protest represents one of many cases of labor activism that has occurred 
in the Eastern Seaboard Industrial Estates.  
Deconstructing Labor Radicalism and Militancy 
 The UM struggle described briefly here (and more in depth in the following 
chapter) exemplifies workplace activism characteristic of the Eastern Seaboard Industrial 
Estates (ESIEs). As an emphasis on collective bargaining agreements in workplaces is 
generally seen as a dominant trait of economic unionism, UM is representative of the 
economic unions in the Eastern Seaboard. One eminent Thai labor scholar, Napaporn 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  A pseudonym	  
64	  The protest and most of the incidents that followed had happened before the field research. However, based on the 
photos and documentation by workers, interviews with activists, as well as news reports, I constructed the incidents 
based on the workers’ narratives.	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Ativanichayapong, (2002) has argued that since the 1990s, economic/business unionism 
has come to dominate the Thai labor movement, replacing the social/political movement 
orientated unionism of an earlier period. Although this view has been influential among  
scholars of Thai labor, it deserves re-examination for at least two main reasons. First, 
clearly delineating between social movement/ political unionism65 and economic/business 
unionism is problematic. Second, I would argue, such views tend to stem from a focus on 
the activities of formal labor organizations, ignoring the individual and broader collective 
agency of the working class. I elaborate on these two points below. 
First, American industrial relations scholars have called into question the clear 
division between social/political unionism and economic/business unionism, suggesting 
the differences are overstated (Gerstle 1989; Cohen 1990; Fraser 1991; Fantasia 1997). 
Such a division is essentially based on deeper assumptions that draw a contrast between 
radicalism and conservatism, whereby the former is revealing of the existence of certain 
forms of class-consciousness, which scholars can assess by studying the behaviors of 
workers or analyzing the agendas of labor organizations (Wellman 1995).  
According to Wellman (1995), scholars of American labor militancy of the 1930s 
employed diverse terminologies and interpretations. Despite this divergence, they seemed 
to agree on one issue—the interruption and short-livedness of radicalism66. In short, 
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  I intentionally use social movement unionism and political unionism interchangeably. 	  
66	  Wellman (1994) argues that there are two main sets of explanation for this interruption: radical labor was either 
defeated or driven underground. Under the first category, what Wellman calls the defeat theory, there are three major 
themes: industrial unionism and labor peace; institutionalization of capitalist power in the workplace through labor 
bureaucracy; and change in the work process. Firstly, industrial unions have successfully gained legal recognition from 
employers, but traded political power with economic power. A widely held belief by many scholars and activists is that 
“class collaboration replaced class conflict because the contractual agreement conceded workplace control to 
management (Wellman 1994, 20).” Stanley Aronowitz’s work is exemplary of this view. According to Aronowitz 
(1973; 1976), the preemptive class struggle, hence the labor peace allows for economic growth and shared prosperity 
between the capital and labor Secondly, similar to the first theme but with emphasis on a different process, the 
explanation is that labor struggle over workplace governance has been replaced by bureaucratic control (see Edward 
1979). Thirdly, due to scientific and technological advancement, workers have habituated with repetitive work process 
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Wellman (1995) argues that three particular components essentially underlie the premise 
behind the construction of such views: 
(1) radical politics are equated with socialism 
(2) the distinction made between “political” versus “business” unions, and “typical” 
unionism in America is constructed as business unionism whereas political unionism is 
“exceptional” 
(3) the operating rules of class relations are located in formal agreements, national 
political agendas, and institutional arrangements (p. 26).” 
 
Debates around the militancy of contemporary American labor movements helps 
shed further light on assumptions about union militancy and class consciousness within 
an established industrial relations system. Contemporary studies of the Thai labor 
movement also exhibit similar assumptions. Examining the historical development of the 
labor movement in Thailand’s changing political economy, Napaporn (2002) argues that 
during the 1960s to mid-1970s, social movement unionism dominated the Thai labor 
movement because of the moment’s emphasis on (1) defense of the common interests of 
workers, (2) class collective action, and (3) pursuit of broad social goals. This broad 
orientation changed between 1977 and 1990 as national labor centers and state enterprise 
labor unions shifted their focus and energy to workplace activism and playing a 
diminishing role roles in ‘protecting the benefits of the working class’ as a whole 
(Napaporn 2002, chapter 4). Although Napaporn (2002) traces changes in the Thai trade 
union movement in the context of wider political and economic shifts, her analysis 
overstates labor organizations as the central political actors, and confuses organizational 
goals with class-consciousness. Implicitly, Napaporn (2002) assumes that workers 
express only express their class-consciousness through involvement in open and very 
public ways, such as national or international campaigns, and through international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and become ‘machines’. Hence, labor has been ‘deskilled (see Braverman 1974).’ Despite distinctive emphases, these 
three strands of theories prompt scholars to reach the same conclusion: the radical American labor movement has died.	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political campaigns. In other words, there is also a simplified but equally problematic 
assumption that social movement unionism equates to class collective action. This logic 
also implies that workers who are engaged with workplace activism alone do not possess 
class consciousness, an implicit assumption with which I disagree. In the following 
chapters, I explicitly explore such approach. 
 To avoid these problems, it is clarify some of the assumptions that will inform my 
further. Firstly, when I refer to radicalism, I do not simply mean socialism. Rather, 
radicalism is used to refer to beliefs and ideas that express a desire to fundamentally 
change ways of doing and being, through both personal and collective means. Secondly, I 
reject the idea that there is a clear distinction between the political and economic arenas. 
As feminist scholarship has pointed out, the personal is political: workplace relations and 
conditions are as much economic and personal as political and collective. As Linda 
Briskin (2007a) explains, “[labor] militancies are understood as part of the continuum of 
activities which seeks to transform societies in the interests of equity, inclusivity and 
justice (p. 99)”. Thirdly, class relationships are not located only in structural basis, or 
national scale, but are relational, interpersonal, and embedded in capital and labor 
relations.  
My second point is concerned with methodology. While analyses of the Thai 
labor movement have helped shed light on how episodic struggles for state power on the 
part of Thai elites have constantly constrained labor’s political space67, the various ways 
in which workers and activists have responded and resisted such constraints has been 
insufficiently documented, particularly in ethnographic studies. Consequently, in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  For the analysis of elite’s domination in the making of Thai constitution 1991, see Hewison and Brown (2005). 	  
	   137	  
following sections, I draw on my ethnographic research—concrete practices and 
discourses of workers located in particular places, to explain how the workers develop, 
acquire as well as exercise their agency.  
Finally I draw on Brown (2007; 2016) and others (see Hewison et al. 1993 and 
Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007) who view the state as a changing set of relationships of 
power, rather than just a group of actors or functions68. Within this framework, I offer an 
analysis of the building and exercise of workers’ collective power and the degree of 
freedom achieved and negotiated through changing sets of power relations via several 
forms of organizing vehicles. By using the ELRG as a case study, I take as a task—albeit 
a daunting one—to elucidate the complexity of labor activism within the organized labor 
movement by focusing on the way in which activists negotiated legal constraints, 
received traditions, and repressive strategies. My second point is concerned with 
methodology. While analyses of Thai labor movement shed light on how episodic 
struggles for powers on the part of Thai elites have constantly shaped the political spaces 
in which labor find themselves organizing69, the genuine way in which workers and 
activists respond and resist to such an arrangement is rarely documented, particularly in 
ethnographic studies. Consequently, in the following sections, my analyses are based on 
ethnographic research, especially briefs evocative of speeches from activists and workers 
on the ground. Here I follow Andrew Brown (2007; 2016) who posits the state as a 
changing set of relationships of power, rather than a group of actors or functions70 (see 
also Hewison et al 1993 and Rodan and Jayasuriya 2007). Within this framework, I offer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  According to Brown (2007; 2016),	  the state is an expression of economic, social, political, and ideological relations 
of power, while regime means a particular type of organization of the state apparatus.	  
69	  For the analysis of elite’s domination in the making of Thai constitution 1991, see Hewison and Brown (2005). 	  
70	  According to Brown (2006; 2010),	  the state is an expression of economic, social, political, and ideological relations 
of power, while regime means a particular type of organization of the state apparatus.	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an analysis of workers’ collective power and degree of freedom achieved and negotiated 
through changing sets of power relations via several forms of organizing vehicles. By 
using the ELRG as a case study, I take as a task—albeit a daunting one—to elucidate the 
complexity of labor activism within the organized labor movement by focusing on the 
way in which activists negotiate constrictions of laws, traditions and repressive strategies. 
 
Conclusion 
The complex composition of Thai organized labor highlights the conflicts and 
contestation associated with organizing workers—organized labor is a site of conflict 
between contending social forces and interests—within which there are significant 
political divisions. This chapter borrows insights from the class composition approach to 
explain such divisions and conflicts. The contribution of the approach is two-hold. First, 
the class composition analysis sheds light the internal dynamics, which are crucial to 
explain why different labor groups supported different sides of the political divide. 
Second, it offers an insight into the entanglement of the Eastern Seaboard labor groups in 
national labor politics, the resulting rift and hence establishment of the local labor group, 
Eastern Labor Relations Group (ELRG). This chapter offers a conceptual tool for further 
discussion on workers’ struggles and power to resist in the following chapters.
Chapter 5. A View from Below: 
Workplace Activism and Militancy in Thailand’s Detroit 
 
This chapter explores the way in which workplace activism becomes a 
springboard for collective struggle and resistance. The first sections discuss the struggle 
of two unions concerning the intensification of work and for union recognition. These 
struggles that took place in American and Japanese carmakers raise questions about the 
effectiveness of workplace activism and the extent to which activists are constrained by 
the legal framework of the industrial relations regime. In short, the case studies touches 
on central questions of labor’s collective agency. In the second half of the chapter, I 
tackle discuss how agency was both constrained and enabled by the legal framework. By 
showing the creative way in which Thai workers breathed new meanings into workplace 
activism, I stress the opportunities created by the labor relations framework and how 
activists made the best out of these opportunities. That said, through the case studies of 
two labor unions in the process of formation, I also illustrate the challenges faced by 
activists and workers, from technical and political class composition perspectives. 
 
5.1 Workers’ Struggle Against Capital 
Based on a dialectical meaning of labor, as non-capital, a creation of value, or a 
process of producing capital, is simultaneously “the moment of the workers’ struggle 
against capital (Tronti and Murphy 2010 [1971], p. 344).”  
As Tronti argues:   
“In the factory, within production, when workers function for the capitalist like machines 
do for capital, with the additional possibility of choosing not to function; when labor is 
within capital and against it at the same time, then the collective boss is tremendously 
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weakened, because for a moment he has left in the hands of his enemies the weapons 
with which to combat him, the productive forces of labor social- ized and objectified in 
the working class.” 
Accordingly, likewise “the total social labor” becomes “the class of organized 
workers—social labor-power as a class (p. 98).” This approach enables an analysis which 
views working class as internal to the capitalist production process and possessing the 
power to attack via its refusal to participate in the process. 
Building on Autonomist Marxism, Cleaver (2017) reformulates Marx’s labor 
theory of value as a theory of the value of labor to capital. By adapting Marx’s definition 
of use value, Cleaver (2017) posits, “The primary social use-value of labor to capital is 
its role in organizing capitalist society and maintaining control over it” (p.65). In other 
words, the capitalists as a class are endowed with the “means of organizing and 
controlling society” (p. 66). Within this framework, Cleaver interprets a class struggle as 
“struggles against work and for the liberation of time and energy for activities of 
individual and collective self-valorization… (p. 67).” In this framework, working class is 
redefined as both factory and non-factory workers, including the women, youth and 
elderly. Cleaver (2000 [1979]) notes that an imposition of work must not be confused 
with the imposition of money wage. Surplus value is understood broadly to include the 
unwaged and unpaid forms of labor power done outside the workplace. As Cleaver 
rightly put “the working class includes those who work for capital in various ways in 
exchange for a portion of the total social wealth they produce” (84). 
The concept of self-valorization is central to the conceptualization of resistance, 
since it is an inversion of Marx’s analysis of ‘valorization’ from the capital vantage point 
to the working class’s political project (Cleaver 1992). As Cleaver explains, Marx’s 
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analysis of the valorization process “captures the essentially undifferentiated sameness of 
the production activities” and “emphasizes the enormous transformation capital achieves 
by reducing the diversity of human production activity to a unified mechanism of social 
control” (116). Cleaver argues that Marx’s valorization is an antipode for the concept of 
alienation but that the latter fails to show the process of such reductionism involved. By 
contrast, the idea of ‘self-valorization’71 represents the positive moments of working-class 
autonomy, where the constitution of new practices emerges from the process of class 
recomposition (Cleaver 1992, 129).  
 
5.2 UM Workers Union: struggle against work intensification 
 
As briefly mentioned above, in 2013 a labor dispute between Universal Motors 
(UM) management and its labor union led to a walkout strike by workers72. After several 
rounds of negotiation over a month, neither side could agree over the terms of a new 
collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Specifically, the dispute centered on the 
proposed addition of Saturday as a working day, a change UM management had been 
trying to introduce since 2011. The union had continually resisted the proposal. However, 
management stated that that they would not negotiate a new CBA unless the union was 
open to discuss the change to the working week. Negotiation reached an impasse, and the 
union executive committee members responded by calling a strike. Although media 
reports claimed that the strike only lasted for three days, the repercussions were far more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  It	  was actually attributed to Antonioni Negri who built on the work of Italian Autonomous Marxists including 
particularly Panzieri and Mario Tronti	  
72	  Similar to industrial relations system in developed countries (such as Canada), strikes are only allowed during 
negotiation of a contract, not in mid-agreement period. During the term of agreement, workers and employers resort 
instead to grievances procedure, what is generally known as right disputes. As noted by Briskin (2007a) in the 
Canadian context, such ‘peace obligation’ and right disputes discourage labor militancy. 
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researching as the return to work did not mark the end of workers’ resistance. As a matter 
of fact, the strike represented the beginning of a protracted struggle that involved 
hundreds of activists.  
On the first day of the protest, as the striking workers walked off the job, union 
staffers organized a sit-in and set up large, temporary tents to accommodate the strikers 
and other participants. As a sign of their unity, both union staffers and the workers wore 
red headbands and scarfs—the union flag’s main color. Inside the large white tents, 
participants sat on reed mats that had been prepared in advanced along with other 
necessities such as electric fans and camping gear. In fact, the union activists had 
prepared for two days beforehand.  
At the end of the day, the sit-down turned into an occupation as fifty workers 
stayed overnight in the tents. For security purposes, union staffers slept in small tents 
positioned around the occupation so as to guard union members while they were sleeping. 
On the second night workers were subject to significant intimidation. Around two o’clock 
in the morning, without any advance warning, security guards together with a group of 
thirty men dressed in black visited the occupied area. They cut off the power, but left 
spotlights on that were aimed only at union leaders. The strikers nevertheless hung tight 
and passed the night together. To their surprise, the attempted intimidation prompted 
more workers to join the sleep-in over following nights. However, union staffers became 
increasingly concerned about their own safety, as union activists had been known to have 
been kidnapped and ‘disappeared’ in the past. Chet, an activist whose father was a trainer 
at the Thai naval academy, was familiar with such tactics. Chet called his father, who put 
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Chet in touch with a group of his ex-students from the academy. According to Chet, the 
tactics used by the ‘men in black’ had the stamp of the military.  
 One of them carried a gun, a pity that the photo we took didn’t work out. But as soon as 
the men in black met with my father’s guys, they stopped the whole operation altogether. 
They just recognized their own kind when they saw the guys. 
 
Subsequently, the company used space that caused the activists to respond in 
spatial terms. Initially the company contained protesters within a defined perimeter on 
factory grounds by wrapping a green net around the tents. Ironically, the workers saw an 
advantage to this action by interpreting it as the company giving them permission to stay 
where they were. Later in court they used this argument to contest their eviction by the 
company. The first court decision ruled in favor of the UM protesters, and allowed them 
to occupy the premise for the first two weeks. The company then requested a temporary 
injunction from the court on the basis of protecting their property. The court then banned 
union executive committees from entering the plant’s premises. In response, the union 
committee members retreated a few meters from the lawn onto the pavement, which was 
considered property of the industrial estate (hence common property not private). In 
response UM management asked the court to issue a warrant for the arrest of union 
executive committee members who had violated the court injunction. However, the court 
refused stating that the union leadership had all moved to stay outside company property. 
Union activists also used vehicles such as pickup trucks to protect the workers from 
another possible raid. In order to move the vehicles closer to the protesters, the activists 
had to manipulate physical space by welding sheets of metal together and place it as a 
passage for cars crossing the trench-like part of the cement ground. Activists even 
searched all the members to prevent alcohol and weapons being brought into the 
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occupied area, denying management any pretext that could be used against workers later 
in court.  
To ease tensions during the first two weeks of the occupation, union staffers 
organized various social activities to keep members occupied. For example, taking 
advantage of Valentine’s Day, union activists organized a soiree in which union members 
with partners shared stories about their relationships. According to a UM union executive 
committee, the event was very successful. 
Some couples had been together for years, but never told they loved each other before. So 
they were tearful. 
 
Moreover, as a show of solidarity, the union invited activists and workers from 
nearby factories to express words of encouragement and support. Many members from 
ELRG visited the UM strikers. Apart from donations, the presence of guests and visitors 
gave striking workers an enormous sense of support and solidarity. These kinds of 
activities demonstrated to rank-and-file members that unionism was not simply a matter 
of isolated struggle within single workplaces73. Through such experiences, members 
learned that the scope of unionism was not limited to the factory’s physical boundary. 
Support was mutual and reciprocal. When other unions also needed support, UM workers 
collected funds and sent representatives to show solidarity. Mutual support and 
reciprocity were crucial values that ELRG activists hoped rank-and-file members would 
experience so as to combat the fear and doubt that strikers always carry with them. 
However, such values cannot be simply taught. They can only be learnt through the 
experience of involvement in industrial disputation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  Interview with a UM executive committee member.	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After two weeks of occupation, the UM management successfully evicted the 
striking workers from the company’s premises. The management requested an eviction 
order from a second court, located in the neighboring province of Chonburi.74 The court 
ordered the occupiers to leave the premise immediately, threatening those who did not 
with a six-month imprisonment sentence. The UM union was subsequently able to move 
activities to a local park outside the industrial estate. Owned by the local administration, 
the park was a public space where fairs and festive activities were held. Although it had 
the advantage of easy access, the park was isolated and located at a considerable distance 
from the industrial estates. As a result, the workers received dwindling media coverage as 
well as support from other unions. The workers eventually relocated to the national 
parliament building, and then to the Ministry of Labor in Bangkok. Occupying a public 
space, at the heart of the country’s capital, the striking workers followed traditional 
demonstrations practiced by Thai labor and social movements which made their struggle 
visible in national politics. One of the most interesting activities held during the public 
demonstrations occurred when a majority of union committee members, including one 
woman, shaved their heads—a radical and symbolic action commonly used in the Korean 
labor movement (Koo 2001).  
As labor geographers (i.e., Harvey 2006; Mitchell 2012) argue, the landscape is 
constantly contested by workers, industrialists, and state agencies over its ‘built 
environment’	  to make it commensurate with their needs. Harvey (2006) suggests that the 
‘built environment’	  (e.g., factory, office building, etc.) is constructed mainly to facilitate 
the accumulation and circulation process of capital within a capitalist landscape.  In that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  An ELRG activist believed that a labor judge in this court had a personal connection with business in the Eastern 
Seaboard.	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sense, labor activism within the industrial estates—the struggle by UM workers, not only 
for wages but for their rights—through contestation over the usage (i.e. use values) of the 
built environment—articulate the workers’ agency in both geographical and collective 
terms. Despite the backlash, UM activists believed that their resistance to the introduction 
of the Saturday working day was the right thing to do. According to Chet, one of the 
activists, if they let the UM normalize the Saturday working day, all the small plants, 
upstream suppliers, in the ESIEs would have to start working six days a week.  
 
5.3 Mitzuki Workers Union: struggle for organizing space 
 
In mid-December 2013, Samart —a manager for a Japanese car manufacturer in 
one of the ESIEs – went to work as he did everyday. Samart had been with the company 
since it began operations, and he was proud of it. Samart was born and raised in 
Chonburi. He had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering. Like all workers, every 
alternate fortnight, Samart was scheduled to work a night shift. Yet, unlike other days, 
Samart sensed something different was happening – an air of tension and anxiety was 
palpable. Within ten days, workers would be leaving for their New Year holiday break; 
most of them planned to return to their hometowns in the Northeast. For this reason, 
Samart’s colleagues were anxiously awaiting news about the annual bonuses about to be 
announced by management. Even though Samart was not from the Northeastern or Isan 
region, and had no children, he knew that most of his colleagues planned to spend the 
end-of-year bonus on presents for their children and their parents at home.  
That evening the workplace welfare committee delivered the news regarding 
annual bonuses. Management had announced that workers would receive a bonus 
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equivalent to six-months salary, plus a specific amount of cash. Samart knew, this 
amount was only one third of the bonuses that other big carmakers had paid that year. 
Unlike some other carmakers in the ESIEs that had already announced the end-of-year 
benefits, workers at Mitzuki knew that the company had performed pretty well, especially 
in the sale of its eco-car models. They certainly knew they had worked hard during the 
whole year.  
During a break, Chai, who worked as Samart’s assistant in the welding 
department, talked to Samart about the workers’ feelings of disappointment. Chai told 
Samart that the workers in welding section were angry, and some were even furious 
about management’s announcement. Looking over toward the space between 
workstations, Samart saw groups of workers huddled together and engaged in an intense 
conversation. This scene contrasted with what usually occurred during breaks as workers 
usually stayed in their own spots and quietly rested. Samart recalled previous 
conversations he had had with colleague, including Chai, Non, and a few others from the 
assembly department, about forming a union. The conservation had reached a dead-end 
due to different ideas as to who should be on the union executive board.  
Other workers in the assembly department were also angry and had actually 
stopped working altogether. When the night shift ended, some workers lingered to inform 
friends and colleagues, who had arrived to work on the day shift, about the disappointing 
news. The work stoppage crept into the day shift, but the withdrawal of labor ended 
around noon. Samart and fifteen other colleagues neither participated in the stop work 
protest, nor had they returned home after the end of their shift. Rather, they met at the 
office of Eastern Labor Relations Group (ELRG) with their minds collectively set on one 
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immediate task –to issue a collective bargaining demand to management supported by a 
majority of Mitzuki workers. Within two days, their demand for changed working 
conditions, signed by nearly 900 workers, had been presented to management, 75. In the 
meantime, Samart and colleagues began the process of registering a labor union with the 
local labor office. Although the union had not yet been legally registered, the workers led 
by Samart and Chai managed to negotiate with representatives of the company and on 25 
December, the last working day before scheduled holidays, reached an agreement over 
new contract terms. On the same day, the Department of Labor Protection had also issued 
the registration for the new Mitzuki Workers Union. This surprised and angered 
management. They responded by dismissing nine employees, including Samart and Chai, 
whose names appeared as founding members of the union.  
 
5.4 Connecting labor struggles with multi-scalar labor activism 
Worker unrest at both the UM and Mitzuki factories were not unrelated. First, 
both UM and Mitzuki unions were members of the same umbrella organizations — the 
Eastern Labor Relations Group (ELRG) and the Thailand Confederation of Trade Unions 
(TCTU). Second, both UM and Mitzuki factories were located in the ESIEs and their 
management belonged to the same employees’ association, known as the HR Club. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, the HR Club not only organized regular meetings and training 
for administrative and managerial professionals but served as a hub for information about 
industrial relations cases received from local government officers. It was very likely that 
what happened earlier in 2013 at the UM factory became a case study for the other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  Thai labor law allows workers without a union to propose collective demand, as long as there are signatures of more 
than fifteen percent of workers forming a bargaining unit.	  
	   149	  
managers, including that at Mitzuki. Most importantly, both UM and Mitzuki managers 
responded to worker recalcitrance in similar ways. For example, charges were pressed 
against union activists on the claim that they had violated several criminal laws. One 
common tactic was the use of a series of lawsuits against some unionists while co-opting 
other union members through financial incentives.  
 
ELRG and international network of activism  
The dismissal of nine Mitzuki union activists set in motion a chain of events that 
touched the lives of many other people, both inside and outside the Mitzuki plant. The 
struggle was to drag on for years, during which time one of the nine sacked workers 
could not tolerate the pressure and committed suicide.76 With the support of activists 
from the Eastern Labor Relations Group, the sacked workers pursued their case through 
many courts, including local and national labor courts, and also filed a petition with the 
International Labor Organization (ILO). 
Almost two years after the events of 2013, I found myself sitting across a table 
from Samart and Chai. We were in a small Thai restaurant on the Eastern Seaboard. 
Sitting next to me was Yumiko (pseudonym), a tiny Japanese woman in her sixties. With 
her soft-spoken manner, Yumiko-san gave the impression of a retired schoolteacher 
rather than the radical labor activist she is who has spent most of her life working for 
international solidarity. In Japan she ran a small organization out of her own house which 
was located in a port city where a global tire corporation had its headquarters. This was 
her first time in Thailand’s Eastern Seaboard.  
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  During the UM protest, activists searched and found weapons on the premises, some of which were passed over to 
Mitzuki activists. Regrettably, an activist committed suicide with one of these weapons.	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Apart from Yumiko, Samart and Chai and myself, we were also joined by 
Yingyong. Yingyong was a leading figure in the ELRG and had known Yumiko for years 
through an Asian labor network. Yumiko was actually in Thailand for a biannual meeting 
of the network, this time to be held in Bangkok. Participants from labor organizations, 
mostly NGOs, from across Asia had just finished a one-day field trip to the ESIEs after 
three days of meetings. Yingyong had been asking Yumiko to help to bring pressure on 
Mitzuki headquarter in Japan to reinstate the sacked workers. Yumiko understood the 
importance of this solidarity work, since she had facilitated similar campaigns supporting 
foreign workers working in Japanese companies in other Southeast Asian countries.77  
  Yingyong usually communicated with Yumiko via email and Skype. With 
Yingyong’s basic Japanese78 and English skills, communication with Yumiko could 
sometime be tricky without translation support. Since Yumiko had wanted to know more 
about the Mitzuki case, she had taken the opportunity of this field trip to conduct her 
‘fact-finding mission’. Having met with Yumiko at the network’s conference in Bangkok, 
I volunteered to act as her translator for the trip. For the meeting, Yingyong chose a 
restaurant that served a variety of Thai and fusion dishes influenced by Japanese cuisine. 
It was actually in this meeting that I realized how workers in Japanese plants like 
Yingyong and Chai had become accustomed to Japanese culture. I learnt that their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  A year after this meeting, I saw a video clip from one of her campaigns in Japan. In the video, Yumiko and a couple 
of senior activists were dressed as Japanese famous video game characters. They spoke in front of a local branch of a 
sportswear company, a main sponsor of the Olympics in Japan, educating the public about the brand’s violation of 
labor rights in another Southeast Asian country. This action took place shortly after the Japanese prime minister himself 
appeared as the video game character at the closing ceremony of the Olympics in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.	  
78	  He was once sent by his workplace to intern in a Japanese branch for several months.	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workplaces had sent them to learn about Japanese working and wider culture, and to my 
surprise, some workers including Chai had acquired a good command of Japanese.79 
During the meeting, Yumiko asked Samart and Chai about the incident that 
happened two years ago on the night of the work stoppage. Yumiko was very meticulous 
and patient in her questioning. Having already read and translated all documents into 
English, I realized how detail-oriented she was. Basically, she asked both Samart and 
Chai to reconstruct the incident, and wanted to know each and every action taken by the 
workers, as the company had used the work stoppage as the key reason for dismissing 
them. It is worth noting that over the past two years, Samart and Chai, along with the 
other sacked workers, had been able to find new jobs. Some others workers had given up 
trying altogether and had become self-employed. Confident in his skills, Samart applied 
for a job in the ESIEs several times. One time, he was told at the end of an interview that 
he got the job, but the company later had a change of mind when they found out that 
Samart was involved with an on-going dispute with Mitzuki. According to many 
activists, the sacked workers had officially been blacklisted from the job market in the 
Eastern Seaboard, as all the automotive companies belonged to the same HR Club.  
After their dismissal in December 2013, ELRG helped the nine workers file a 
petition to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). In April 2014, the NLRC 
ordered the company to reinstate all the workers. The company then appealed the order at 
the Central Labor Court, and in May 2014 ruled in favor of the NLRC’s decision. 
However, the company did not reinstate the workers and appealed again, this time to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  With their professional and language skills, it should not have been hard for Chai and Samart to find a new job. 
However, they told me they could not find any job because they were already on the ‘blacklist’ made by the HR Club.	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Supreme Court.80 For the ELRG, the Mitzuki case (and many other cases) demonstrated 
how the domestic legal system was biased and totally ineffective in terms of enforcing 
the laws where multinational companies were involved. The labor court’s failure to 
enforce its decision on the Mitzuki was a case in point. For these reasons, Yingyong had 
sought support from international networks, including Japanese activists, who 
encouraged the ELRG to seek justice through international mechanisms such as the ILO 
and OECD. At the time, ELRG had already filed complaints with the ILO, supported by a 
network of Thai and international NGO activists. Through OECD guidelines for 
multinational enterprises,81 Yumiko herself had brought several cases involving foreign 
workers to the Japanese National Contact Point, including cases of Filipino unions 
working for a Japanese multinational carmaker, as well as a case involving Indonesian 
unions producing for a Japanese sportswear company. 
During our meeting, Yingyong expressed skepticism as to the effectiveness of 
international mechanisms such as the OECD. When asked why, he simply responded that 
he had no faith in international legal frameworks. “Then why did you submit a petition 
with ILO?” Yumiko asked.82 Her question went to the heart of ELRG practices where 
much emphasis was placed on conducting legal battles within formal industrial relations 
framework. What choices did labor activists have in pursuing their battles? How did they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  There are only two steps in the Thai labor court.	  
81	  According to the OECD guidelines, foreign workers in multinational companies could file grievances to the 
headquarters of the company through the relevant National Contact Point, which comprises representatives from the 
relevant ministries such as the ministry of trade, industry and foreign affairs.	  
82	  Yingyong worked for a Japanese company providing a Japanese carmaker with hot-forged parts such as 
transmission and chassis. To my surprise, he expressed his skepticism about the support from Japanese activists and 
organizations. He seemed to believe that Japanese people were very nationalist, and for them, nationalist interests 
trumped international labor solidarity.	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choose the strategies and tactics? Were they simply forced into this legal approach by the 
overpowering corporations? What were the benefits and costs of such tactics?  
The chapter has so far discussed the UM and Mitzuki Workers Unions together 
and treated them as if they were organizationally identical. In actuality, the two cases 
have distinctive backgrounds. First, although both labor unions were in the ESIEs, the 
UM was an American carmaker whereas the Mitzuki was Japanese. It is actually argued 
that American carmakers in Thailand tend to encourage labor unionism within the 
workplace (Wad 2017). Second, and most importantly, the UM union was established for 
many years, while the Mitzuki union was only embryotic in its activism. Compared with 
the Mitzuki union, the UM Workers Union had many stories of past struggle, in which 
union activists took pride. During my field research, for instance, a former UM secretary 
often told the stories of the union’s past achievements and the benefits that the union had 
contributed to improving its members’ working conditions.  
However, it is impossible to generalize that American carmakers in the Eastern 
Seaboard were more tolerant of labor activism than Japanese counterparts. In fact, 
following the dismissal of nine executive committee members, Mitzuki management had 
tried to convert the registered union into a yellow union by applying more covert and 
subtle ways to control its activities. Moreover, as the two cases of labor activism in two 
Japanese companies in the next chapter will attest, the way in which managements 
respond to labor unions is contingent, depending on their experiences with labor unions 
in the past, as well as activists’ strategies.  
Notwithstanding their differences, the stories of Mitzuki and the UM Workers 
Unions are revealing of the general situations in the Eastern Seaboard regarding workers’ 
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limited rights. When companies expressed acute hostility against labor unions, with only 
slight concerns, if not total indifference to the rule of law, it begs a question of how 
effective laws and regulations are and to what degree the state apparatus is willing to 
enforce the rule of law. Moreover, during the lawsuits, multinational companies such as 
UM and Mitzuki could afford to hire a team of lawyers to represent them, while a small 
union could hardly pay one lawyer with the meager amount collected from membership 
dues. As the UM and Mitzuki cases testify, the struggle had continued for more than four 
years (and still went on while I was writing this dissertation), disrupting workers’ lives as 
well as workplace activism. In short, for workers, the legal framework appeared to be 
ineffective in protecting their formal rights.  
Nevertheless, the legalistic approach pursued by the UM and the Mitzuki Workers 
Unions  (illustrated in the next section) is characteristic of local union movement led by 
the ELRG. It is important to note that through the National Board of Labor Relations 
mechanism, the ELRG helped many individual workers to recuperate severance and 
compensation otherwise lost. In other words, despite its limitations, using lawyers and 
labor law as means to pursue justice in the legal framework did bring about some 
remedies. In the next section, thus I focus on the contradictory nature of workplace 
activism within this labor-relations framework.  
 
 5.5 The Nature and Limits of Militancy in Workplace Activism  
The following sections offer detailed accounts of two labor unions in the process 
of formation. By doing so, I demonstrate the way in which activists made use of the 
industrial relations framework and gave meaning to workplace activism during 
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organizing activities. For the first union, I highlight narratives of the ELRG and union 
activists and how they framed legal battles to the rank-and-file members in their 
speeches. In the second case, I highlight two issues through a series of events over a 
longer period. First, structural constraints (i.e., laws and business strategies) played key 
roles in shaping the legal approach of activism in the ESIEs. Second, as a result, in 
practice the ELRG’s activism embodied both opportunities and challenges pertaining to 
the legal approach for organizing workers. As will be shown, despite its limitations, such 
a framework opened a space for contestation otherwise impossible for industrial workers.  
 
Practices and Meanings of Workplace Activism  
During the year of my research, ELRG played a role in organizing a couple of 
new labor unions in the area. Since the ELRG reached a point where they could no longer 
organize new unions in the areas, the organizers had begun to reach out to unorganized 
workers within recently founded industrial estates, including two private industrial estates 
called 304 and Pin Thong Industrial Estates. The first company, Siam Perfect (a 
pseudonym), is located at the 304 Industrial Estate, whereas the second, Takiya, is at the 
Pin Thong Industrial Estate. 
Driving from Bangkok to the Eastern Seaboard area, a passerby would spot a big 
billboard advertising for the 304 Industrial Estate in Kabinburi district, Chacheungsao 
province, inviting potential investors to relocate to ‘a green zone.’ Green has double 
meanings here. It suggests an agricultural background and the density of plants in the 
surrounding area or alternatively that the workforce in this industrial estate is still 
unorganized.  
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5.5.1 Cases Study: Organizing Siam Perfect Workers Union 
As requested by a good friend, Yingyong helped organize and register a labor 
union for the Siam Perfect (SP) workers who were producing seat covers and airbags. In 
one of the first meetings, I accompanied Yingyong and Chet to a gathering of SP 
workers. After a ride of two and a half hours in Yingyong’s pickup, I was surprised to 
find myself at a local temple. We arrived a bit early, but there was already a group of men 
sitting under the shade of tree. There was also a bottle of Thai whisky next to them. Our 
arrival signaled to the men that they should start preparing for the event. Along with a set 
of loudspeakers, stacks of red plastic chairs were brought to a clearing—an open space 
next to a small storage building– and the men arranged them in rows. There were many 
chairs, far more than I ever saw in any meeting before that. From my estimation, there 
were around three hundred and fifty seats.83 This was not usual for a newly formed labor 
union meeting. After an hour, a stream of uniformed workers, most of whom were 
women, filled the empty chairs, despite pouring rain. Later in the evening, steamed 
Chinese buns were handed out to these female workers who participated in the gathering. 
Before the event started, a man came to Yingyong and Chet. “Everyone wants to 
fight,” he reassured Yingyong, who had endured a hundred-mile ride after work. In past 
years, Yingyong’s health had been fragile, and he could not drive a long distance by 
himself any more. Since Chet had been outside the factory, owing to the UM struggle, he 
was the designated driver. Ekachai, the man who led this gathering, had the air of a small 
business owner, speaking with confidence and authority.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  Later, I found out that this factory employed over a thousand workers.	  
	   157	  
It was shortly after we arrived that a man explained about the ongoing struggle in 
the workplace – the very reason we were all there. Speaking on the stage through the 
microphone, he said 
I have something to tell y’all, so we are on the same page, about how the 
capitalists (nay tuun), or the Japanese (puak yii pun), treated us. We have the committee, 
which is now negotiating with them about our proposed demand. One thing that they 
asked puank pii (collective noun that signifies seniority of the speakers): ‘why are you 
doing this? You don’t have to do it, because you are not gaining anything from it’. We 
responded that we do this for all the Siam Perfect folks. 
 
This last sentence was well received by loud applause. Then he proceeded, 
We are not asking for a lot, but what they should not have done is proposing their 
counter-demand in return. There are two main issues. First, for us to start working at 
7.45 am and finish at 4.45 pm.  
 
Between the pause, a brisk male voice interrupted, “[we are] not taking it (mai ao).” It 
solicited a burst of laughter from the female workers. Then the speaker on the stage went 
on, 
Second, this is serious. Despite the fact that our initial proposed demand does not 
yet include a bonus, the employer proposes that the bonus payment be postponed to the 
next February.  
 
This time, workers gave a collective sneer, followed again by “mai ao” shouted by a 
man. The speaker then asked, “yom mai? (Do we give in?)”, that provoked an even louder 
collective answer: “mai ao.”  
Same here, I did not accept it, so the legal process of bargaining begins. Even 
though I told their lawyer that these terms are not negotiable, they still propose the 
second proposal with a slight change. The bonus will be paid twice a year. The first 
(normal) round in December, and the second in April.  
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Without a pause, this was followed immediately by a more feminine hiss, “hoi!,” telling 
of a surprising contempt. The speaker continued, “I reply no, we do not accept any of…”  
The workers’ applause and cheers muted the last word. Then the speaker joked that “I 
thought you guys might boo me, because you wanted pocket money for Songkran,” 
referring to the Thai traditional New Year during the second week of April, a major 
holiday in Thailand. 
So I am asking y’all for one thing. As this fight is for all of us, for the SP folks, for 
the Thai working in SP. We fight with consciousness (sati), wisdom (panya), and peace 
(santi). Our fight is peaceful and lawful. Unity is also important. Therefore, we need 
mutual aids and care. We will not let anybody go, not even one, including Pii (brother) 
Eakachai. We have to bring him back.  
 
He referred to the first man who came to reassure Yingyong. Leaving a pause for 
clapping, he ended by saying, 
with almost a hundred percent of manual workers present today, I believe that we 
will survive this monsoon. 
 
The first speaker then invited Yingyong to go next, introducing Yingyong as 
someone from the same hometown as himself. He ended half-jokingly, ‘therefore, I 
believe Yingyong will not abandon us.’ Yingyong took the cue and started with a 
nationalist tone, emphasizing that he helped many workers, even foreigners (khon tang 
chat), who were dismissed by their own people.  
Therefore, as we are all Thai, we have to help each other. Right?  
Yes! 
 
Then he continued,  
A labor union is an organization of laborers, founded by laborers, and according 
to the law, aimed to pursue and protect our benefits with regard to working conditions, 
as well as to create good relations between employer and employee, and among the 
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employees. To pursue and protect our benefits concerned with the working conditions: 
what does it mean? From what I’ve heard so far, your employer is trying to take away the 
existing working conditions that we have already attained, including the two free 
uniforms per year, or the annual holidays. Therefore, we may need to sue the employer, 
and have a lawsuit. 
 In the past, we have sacrificed for the company. But today, we are stepping up to 
protect our rights, but several of our friends are being harassed. I heard that some of our 
female friends are getting moved to the maintenance section. Some people like our 
Ekachai, our human resource, who is trying to protect our rights, is being harassed, and 
sees no justice. Art 31 of the Labor Relation Act protects us during which we propose a 
new CBA. Do they (the employer) play dumb? Or are they simply shameless?  
 
The blunt critique excited the workers, who probably had never heard such a public 
statement against an employer before. Yingyong received an even louder shout when he 
raised the question of strike and protest.  
Prom mai krab (are you ready)? Suu mai suu (are you fighting or not)? 
“Suu Suu (fight, fight), Suu Suu,” replied the workers in a loud and clear chant, 
repeated a few times. 
 
Yingyong went on to say that,  
Next week, we meet in front of the factory. We will not occupy the street, causing any 
trouble, but we will seize the factory. As the executive is lame, we will manage it by 
ourselves. Can we do it? 
 
The idea seemed to stir workers to chatter among themselves.  
We are in thousands, and no need to be afraid of a few. Right? 
Yes! 
 
Yingyong then compared the fringe benefits between workers in one ESIE with SP 
workers in the 304 Industrial Estate, such as the night shift payments of baht 200 and 50, 
respectively. He raised an important issue that the better benefits of the counterparts in 
ESIEs did not “fall from the sky” but were a result of self-organizing and laborious 
negotiation.   
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After Yingyong’s speech, workers had a chance to listen to women, most of them 
female supervisors. One female supervisor summarized the need for a labor union as the 
need for job security,  
We need a labor union because this group of capitalists exploit us. They exploit 
Thai people. First, they took away our free working pants. Second, they increased the air 
conditioning to 28 degree Celsius without consulting with us, especially for the Air Bag 
department, that they have more profit, but we have fewer bonuses. Third, they changed 
the way they calculated the base salary, from the percentage. I have worked here for 
eighteen years, and like everybody else, I am not smashing my own rice pot. But we need 
job security, and that’s why we need a union. 
She continued,  
I am not afraid of being dismissed. If I am dismissed, I could go back home to 
grow rice. But growing rice, I would get tanned skin from the sunburn (laugh).  I’d better 
fight. But fighting for staying, not for leaving. 
 
Her speech was forceful and humorous. Moreover, as most workers were female, 
her allusion to skin color spoke directly to them, who not only understood the class 
connotation of dark skin in Thai society, but had also probably internalized it. Like other 
migrant workers in my research, the speaker raised an issue of going back home, by 
choice. It was a narrative they all told themselves, or perhaps were told by their families 
back home, as a sort of consolation: they could go back home and do whatever their folks 
had done for all their lives – working the fields. All in all, as the supervisor pointed out, 
they had the right to be here and to have a union. That right needs to be asserted. 
After two female supervisors gave speeches, a male supervisor provided an 
interesting way of framing the struggle. He asked everyone if they wanted to participate 
in the decision-making regarding what they wanted or demanded. His plea for justice was 
clear,  
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We would not ask for something unrealistic, so that the company has to shut down 
or something like that. But so far we have not demanded anything yet, but they already 
react in the punitive way. This is not right. 
 
When the Human Resource Manager, Eakachai or Eak, finally came up to address the 
workers, he began,   
what the supervisors (hua-na-ngan) do, we do it for everyone.. We have to fight! 
yes, indeed 
 
Again, a male voice answered the call; then Eakachai added,  
If the employees unite, I believe that we can achieve anything. Thus the victory 
will be ours.  
 
The crowd clapped and cheered. While listening, I wondered how the rank-and-
file workers perceived the meaning and the scope of the word ‘victory’ and whether it 
was different from the meanings perceived by supervisors. Addressing the listeners 
collectively as younger kin, Ekachai referred to himself as pii, which meant older 
brother/sister. He continued,  
I am so glad that all of you gather here too. I am speechless seeing that we still 
love and help each other. There may be some people who do not agree with us; that is 
normal. There is no consensus, but with a majority, there is a way to win. Today, I have 
to thank all of us, pii pii (the seniors, referred to supervisors) nong nong (the juniors, 
referred to workers in general). I’m myself trying to fight, fight with all my strength. 
There is now an order to transfer me to another branch, but I have refused to sign it. I am 
still here. 
 
Interrupted again by applause, or perhaps the pause was intentional, he resumed, 
We will fight within the legal framework. I want all of us to collaborate with the 
team. We will fight lawfully and peacefully. I believe that everyone must unite and we will 
win. Finally I have to thank everyone. The victory is not out of reach. I plead that we 
keep fighting. Thank you. 
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The mood was suddenly celebratory, particularly for the supervisors present at 
that gathering; it felt as if the labor union was already formed and had won a big case 
against the employer. Personally, I was expecting that a decision would be made together, 
be it large or small, particularly affirming the need for a trade union was. Unfortunately, 
on that evening, the very question of whether they needed a labor union was not 
explicitly asked but already assumed. Given that most workers came with extremely little 
knowledge about the gathering’s purposes, I was troubled by this omission. For the 
supervisors, at least the evening ended with a positive note. Workers’ morale was lifted, 
and organizers were reassured about ‘the victory’ they would have over management. 
For the ELRG organizers such as Yingyong, to meet with young and unorganized 
workers was a great opportunity to educate them and raise their awareness of the unjust 
system. Most importantly, to show them that it was possible to criticize employers in the 
way he did was a crucial empowering aspect. For example, by calling out the employers 
who deliberately violated the law, Yingyong not only sought to please the workers but 
also gave them an example of what could be done within the industrial relations 
framework. It should be noted that as an awareness-raising tactic, the ELRG organizers 
often used provocation to rouse workers. Take, for example, the talk of the factory 
takeover. At the end of his speech, Yingyong corrected himself that workers could strike 
at their will. They too needed to follow labor laws because the laws are one of the only 
means of resistance they have. He explained to workers that Thai laws allow a strike only 
after a labor dispute takes place, meaning that an agreement cannot be reached between 
the two parties. Nevertheless, he was shrewd to provoke workers about the factory 
seizure. Yingyong’s statement that workers were greater in number than the factory 
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executive was not provocative, but rather enlightening. What he did planted seeds for 
critical thinking in workers’ minds. It explicitly addressed the issues of power 
differentials between classes and between capital and labor embedded in employment 
relations.    
Moreover, as an area-based group, the ELRG also served as an equalizer of wages 
and benefits by sharing information about these to all union members in several ways. 
For example, when Yingyong compared the night shift fees in the SP with other workers 
in the ESIEs, he was indirectly contributing to lowering the gap among workers in 
different factories. In fact, the ELRG activists always tried to find an opportunity to 
educate and raise worker awareness, and this aspect of activism will be made clear 
through many activities discussed in the following case. 
 
5.5.2 Power and hierarchy in the workplace activism 
It is worth pointing out that it is not common for a human resource manager to be 
part of a labor union. However, as showed in Chapter Three (section 3.3), labor unionism 
in the Eastern Seaboard was gradually being assimilated into human resource framework. 
For many practitioners, the line between labor union and human resources is thus 
confused. A speaker from one of the biggest unions remarked, “sometimes I cannot 
distinguish between the human resources department and the labor union”.84  
When managerial ranks mobilize workers as leverage against the employer, 
workplace hierarchy and seniority—rather than participation from membership base—
becomes the source of organizing power. In the SP case, as all the hua-na-ngan alluded 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84	  This statement was recorded by a worker in a seminar on labor relations in the Eastern Seaboard organized jointly 
by the local labor office and a few big labor unions.	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to, they organized and mobilized the rank-and-file working under them to show support 
and gratitude for Ekachai. Notwithstanding supervisors’ intentions, a major 
organizational issue arose: the union in question was accordingly top-down and 
undemocratic.  
Further, the power differential between managers and operational workers is 
notably more pronounced because of gender hierarchies between male supervisors and 
female operational workers. In the case of SP, which produced car seats and airbags, the 
workforce was highly feminized because such production required sewing, a skill 
considered specific to women in Thailand. The gender hierarchy in this group of workers, 
where supervising positions were male dominated and operational workers were mostly 
female, is thus similar to gender dynamics within the feminized production of light 
industries such as garments, textiles, and electronics (see Theobald 1997). In this context, 
the domination of leadership within a labor union could be very visible. 
As I was writing this chapter– only fifteen months after the SP’s formation – the 
union had already been disbanded.  After that first meeting, the leadership went on to 
form a supervisors’ union. Later, the employer requested an inspection of registered 
members, which led to nullification of its registration, as Thai Labor Relations Act 
prohibits supervisors and operational workers from joining the same labor union. The 
manual workers then registered another labor union and faced difficulties in transferring 
the union dues they paid to the previous supervisor union.85  
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  As an anecdote, several months after the SP union was disorganized, an activist said that Board of Investment of 
Thailand and Japanese investors discussed with the Ministry of Labor that unions should not be allowed in this 
industrial estate. He added that as a solution, the National Board of Labor Relations even suggested that employers start 
labor union by themselves and hire private organizations to be consultants for workers.	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The other new labor union that formed shortly after the SP was the Takiya 
Workers Union. This group of workers produced electronic drills for a Japanese company 
in the nearby Pin Thong Industrial Estate. Since Pin Thong is not far from the ESIEs, the 
ELRG activists encouraged workers to visit the office as frequently as they could, 
especially during the union’s formation. By doing that, novice organizers in the process 
of forming a new labor union would meet more seasoned activists who regularly came to 
socialize at the office. During the first six months of my research, by closely following 
the activities of the Takiya workers union, the process of organizing a new union 
unfolded before me.86 
 
5.5.3 Organizing Takiya Workers Union 
To complement vignettes from the SP Workers Union (SPWU)’s single event, I 
now turn to a series of organizing activities observed within the Takiya Workers Union 
(TWU). The first time I saw the Takiya workers, I was at the ELRG office and overheard 
two workers repeating the phrase, “we have nothing to lose. We are quitting anyway, let’s 
go all out.” As I soon realized, this group of young workers, five men and four women, 
wanted to form a labor union because the factory was ‘returning’ subcontract workers to 
the dispatch company. One subcontract worker was there, with his wife, a permanent 
worker at the supervisor level.   
To register a union, Takiya workers sought expertise from the ELRG activists. 
Upon the introduction of a friend, they came to discuss problems and prospects of 
registering a union. After the ELRG organizers decided to help them, the workers would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  Apart from participant observation, I also accompanied the union president to register their union with the local 
labor department and facilitated a workshop session with Takiya founding workers.	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regularly attend meetings with ‘the consultants’ to discuss organizing strategies until the 
union was successfully registered and the first negotiation was over. As I had actively 
participated in several meetings and activities related to the process of its formation, I 
highlight here the notes from important meetings to illustrate details of interaction and a 
longer process of worker socialization and inherent challenges. 
Meeting no. 2 
 In the second meeting, Chet gave a brief introduction of the ELRG (henceforth 
called the Group) and explained differences between the Group and the labor congress to 
which the Group belonged. As a trained lawyer and unionist, Yingyong talked about 
principles and practices of labor unions. The main objective of this meeting was to 
evalute the readiness of the workers and potential members in the workplace. The ELRG 
activists, led by Chet and Yingyong, planned organizing strategies according to details 
shared by the workers – about all production lines and the number of workers in each 
section, including the subcontract and office (i.e. administrative and managerial) workers. 
This meeting showed me that workers generally did not have knowledge of the size of 
their workplace, nor the number of subcontract workers, until they figured out the 
answers in order to respond to the Group activists. 
While Chet emphasized that the workers had to take only one day to get 
signatures from members in order to form a collective bargaining unit or a union, the 
workers were trying to explain that the factory was very large and that they had not yet 
utilized all the space. At this point, the workers started to brainstorm about the locations 
of the CCTVs in the plant, but Chet repeated, “One day was the best way.” 
An interesting issue is the workers’ misunderstanding of the subcontract workers. 
From the meeting, workers appeared to think that subcontract workers were better off 
than permanent workers since they received a higher bonus. This was an opportunity for 
Chet to explain the plant’s strategy, to undermine formation of a union as well as to 
accommodate fluctuating demands of labor. Then Chet asked them to evaluate the 
number of subcontract workers who would join the union. Here there was an interesting 
conversation, when a male worker said that if all the male subcontract workers joined, 
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they could put the factory to a halt. He seemed confident that many subcontract workers, 
who were men, would likely be interested in any militant action. Nevertheless, another 
worker commented that the workers would be afraid to participate in any action, 
particularly a work stoppage. As a response, Chet replied that the goal of a union should 
neither be necessarily disruptive, nor about financial gains, but to improve working 
conditions, safety, and quality of life. He added,“Everyone is afraid, the permanent 
workers are afraid too, especially when you start with actions.” 
 
Registration  
 Beforehand, Yingyong and Cha, two of the main consultants, organized a session 
to help Takiya workers prepare paperwork for the union registration. The meeting could 
not easily start because the Takiya workers were very late. Moreover, only two out of 
four women attended this session. Yingyong spent most of the time explaining how to 
answer personal and organizational questions on registration forms. As he pointed out, 
any mistake could delay the process since officers at the labor protection and welfare 
office were very busy, and they would not hesitate to send the workers back to redo the 
paperwork. In fact, as Pong was going to register a union at the provincial labor office, a 
mistake with spelling on the union’s seal would delay the registration process. I was 
surprised that in order to facilitate the registration, ELRG activists did a good chunk of 
work in place of labor officers. Eventually, TWU was registered, but not without the 
Group’s pressure on local labor officers. From my research, individual workers often felt 
unattended or ignored when they had to deal with local officers alone. From such 
experiences, every time a labor union or a worker needed a document from local labor 
offices, the Group would call in advance to speak with an officer. By doing that, the 
Group activists made sure that the officers were aware of the Group’s involvement.  
 
Group building workshop 
 A one-day workshop was organized on Sunday to support Takiya organizing 
workers. Two main activities were designed to allow workers to discuss individual 
expectations, share personal information with one another, and learn about 
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communication skills and informational flow within a group. The workers had difficulty 
with a scheduled time set by the Group organizers because apparently some women 
workers needed support for transportation. The workshop could not begin until an hour 
and a half later than the scheduled time.  
 
Day of recruitment 
The Takiya organizing committee scheduled a meeting to discuss the recruitment 
problems at the Group office in the evening, after having scheduled that day as a 
recruitment day. Again, the meeting started an hour and a half later than scheduled 
because some workers were very late. The partners of two workers came along and 
waited inside. While waiting for the meeting to begin, Yingyong asked Takiya workers 
who were there to observe a meeting he was having with Virachai and other workers, 
who were there to consult with Yingyong about the annual workplace negotiation. As a 
seasoned unionist, Virachai,87 commented that unionists must be punctual. As a response, 
Pong said that some committee members lived far away from the ELRG and those who 
were close were not willing to be on a committee. 
 
Submission of the first demand 
Takiya Workers Union (TWU) officially submitted their first collective 
bargaining demand to the management. It was not off to a good start. According to Pong, 
a Japanese executive was shocked to the point that his nose bled and he had to see a 
doctor. The workers were concerned that the demand would not legally be recognized 
since the executive refused to accept the document in the first place. However, Thai laws 
obligate employers to begin the negotiation process within three days of receiving a 
demand.88 A few days later, the negotiation began. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87	  Virachai was the person who originally introduced the ELRG activists to Pong, the first president of Takiya 
Workers Union. 	  
88According to article 16, Thai Labor Relations Act, 1975	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First negotiation  
Six TWU executive committee members attended a meeting with the Group, 
preparing for the first collective bargaining negotiation with the employer. The Group 
activists now played the role of negotiation consultants, as they coached TWU about how 
to present and defend each demand on the proposed agreement. This was a very 
informational step because discussion allowed a union executive committee to explain 
why each demand mattered to union members as a whole. It revealed a great deal about 
the existing problems in the workplace. For example, one issue was transportation and 
the problems caused by the company’s merging of bus lines. One of the women criticized 
the employer, who remarked that if a worker spends less than 5 hours in the commute, it 
was still acceptable. The women executive committee members believed that the merging 
of bus lines saved the company’s money but resulted in women workers’ inconvenience 
and insecurity; for instance, they needed to get off the bus and walk on their own, which 
made them feel unsafe. Therefore, the union addressed the issue by asking the company 
to reverse the change. 
Normally Chet, Yingyong and Cha, the Group activists who had consultant 
licenses, would observe negotiation between managements and unions. However, the 
management was generally very strict as to who would be inside the negotiation room. 
Therefore, it was out of the question that outsiders or researchers like me could observe 
the negotiation. Even so, I could deduce that the negotiation room was a slippery slope 
for workers. The management was normally much better equipped and prepared for 
negotiation. Most importantly, they would also try to turn a negotiation into a sort of data 
contest. For example, the management would usually ask union executive members to 
present socio-economic data including the inflation rate, costs of living, and general 
wages in the area, as supporting information. This was a daunting task for labor unions, 
which mostly did not have full time personnel, not to mention for a new union such as 
TWU.89  
Apart from the art and science of negotiation that TWU needed to master, during 
the negotiation period another challenge arose. As TWU activists never fully 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  That said, I found it rather remarkable that most unions were well informed of the company’s performance, 
especially annual sales and profits.	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communicated with members about what they wanted from the union, it was difficult for 
the members to develop a sense of ownership – over both the union and the collective 
demand. Not unlike other unions, TWU activists soon realized that they also had to 
convince their own members that the support would finally translate into betterment of 
working conditions for them rather than for the union executive committee alone.  
 
5.6 Labor relations as the rules of the game  
The 1975 Labor Relations Act of Thailand permits a group of at least ten workers 
who are hired by the same employer to register a workplace union or who are in the same 
industry to register an industrial union. The Thai labor relations framework has thus set a 
low bar for workers who want to register a workplace union.90 It is also important to note 
that a union is not necessarily the same as a bargaining unit. In other words, a union can 
be registered without functioning as a bargaining unit. According to Thai laws, on the 
other hand, any group of workers – more than fifteen percent of the total employees– can 
act as a bargaining unit and propose a collective bargaining agreement without a union 
banner.91  
During the period of formation, as the cases show, labor unions in the process of 
registration such as the Mitzuki, SPWU, and TWU could be vulnerable and easily 
disbanded unless they have a solid membership base. Experienced unionists among the 
Eastern Labor Relations Group activists were well aware of this fact. In the past, 
organizers in the Eastern Seaboard helped workers form unions first and propose a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  In the American context, by contrast, it is much harder to form a union that is legally recognized by employers. 
First, signatures of more than thirty percent of workers are needed to form a bargaining unit in order for the National 
Labor Relations Board to organize an election in the workplace. The bargaining unit then needs a simple majority – 
more than fifty percent of the total employees –to oblige the employer to recognize the union. Compared to the 
American counterpart, a Thai labor union is much easier to register.	  
91	  As a minimum number of 10 workers is required, firms that hire less than 10 employees are not covered by the 
LRA. As noted by Brown (2016), small businesses accounted for almost 75% of registered firms in 2012. Moreover, as 
the LRA allows workers in the same enterprise to register multiple labor unions, it facilitates fragmentation rather than 
solidification of labor unions (Solidarity Center 2007; Brown 2016).  
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collective bargaining demand later. Followed not only by the ELRG, such practice had 
become a tradition within the larger scope of the Eastern Region. However, aggressive 
responses from employers during formation convinced organizers and activists to change 
their strategies. Instead, as seen in the Mitzuki, SPWU, and TWU cases, activists had 
encouraged workers to propose new collective bargaining before registering the union.  
According to Chet and Yingyong, by registering a labor union as quickly as 
possible, workers generally minimized the risk of being dismissed. To begin, Thai law 
prohibits employers from dismissing any union executive committee members on the 
grounds of forming a union. As an additional protection, activists also told union 
executive members to recruit more than half the total workers. By doing so, the union 
executive board would be entitled to appoint the whole union executive board as a 
workplace committee. If all union executive members become the workplace committee, 
it is hard, if not impossible, for employers to dismiss any of them. Article 52 of the Labor 
Relations Act stipulates that the employer could only do so with the permission of the 
labor court.  
Despite the laws, employers often dismissed workers in the process of labor union 
registration by using other justifications. For the Mitzuki Workers Union, although the 
union was legally recognized, the executive committee members had not yet had time to 
mobilize members in appointing the workplace committee. The newly registered union 
did not even have a solid membership base. The workers who joined in the bargaining 
unit by giving their signatures to the new collective bargaining demand were all 
mobilized only around short-term and specific goals of new working conditions. Without 
much difficulty, management was able to dismiss the nine executive committee members 
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by claiming that they violated both company regulations, especially by instigating the 
workers to strike, and criminal laws.92 By comparison, in the case of the UM Workers 
Union, management could not easily dismiss union executive members as the union was 
well established and they were all on the workplace committee. However, the UM used 
criminal law, particularly physical infringement, as a pretext. Additionally, in spotting a 
legal loophole, the company indefinitely locked out unionized workers, forcing the union 
executive committee to give in to the company’s own terms. As a result of these charges, 
workers were frequently forced to prove, either through the National Board of Labor 
Relations or the labor court, that employers dismissed them on the basis of union 
formation, which is not easy.   
Carving Out Activist Spaces in the Labor Relations System 
With the introduction of Saturday as an additional working day, management’s 
effort to impose more work is conspicuous in the UM struggle, while the imposition is 
rather marginal in the SP case, in the form of starting work earlier and finishing later, 
mixed with the reduction of other benefits.93 In the case of the SP Workers Union 
(SPWU), management responded by proposing a counter-proposal and became 
confrontational with the union, while in the Takiya Workers Union (TWU), management 
was more consensual than confrontational. Since the 1980s, Japanese plants in other 
industrial areas, such as the Rangsit area in Pathumthai province, have intensively used 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92The company claimed that the workers stole documents from a manager. In fact, the documents in question were the 
company’s forms on which workers were asked to sign, in order to withdraw from the union’s collective demand. As 
some workers who withdrew from the demand later changed their minds, they requested the union executive committee 
to retrieve the forms from the management.	  
93	  In fact, during my research, the Mitzuki workers already mentioned the company’s plan to replace some workers 
with automaton. All of these efforts are reminiscent of Marx’s study of working days in volume one of Capital and E.P. 
Thompson’s studies of industrial time (see also Cleaver 2017).   
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counter-proposals and lockouts as destabilizing tactics (Napaporn 2002).94 This strategy 
has actually been very common in the Eastern Seaboard and promoted by local Labor 
Protection and Welfare offices. Nevertheless, as these two cases suggested, despite 
unions’ uncertain prospect, labor activism allowed activists to potentially raise workers’ 
awareness and cultivate social values based on collectivity and solidarity. 
A space of activism, as seen in both the SPWU and Takiya cases, was normally 
rare for unorganized workers. Without an official site for a labor union, workers did not 
usually have a private and safe space in which they collectively share their frustration and 
anger, let alone the criticism against employers. Normally, when workers came to the 
ELRG office, they could be confident about privacy and safety in speaking out. 
Organizers were totally independent in that physical space because their office was 
located in a tight-knit community in which activists knew all the neighbors. Within the 
ESIEs, accordingly, availability of safe and public space such as the temple used by the 
SP workers is rather an exception. 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter illustrates the way in which workers strategically responded to the 
workplace challenges within legal framework of Thailand’s industrial relations. By 
understanding its limitations and potentials, we begin to understand the nature and 
limitations of workplace activism and militancy. This understanding sheds light on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  Interestingly, Napaporn (2002) spots a similar pattern of industrial relation strategy in the Rangsit area, where 
workers mostly worked in multinational companies and gained better wages and working conditions than in other areas 
(p. 136). According to Napaporn (2002), the management of Japanese firms proposed a ‘joint consultation committee’ 
by convincing labor unions to avoid confrontations, including strikes or lockouts, and to try to reach compromise in the 
process.	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constrained agency of both activists and workers, otherwise interpreted as reactionary and 
conservative by labor scholars and commentators. 
Moreover, it shows that despite its limitation, the labor relations framework can 
open a space in which activists empower workers to learn about what they were capable 
of. A space of empowerment is crucial because it transforms workers and makes them 
‘dangerous’ especially from management’s viewpoint. This transformation is a 
fundamental reason why companies spend so much energy and resources in pursuing 
legal battles with dismissed workers.  
In the context of the Eastern Seaboard, in which workers were regional migrants 
without political representation and social network of communities were stretched across 
regions, workplace activism, albeit limited, was significant in creating social and political 
spaces. Despite such potential and limitations, as all the case studies testified, there was 
still a big gap between the commitments of union executive committee members and of 
union members. In the Mitzuki case, the latter faced an immediate urge created by needs 
and expectations of financial benefits. As a matter of fact, many workers were drawn to 
the ESIEs because of its reputation for higher pay and bonuses, benefits unheard of in 
light industry and small business.95 According to many union activists, this collective 
anticipation undermined unity within unions by giving companies an opportunity to co-
opt workers. For example, the Mitzuki management opted out workers who supported the 
collective bargaining agreement by offering immediate, but discounted, bonus payment in 
exchange for their withdrawal from collective bargaining. According to the company, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  Following Western norms, most companies issued bonuses before the end of the year holidays. For this reason, 
workers gradually adopted new habits and home visits during New Year holidays, rather than the Thai New Year. 
While most workers still visited home in April, they preferred to bring pocket money to their parents and children 
during the Western holiday season.	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those who refused would go home empty-handed during the holidays since the bonus 
payment would be put on hold indefinitely. In past years, companies in ESIEs, including 
the Siam Perfect (SP), used such tactics extensively in negotiating with unions, resulting 
in mass withdrawal of workers’ support from the unions.  
Such disconnects between activists and members fundamentally point to two 
unexplored relationships: internal dynamics within unions and the linkage between the 
sphere of production and consumption. As such dynamics are relational to the broader 
social relations, the next chapter turns to a relational analysis of formations of class and 
ethnic identity before explicitly addressing gender relations in the following chapters. 
	  
Chapter 6. An Intersectional View: 
Resistance from Ethno-regional and Class Perspectives 
 
This chapter delves into the gap between individuals and the collective by looking 
into workers subjectivity at the intersection of class and ethnicity. Having explored the 
challenges of workplace activism and the broader labor struggle in Thailand in previous 
chapters, this chapter investigates relationships between shared dissents along ethno-
regional and class lines and how they related to fragmentation or division within unions 
movement. This chapter also highlights the process of empowerment, or personal 
transformation generated by collective struggle, which is central in the theorization of 
labor agency. 
Studying the history of Thai workers since the early-20th century, Andrew Brown 
(2010) recognizes Thai workers’ incessant efforts and historical significance in building 
organizations as a vehicle to increase their power in class politics. As Brown (2010) 
wittingly points out, “it is clear that the vast majority of workers who have been 
incorporated into capitalist class relations and processes have not sought the 
revolutionary overthrow of the entire capitalist system or even a radical response to their 
relationship with employers” (p. 132). Additionally, Brown proposes,  
 
“Without an appreciation of this history of a daily, often private, search for justice, 
dignity and equity, it is impossible to understand the impulses that have driven workers to 
try to publicly organize their struggles even in the face of often hostile, economic and 
political circumstances” (ibid.).  
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Elsewhere, in citing Ellen Meiksins Wood (1995), Brown elaborates that it is “in 
relationships of exploitation, conflict and struggle, which provide the impulses to 
processes of class formation” that working-class power should be located (2002, p. 178: 
my emphasis). I agree with this relational view of class, which suits the dialectic, 
relational, and class-based definition of labor set out by labor geographers in chapter 1. 
Therefore, I heed Brown’s guidance by turning to analyses of workers’ impulses. A 
central argument of this chapter is that, while workers’ impulses find their expressions in 
apparent workplace activism, such impulses are driven by motives beyond the factory 
fences and narrow focus of industrial relations framework. 
 
6.1 Getting Involved in Labor Activism  
Almost no union executive committee members I talked to had prior knowledge 
of labor unions before getting involved. Several female workers shared the same story of 
becoming involved in impromptu ways, such as being asked to put their names on the 
executive committee at the last minutes before the union registration, without knowing 
what labor union was and what they would be doing in that position. Such an unexpected 
start was not uncommon for most male and female workers involved in the unions. As 
numerous stories in the preceding chapters unfolded, the emergence of labor unions in 
many workplaces was typically spontaneous and impulsive. Notwithstanding the 
reactionary nature of workplace activism, workers’ senses of righteousness and urgency 
to find collective voices cannot be dismissed. In this chapter, I examine the roots of such 
strong personal and collective discontents that workers shared.  
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I want to start with a female worker’s voice that embodies ambivalent and 
conflicted feelings that most unionists had vis-a-vis management, coworkers and family 
members. Na (pseudonym) was a female worker in a Japanese auto-parts factory and a 
union treasurer. During the first years of her getting involvement, Na constantly argued 
with her boyfriend, working in another auto-parts company, who did not support or 
understand her reasons for getting involved with the union. In short, her activism was 
fraught with tensions and conflicts, with other executive committee members not so 
active as she expected whereas workers in general were passive and not supportive of the 
union. Na was more easygoing than other female workers, and she did not mind hanging 
out with male activists. For this reason, she told me, her boyfriend was even more jealous 
and against her involvement. When asked why she was still involved in the union 
activism, her reply was, “if we are not doing anything, we would be targeted. Because 
we’ve already formed the union, if it fails, the company would easily fire us.” Like other 
unionists I talked to, she felt torn and caught in a dilemma. On the one hand, she 
understood that workers were ambivalent about activism for many reasons, including 
‘they were not ready, scared, or they wanted private life with friends and family.” On the 
other hand, she wished that the company was more understanding and appreciative of her 
hard work; the union would otherwise not be needed.  
During our conversation, Na reminisced about her first employer, that she thought 
treated employees well and had workers happy. “I really want to use that company as a 
case study for my boss, and show them why the workers do not form a union there; why 
the workers get a lot of bonus payment.”Apparently, it was not a unique workplace; Na 
felt the second factory at which she worked also treated workers well and there was no 
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union there either. However, she quit the first factory for personal reasons, and the 
second time because they did not promote her from subcontract to permanent worker 
after three years. When I asked her about the most serious problem in her current 
workplace, she gave an answer that revealed the latent meanings behind the demand for 
bonus payment (see below). 
Everything is part of the problem: hua na ngan (the supervisor), how they decide 
the raise, bonus, you name it. We work all the time, and we produce all the time. There 
were not many problems (before the union), but the company decided to give us that 
formula (for calculating the bonus). So we thought it was not fair to us. They reap profits 
that come from our work. They have a lot of income. But why did they share such a tiny 
bonus with us. Where has all the rest of money gone? The workers deserve more bonus 
than this. Plus, this is not a big factory. It’s just a small factory with 300 something 
workers. … We don't want much. Well how much profit the company received, they don’t 
know. They do not want to make the company broke, with nothing left. No, not like that.  
 
Dilemma of the Workplace Activism: Personal vs. Group Interests 
 
According to Na, workers’ real desire was a fair share from their labor. While this 
demand reflected what scholars call politics of redistribution (Fraser and Honneth 1995), 
rooted in a claim over economic justice, there was also an element of recognition. 
But the company and the Thai employer, especially hua na ngan believe that the 
formation of a union means the declining of the company. They were the ones who tell on 
us [to the Japanese boss]. Actually, the Japanese boss is not difficult to talk to at all. It is 
the Thai management. I don’t understand why they are doing this. Why are they 
jeopardizing our success? We have a hard time organizing because of our Thai people 
(kon thai duay gan)—HR, and managers. They said that the workers made faulty 
products. I wanted to ask them if they had good planning, would the workers who only 
followed their order produce any defective goods? It is their skills that should be in 
question. The workers cannot decide for themselves about how to work. They cannot set 
the values for the machine by themselves, or on their own will. They really cannot. But 
these days they blame the workers for letting the damaged products out. 
 
In the past few years, Na had suffered from chronic back pain, as her work 
entailed regular bending and lifting a heavy load of metal bearings. After she tried to 
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make management aware of the harsh working conditions, the response was not positive. 
Moreover, our conversation demonstrated that she was aware and critical of her 
colleagues, who tried to abuse their positions with the union, but at the same time, 
understood the significance of having labor organizations. Despite her unintended 
involvement in the beginning, she tried her best and hoped that the union would gain 
more support.  
 
One main reason I’d like the union to continue is that I want to see changes in 
many things. Yet, as folks are not easily organized, it’s difficult to do anything.  
 
Here, Na stressed the discrepancy between the instrumentality of trade unions and 
reality. The prospects did not get better, with two other female executive members, two 
close friends being disciplined by getting transferred to do manual work. The union 
finally came to a standstill, much like other unions that could not overcome both the 
challenges and particularly the gap of commitments between the executive committee 
and rank-and-file members (see Chapter Five). Eventually, Na was ready to let go of the 
union. According to her, if she ever quit her job, she would go home to sell vegetables 
with her mom. Unlike most workers, Na was local. Almost a year after I left the field site, 
Na contacted me with the aim of selling an insurance package to me. She finally quit the 
job.  
Na’s account brings to the fore a central issue. It is beyond doubt that those 
workers involved and active in workplace activism were largely driven by indignation—
pent-up feelings about unfair treatments, harsh working conditions, and undeservedly low 
pay. When I asked worker-activists about their primary reasons for interest in labor 
unions, the common response was that they could not stand by and witness injustice (in 
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Thai words, kwam mai phen tham) happening to either coworkers or themselves. Orn’s 
statement could offer a comprehensive summary of other workers’ opinions: 
 
[I was] in contact with the work of labor unions for the first time here, with this 
group of people. [Before that] I didn’t know anything about the background at all…only 
knew that it was the union that helped workers, for labor issues, just that. Therefore, I 
admire the union. I think if we don’t have passion or time, we wouldn’t sacrifice so much 
for other people. It has to be people with jai suu (literal: combative heart; courage), who 
rak (love) kwam yutitham (justice), who don’t want to see anyone being harassed. Or, 
someone who wants to fight for the working people. This is how I genuinely feel. But 
again, sometimes, I feel that if other people never understand our importance, or only 
expect our support, why do we need to help them? Why do we work so hard? This is how 
I feel sometimes. It is both these feelings. 
 
 
This evidence corresponds with research conducted on industrial relations from 
mobilization theory (e.g., Gouldner 1954; McAdam 1988; Gamson 1995; Kelly 1998). 
Most importantly, John Kelly (1998) argues that workers’ sense of injustice—injustice or 
grievances caused by employers and felt by employees—is often the motive that leads to 
workers’ collective action, in either union or non-union forms. Drawing on Charles 
Tilly’s (1978) theory of collective action,96 Kelly (1998) explains that workers’ sense of 
injustice does not always engender successful labor organizations. As he elaborates, 
collective action can take various forms “according to the balance between interests, 
organization, mobilization and opportunity” (p. 26). Making sense of the absence of 
formal industrial relations actions in the Global North, Kelly points to a potential 
disjuncture between the group’s degree of interest and the resulting collective 
organization (ibid., p. 26). This disjunction is apparent among Thai unionized workers, as 
I highlighted in Chapters Five. 
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forms of action. Organization refers to the group’s structure and aspects impacting its capacity to act, and opportunity is 
the balance of power, the costs of repression, and opportunities available for the group to respond (Tilly 1978).	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6.2 Empowerment: Personal Agency and Collective Action 
Mobilization theory is very useful to explain the discrepancy between workers’ 
grievances and the resulting collective action (or lack thereof). Several authors in this 
vein highlight two crucial elements: conviction or strong feelings of injustice 
(Klandermans 1992; Gamson 1995) and feelings of entitlement to one’s demands and a 
belief in collective agency (McAdam 1988; Gamson 1992; Kelly 1998). In short, the 
sense of injustice is often the point of departure, but it does not suffice to make the 
workers act collectively, unless they are empowered to see possibilities of future change 
brought about by collective action. This insight is very important because the entitlement, 
hope and optimistic feelings—which together I call ‘being empowered’—are central but 
largely underexplored in the studies of labor agency. Similarly, McAdam (1988) 
highlights the cognitive aspect of workers’ liberation, which points to disillusionment 
from the status quo. In this chapter, I want to stress the process of disillusionment, or 
personal transformation generated by collective struggle. Doing so requires a framework 
attentive to power and agency, with a particular sensitivity to subjectivity and 
collectivism. Therefore, I turn to the social ontology proposed by Feminist Historical 
Materialism.  
In Power, Production and Social Reproduction, Stephen Gills proposes a 
Feminist Historical Materialist ontology constructed on a set of central arguments (2003). 
Among them, I want to highlight the concept that innovatively weaves together labor 
agency, subjectivity, and social reproduction. This approach is in accord with my 
theoretical choice to go against the binary of culture and structure (McDowell 2000; 
2008; 2013). In this framework, work is defined in a broader sense as part of an 
	   183	  
ontological conception of the social world, rooted in education, culture, and institutions 
of social development (cf Gramsci 1971). Thus, human labor is defined both within the 
social relations of capital. In other words, labor agency could be negative (i.e., 
reproducing the capital-labor relations) and creative (i.e., purposeful and liberating) 
forces, which work to sustain or resist the penetration of capitalist forces in social 
relations and institutions. For this reason, political struggle should be broadly defined in 
economic, political, and cultural spheres, and include the struggle for better organizations 
and relations of social reproduction. Second, as waged labor is forced to sell labor power 
in the market, it is subject to the social and power relations of capital. However, such 
expansion of forms of social control provokes resistance from the protecting movement 
and community (cf Polanyi 1957). 
To put flesh on the bone of this framework, I follow Kelly (1998), who rightly 
observes that the manifestation of two elements above—what I call henceforth the sense 
of injustice and empowerment—begs critical questions about the sources of social beliefs 
(p. 29). In the next section, after situating the notion of social justice in theoretical debate, 
I explore Thai workers’ sources of social and cultural beliefs in equality and fairness by 
visiting the meaning of kwam phen tham (justice) in Thai society, before focusing on the 
structure of Isan workers’ feelings, in particular. In doing so, I highlight communitarian 
notion of equality as an alternative to its liberal version in order to understand the 
workers’ idea of justice. 
6.2.1 Meanings of justice as experienced by workers 
Despite prior unfamiliarity with unionism or labor laws, Thai workers often had 
the strong conviction that employers did not treat them well or that the working 
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conditions were not right. They expressed a similar normative claim for kwam phen tham.  
In vernacular Thai, the word ‘tham’ has two overlapping meanings. First, it is shorthand 
for yuti-tham, which is translated as justice. According to the Thai dictionary, its literal 
meaning is associated with the concepts of equity and legitimacy. Its usage is also 
associated with the legal and judicial system, thus presupposing laws and enforcement. It 
must be noted that justice in this sense is different from fairness, which is more akin to 
second meaning of tham. Alternatively, the second meaning of tham overlaps with the 
term dharma, as they share the same pronunciation in colloquial Thai. In fact, dharma is 
one of the most complex words, with its roots in Pali; it entails several meanings and 
interpretation. Pataraporn Sirikanchana, a Thai scholar on Buddhism, categorized dharma 
into two main meanings: external or ontological and internal or spiritual/epistemological 
(1985). To put it simply, dharma is understood by Thais, ontologically and independently 
of individual selves, as the laws of nature or ways things are. Second, epistemologically 
or internally, it means righteousness, duty, norms, or truth. In this sense, it is close to the 
idea of fairness. When workers such as Na or Orn said that they became involved in labor 
unions because they saw kwam mai pen tham happening with their colleagues or 
themselves, they meant that they could not stand by and witness something that is not 
right, which is related to the second meaning.    
 
6.2.2 Erasure of Social Memory and Injustice  
In the ELRG office, the visual display of workers’ moral discontent and sense of 
justice were apparent from the first day of my arrival. Here is a description taken from 
my fieldnotes: 
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The office of the Eastern Labor Relations Group (ELRG) was a one-story 
building that used to be a snooker parlor. During my field research, it was mainly 
equipped with two long, foldable tables, office chairs, a used office desk and cabinets, 
and a few bookshelves, without air-conditioning. The wall was painted in light blue, now 
stained and faded, looking almost white. The most outstanding feature was a set of four 
separate banners in a long rectangular shape that hung on the wall. On top of each satin 
banner was the seal of the group, within which a map of Thailand is surrounded by a 
circle in the shape of a rice plant, on the upper half, and a gear on the lower half. The rice 
plant and the gear represent agriculture and industry that co-exist to support the country. 
The four banners must be read altogether, otherwise they do not make sense. The first 
banner read ‘bureaucrats = human beings (kha ratchakarn = khon)’, while the second and 
third ‘employees = human beings (nai cang = khon)’ and ‘workers = human beings  
(khon ngan = khon)’, respectively. The last piece, in my view not necessary, made the 
full circle by stating khon = khon. When read together, these banners stressed the 
intrinsic value of equality embedded within the persons that incarnate these three classes 
and socio-economic roles: bureaucrats, capitalists and workers. Such messages were also 
emphasized by the faded posters that hung around them, one of which read “free trade = 
capital reigns the world” while the other a picture of Che Guevara hung on the far left.97   
 
To make sense of such an equation, it is crucial to understand the roots of Thai 
labor activism. According to eminent Thai labor historian Andrew Brown, the 1923 
tramway strike symbolized the emergence of Thai labor activism (2004). To show the 
sentiments of striking workers and activists of the time, Brown (2004) quoted at length an 
article of the Laborer Group (khana kammakon), a group of labor activists inspired by the 
tramway strike. The article’s author publicly rebuked the unjust nature of waged 
contracts between employers and employees, while going on to equate wage-labor 
relations to modern slavery. Not only were such messages markedly similar to the ones 
used by ELRG workers (recall the denouncement of slavery on the UM’s placard), but 
also tramway striking-workers and the Laborer Group were involved in the same 
conflicts of patronage-relations and the search for freedom and dignity. As the authority 
failed to address workers’ grievances, the latter went on to seek redress from the Minister 
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  For particular reasons, images of Thai royalty were also present.	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of Interior.98 As the Minister of Interior was proven loyal to the company and indifferent 
to the striking tramway men, activists called for all workers to act in unison by striking 
and taking matters into their own hands. For the sake of comparison, I would like to show 
a part of an article published by the Laborer Group in 1923 here. 
 
…Workers! Remember! Freedom does not lie with others, it lies within our own 
group. We should follow the correct method, that is, when we are dissatisfied with the 
regulations, or oppression of the employers, we should all stop work. Having ceased 
working, we should all vote one of our members, who we think capable of discussing the 
issue with the employer, to be our leader. We should work out an agreement with the 
employer to the satisfaction of all concerned….our leader should make the contract by 
which we accept to work. The contract should be made so that both sides have a solid 
and stable base. (Kammakon 27 January 1923, cited in Brown 2004, p. 29:emphasis 
added) 
 
This passage, taken from the article published in the early-twentieth century, 
bears an unmistakable resemblance to present rhetoric and actions of ELRG activists in 
the Eastern Seaboard. To begin, such a semblance could indicate Thai workers’ 
unchanging situations of in the waged labor system emerging during the time. As the 
legal and institutional arrangement of the contemporary industrial relations was not 
established until the post-WWII period, the mention of ‘the contract’ referred to a social 
contract, rather than a collective bargaining agreement. However, I should note that the 
general organizing and negotiating approach of the ELRG members was still in accord 
with ‘the correct method’ described in the article: distraught workers participated in 
wildcat strikes, then delegated their decisions to leaders, who worked out a win-win 
contract with the employer via negotiation. Similarly, an unstated assumption is, as seen 
in previous chapters, that the leaders would know what was best for the workers, which is 
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   187	  
not always the case. In other words, democratic practices within collectivism were 
assumed, rather than worked out or structured.  
In terms of Thai legal and political systems, at least in workers’ structure of 
feelings, they have always felt that laws and state agencies operated to employers’ 
advantage. This sentiment was firmly imprinted on the social consciousness of past 
workers and still conspicuous among present-day workers. Despite the seeming 
continuity, Brown noted an aspect of discontinuity caused by the Thai state, which 
attempted to erase the memory of labor radicalism by obliterating the term ‘kammakorn’ 
through law reform. As Brown comments,  
 
This renewed endeavor to establish and embed a clear distinction between 
‘economic’ and ‘political’ issues is reflected in the language of the law itself. By the late 
1950s, the term kammakorn, in use since the days of the absolute monarchy, had acquired 
subversive and dangerous semantic connotations that evoked images of the masculine 
manual laborer as a member of a potential revolutionary proletariat. There was no place 
for such a term in the new legislation that only spoke of raengngan (worker) or lukcang 
(employee). Everyone from factory workers right through to the Prime Minister could 
and would be described as raengngan.” (Brown 2004, p. 67: original emphasis) 
 
 
I should note my disagreement with Brown’s comment that the current use of 
raengngan stands as a universal description for everyone, especially for white-collar 
labor upward to a Prime Minister, as kammakorn is currently replaced by raengngan, 
which has acquired connotations of manual and menial labor. Nevertheless, Brown is 
right to point out the censorship by deletion of kammakorn in official usage. Despite the 
state’s effort, labor groups and unions, especially independent and political groups such 
as the ELRG, often self-identified with the term kammakorn to stress the hardship and 
alienation they faced. The term was still heard particularly through speeches of labor 
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leaders and songs that carried on the tradition of labor radicalism via the use of 
kammakorn in the lyrics. One such song, Saksi-kammakorn (dignity of laborer), was 
considerably idolized by workers. Another song sung by union representatives that 
evoked a great sense of strength and unity in a gathering I attended went as follows: 
 
Let’s fight! Don’t retreat. The Masses are rooting for us. Come together and 
destroy the enemies. We fight for justice. Let’s walk side by side, march in with the 
determining heart.  They’ll strike us, but we’ll have no fear. We will fight til the death. 
Let’s fight! Do not flee, for the great freedom. Come together, we the Thai people. Fight 
tooth and nail, we are kammakorn. 
 
 
Dating back to the days of the 1970s student movement, this song was frequently 
used by organized labor and, more recently, by the anti-government movement as well. 
Since the word kammakorn captured a revolutionary fervor of the communist past, the 
song itself was crafted in March style. During the anti-government rallies in the past 
decade, ironically, it was popularized by the leaders of Yellow-shirts movement. The 
mismatch between the movement’s urban, upper-middle class crowd and the working-
class rhetoric of revolution often raised eyebrows of many leftist and pro-democracy 
activists. This appropriation of working class rhetoric is an attempt to recapture workers’ 
symbolism and energy related to dissidence and opposition to the government.99  
For raengngan Thai (Thai workers) and sahaphab-raengngan (labor unions), 
despite the term’s official erasure, they continue to identity themselves with kammakorn 
and such the essential meanings of the term. Most activists I knew preferred to call May 
Day, Wan Kammakorn (Laborer Day), as opposed to Wan Raengngan used by the 
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  Ironically, the elite-led Yellow-shirts movement could use such tactics to generate so much energy that they put a 
halt to the Thai economy, as epitomized by the shutdown of the capital and the siege of parliament and the main airport 
in 2014. See for example, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/bangkok-shutdown-thai-anti-government-
protesters-continue-demonstrations-9057966.html	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government. As unionism has only been limited, solidaristic values of Thai workers in 
general reflects rootedness in the larger historical context of Thai society, in which the 
working class has ceaselessly negotiated for its place with the Thai state and its dominant 
urban elites.  
In this sense, the idea of tham or justice, as used by ELRG activists, captures the 
discrepancy between the ideal notion of equality as innate and natural, on the one hand, 
and justice as struggled and perceived by society’s lower rank, on the other. Therefore, 
when workers talked about kwam mai pen tham, it should be understood in the context of 
both fairness and equity. Moreover, it should be noted that this meaning of justice does 
not necessarily presuppose the judicial system’s existence and effectiveness. For instance, 
Chat, a veteran unionist and activist, questioned the Thai justice system and criticized 
judges in labor court as siding with employers and capitalists: 
 
If anything happens, and we decide to strike or protest, who would be on our 
side? It is very difficult these days. The industrial estate would sue us too. We are not 
only fighting with the employers. If we fight with the employers only…they beat us, we 
beat them; it is fair. If the industrial estate joins the fight, the employers, and HR club 
too….then the law makers, and the state, they are all on one side. As if we are besieged, 
who do we turn to? 
 
 
Noting the implicit idea of fairness, the local activist pointed to equal power 
relations between employers and employees, which in turn imply a law enforcer in the 
market economy. In other words, workers’ notion of justice presupposes the state as a 
guarantor of a fair system. Informed by their lived experiences as waged and migrant 
labor, workers viewed the system as unfair and criticized the collusion between the state 
offices and capitalists or employers. This is fundamental disillusionment that began the 
process of empowerment. Such shared experience and realization are foundational to 
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their collective identity, akin to what Raymond Williams calls ‘structures of feeling 
(1977). Williams (1977) proposed the concept ‘a structure of feeling’ to capture the 
active and ongoing processes of the subjective, as opposed to the formal (i.e., explicit and 
known forms such as relationships and institutions).100 He defined structure as a set of 
“characteristic elements of impulse, restraint and tone; specifically affective elements of 
consciousness and relationships (p. 132, emphasis added), whereas the use of ‘feeling’ is 
in contrast with the formal concept of ideology. It is a broad term encompassing a wide 
range: meaning and values as actually lived and felt, formally held systematic beliefs and 
its practical, nuanced, and variable forms, and the acted and justified experiences (ibid). 
By changes in the structures of feeling, therefore, he meant changes in social relations, as 
they were lived at the present time and still emerging. Building on Williams’ structures of 
feeling, I take the cue from Chari and Gidwani (2005), who argue that “[G]eographical 
ethnographies of work must be attentive not only dominant structures, power relations 
and practices, but also to the fleeting nascent, and marginal, and to the forms of working-
class yearning” (273). The next section discusses, first, concepts of social justice in 
geographical theories and, then, a concept attentive to Thai workers’ yearning. 
 
6.3 Social Justice in Geographical Theories 
 
A relevant debate in geography concerns with the theorization of social justice in 
spatial terms. As David Harvey (2009) argues, in a liberal perspective, justice is often 
understood as a set of principles that operate to resolve conflicts. The principles are 
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  Whereas the dominant tendency in theories is to reduce the social as habitual (i.e., fixed, finished and known 
products of the past relationships and institutions), Williams stressed theories that apprehend the active—the moving, 
forming, and momentary processes of lived experience, consciousness and feelings. 
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related to social and institutional arrangements, concerned primarily with ‘just 
distribution’ of benefits and burdens arising in the process of production (p. 97). In short, 
the liberal principle of social justice is summarized as ‘a just distribution justly arrived at’ 
(p. 98). In other words, the principle of justice is based on the acceptance of rules of the 
game. This is equivalent to John Rawls’s initial position in four mechanisms: allocation 
(market competition), stabilization (full employment), transfer (redistribution), and 
distribution (public goods). However, as critical theorists point out, “distributive justice is 
necessary, but not sufficient, conditions” (Young 1990; Mitchell 2003). Iris Marion 
Young (1990) argues that the framework for social justice that exposes injustice demands 
theories that incorporate both the universality—the liberal assumption behind just 
distribution that society is homogenous – and the particularity of social context that 
allows us to recognize social differences and criticize structures of oppression and 
domination (see Mitchell 2003, 30-31). Building on Young, Mitchell (2003) connects the 
radical framework proposed by Young (1990) with theories of spaces by highlighting the 
role of the rights framework in supporting collective control over the means of 
distribution. In the context of Thai political economy, where the scales of justice in both 
judicial and geographical meanings are multiple and, thus, subject to what Nancy Fraser 
calls the problem of incommensurability (2009)—how do we know which balance (or 
scale) to use in a given case?  
Here the collective work of both Young (1990; 1997; 1998) and Fraser (1997; 
2008; 2009) offer great insights into the struggle of subordinated or marginalized groups 
(McDowell 2000). When read together, Young’s approach is complementary to what 
Fraser leaves underdeveloped, which consists of the political process, collectivism, and 
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definitions of oppression and domination. To begin, I want to highlight McDowell’s 
(2008) remark that to collapse the binary of structure and culture, “we need to answer, 
questions such as what sorts of inequality matters most, in what circumstances and how 
do we decide?” (p. 494).  
According to Fraser, justice means parity of participation, or participatory parity. 
Fraser’s work offers clarity for conceptualizing the complexity and multiplicity of 
injustice, in terms of economic, political, and cultural inequalities. Fraser (2009) argues 
that in western thinking, questions of justice are normally concerned with the right, 
which belongs to a terrain of morality, while questions of self-realization are concerned 
with the good, a terrain of ethics (27). However, she proposes that recognition, or the 
questions of self-realization, is also an issue of justice. In comparison, Young’s concept 
of justice is very helpful for understanding enablement and constraints and especially the 
focus on procedural aspects of participation within the social group itself. For example, 
drawing on the ideas of communicative ethics and deliberative democracy, developed by 
Jergen Habermas and Agnes Heller, Young highlights the roles of deliberation and 
decision-making and hence the consensual voices of the marginalized group. I also find 
Young’s approach more concrete than Fraser’s, in the way it reconciles internal conflicts 
among analytical categories.  
This framework of social justice, a concept that should encapsulate redistribution, 
recognition, and representation (what Fraser calls three-dimensional social 
differentiation), offers insight to help us understand workers’ struggle for dignity. 
According to Sayer (2011), dignity is a complex concept, since it embodies dual 
concepts. From a relational perspective, dignity is fulfilled by respect and recognition. It 
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is something to be attained, not existent by itself. In the ideal situation, when a subject is 
autonomous, dignity could be intrinsic. Otherwise, it would be attained through 
negotiation or struggle, as in workers’ situations. When a subject is vulnerable, dignity 
begins to be dependent on others.  For Sayer, it has to do with the capacities we have (the 
real) and the capacities we exercise (the actual). It entails two kinds of recognition: 
conditional and unconditional. In a workplace context, Sayer also highlights the dignity 
that comes from respect and trust, from management to workers, in decision-making and 
freedom. Citing Ehrenreich’s (2001) report on low-waged workers, for instance, Sayer 
points out that forms of workers’ surveillance and restrictions strip workers of self-
respect and dignity (201). 
It is important to note two caveats here. First, my reference to kammakorn is 
intended to stress the contradiction between the indispensable roles of the Thai working 
class in national development and the lack of social recognition. Unlike the South Korean 
state, the Thai state does not fairly compensate for Thai working class’s contribution, or 
publicly praise them as “warriors” in the making of its economy (see Koo 2001). On the 
contrary, the Thai government has always alienated the working class, while at the same 
time blaming them for low productivity. Second, to say that workers’ norms of 
righteousness are rooted in the historical consciousness of the Thai working class is not to 
deny the significance of trade unions and socialist ideology. Despite the limitations of 
formal unionism, I argue that workers benefited to a certain degree from what Rick 
Fantasia (1988) calls a ‘culture of solidarity,’ through the process of forming unions and 
organizing labor-related activities that restructure their relations and agency (p. 11). 
However, such consciousness-in-association is not the only basis for workers’ 
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collectivism. As regional migrants with a strong sense of identity, they were able to draw 
on cultural resources to contest repressive state-capital collusion. By broadening my 
analysis to include culture, I heed Chakrabarty (1989), who forewarns us that “a logic of 
a particular culture cannot be explained by the methods of political economy, that often 
fail to distinguish between ‘function’ and ‘reason’” (xii). In the next section, I make a 
case by drawing on the literature in social anthropology and history of the Thai 
northeasterners to understand their cultural meanings of justice and class struggle. 
 
6.4 Historical labor consciousness and geography of ethno-class struggle 
 
By pointing out the historical continuity of radical activism within the Thai 
working class, I do not intend to suggest an evenness of labor activism across 
geographies in Thailand. By contrast, the unevenness of labor activism cannot be 
overstated. As Brown (2006) points out, radical activism of the early-twentieth century 
was concentrated in urban and commercial centers such as Bangkok, the diffusion of 
labor activism to other parts of the country such as the Eastern Seaboard gradually but 
inevitably followed the patterns of movement in foreign capital and production across 
spaces.  
6.4.1 Regions, Traditions and Class Struggle 
As Jane Wills reminded us, “in focusing on uneven patterns of trade unionism, 
geographers have tended to neglect the importance of historical discontinuities and 
conflicts in the social and political practices deployed in particular places” (1998, p. 130). 
Accordingly, despite the history, I intend to show that the changing geography of 
activism and workers’ demography in the Eastern Seaboard necessarily combine to create 
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distinctive practices, experiences, and sets of challenges. Discussing the spatiality of 
trade unionism traditions, Wills went on to warn labor geographers of “the dangers of 
freezing social processes and losing sight of their dynamic development over both time 
and space” (ibid.). To avoid such dangers, in theorizing workers’ collective agency, I 
refrain from drawing a boundary around the Eastern Seaboard as a delimited region. 
Instead, I consider the constant flows and exchanges of ideas and people across places, 
including migration from the Northeast to the Eastern Thailand, as well as the circulation 
of thoughts and practices from the urban center to the industrial periphery. 
The economic migration of Northeastern workers is not a new phenomenon. 
According to Charles Keyes (2014; 1967), the migration of Northeasterners, or Isan 
people, to Bangkok started after World War II, when the stream of Chinese immigrants 
was curtailed by the Thai state for security and political reasons. For over four decades, 
anthropologist Charles Keyes has studied Northeastern villages and Isan—the collective 
designation of the Lao-speaking people in Thailand’s Northeastern region. According to 
Keyes, the formation of Isan identity101 is deeply rooted in the historical moment of the 
national politics.  
 
6.4.2 Being Northeastern Workers 
I want to highlight the significance of applying labor-geography perspective 
beyond unionism (Herod 1997) to the working class in the Global South, “where the 
exercise of ‘agency’ takes on significantly different form and meaning” (Tufts and 
Savage 2009: 946). To shift from labor as an analytical category to class, I start with 
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  Keyes’s view has become a standard, academic version. Recognizing the political nature of Isan identity, 
nevertheless, McCargo and Krisadawan (2004) explicitly challenge the singular, fixed and insufficiently nuanced Isan 
identity. They argue that Isan identity is fluid and plural with ongoing negotiation with Thai and Lao identities.  
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Katznelson’s (1992) framework of class formation in terms of space, language, and 
everyday lives. According to Katznelson (1992), there are four levels of class formation. 
The first is the well-known Marxist class analysis, namely class within the structure of 
capitalist development. Katznelson notes that this is “the model of empty places within 
the mode of production” (1992, p. 208). The second level is class as social relations and 
ways of life, or the organization of lives inside and outside workplaces, whereas the third 
layer is cognitive and linguistic dispositions, or “the ways people represent lived 
experiences and constitute a normative guide to action.” These dispositions “grounded in 
language and symbols constitute significant cultural resources which structure the 
repertoire of working classes at the fourth level of class, that of collective action” (ibid., 
p. 208-209). In the next two sub-sections, my analysis attempts to capture the linkage 
between the second, third, and fourth level of class. 
Far from being an idiosyncrasy, tensions between Thai management and local 
workers, such as those raised by Na in the beginning of this chapter, were commonplace 
and repeatedly mentioned by workers across the Eastern Seaboard. On the surface, such a 
rift appeared as a technical and hierarchical division between white and blue collars. 
However, as accounts of workers’ interactions in Chapter 5 illustrated, the hierarchy 
overlaps with social class, with urban, well-educated professionals on one side and the 
provincial working poor on the other. The class dividing lines also intersect with ethno-
regional differences whereby almost all blue-collar workers were from the Northeast 
region and the managerial position holders were from Bangkok and central provinces. 
Although not all workers were northeaster or khon Isan, its large numbers made the Isan 
characteristics hegemonic among workers. As I discuss later, intersections of ethno-
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regional and class identities placed activist-workers in certain social positions which 
shaped how they experienced and thus understood both the abusive employer-employee 
relations and the capitalist-state collusion. 
Regarding the ELRG, it is important to distinguish between various forms of 
collectivism. In their interview-based research in the UK, Healy et al. (2004) found that 
workers from different backgrounds took varying routes to gaining consciousness and 
hence distinctive forms of collectivism. For example, while middle-class and educated 
respondents learned about feminism and activism in the forms of socialist ideologies via 
the social movement in which they participated, ethnic minority and communities 
experienced collectivism through the racial injustice they faced growing up. As ELRG 
activists and workers were mostly regional migrants from the Northeast, despite different 
contexts, my finding concurs with Healy et al.’s (2004) argument that workers often 
gained collective consciousness through the lived experiences of ethnic and group 
injustice. As Healy et al. insightfully argue, “Injustice/justice is perhaps the key concept, 
which arises from this experience of ethnic community activism. This can become an 
absolutely crucial motivator both for voluntary work in the communities and for trade 
union activism” (p. 458). 
6.4.3 Isan as Disadvantaged Group and People of Dissidence 
Over the past century, the relationships between northeasterners and the Thai 
state, mediated by bureaucrats, have been cloaked by a theme of tense relations (Keyes 
2014, 175). Comparing the Isan’s millenarian uprising in 1902 with the Red Shirts 
movement in recent Thai politics, Keyes (2014) points to continuing tensions and violent 
conflicts brought on northeasterners by the Thai authority and its urban and middle 
	   198	  
classes supporters. From April to May 2010, in one of the most tragic episodes in Thai 
contemporary politics, the Red Shirts participants, most of whom came from 
Northeastern and Northern Thailand, were subject to a violent crackdown by the military 
force in the heart of Bangkok’s financial district. Human Right Watch reported that at 
least 90 were killed and more than 2,000 injured and that the government “seriously 
infringed on fundamental human rights” of protesters during and after the protests (HRW 
2011). Among key issues of the protests, the report noted “widespread economic 
disparities” and “a deep rural-urban divide” as the main impetuses (ibid.). On May 19, in 
response to the crackdown in Bangkok, supporters in several Northeastern provinces 
rioted and set local government buildings on fire, leading to the killing of three protestors 
and prosecution of almost a hundred people (Prachatai 2014). The Thai media noted a 
highly disproportionate punishment for Northeastern incendiaries, who in one case 
received lifetime imprisonment sentence (Prachatai 2015). 
It is natural for Thai political commentators to draw a parallel between the 
northeasterners and the Red Shirts. As Keyes and many observers identify, the depiction 
of protesters as water buffalo102 walking on the Bangkok streets was immediately 
recognized, as the same pejorative used to label Isan people (see Chapter Eight in Keyes 
2014). In addition, the political discourse of the Red Shirt movement that they were 
‘prai,’ a variant of historical serfdom, is strikingly similar to the way that Isan people 
were associated with prai through their association with Lao people (Streckfuss 2012; 
Keyes 2014).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102	  In Thai culture, the water buffalo is always seen by city-dwellers as stupid and simple-minded (hence become a 
slang for stupid), while people from the upcountry, especially Isan, feel obliged to explain whenever changes arise that 
the water buffalo is much smarter than conventionally understood in society.	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The self-identification by the Red Shirts as slaves, and the political discourse of 
ending slavery, finds resonance with Thai organized labor that equated waged labor 
relations with modern slavery, as mentioned in Chapter Five. The generations of labor 
activists seemed to draw on the same political discourse to rouse the idea of class warfare 
against the elite class whose power derived from their economic and political resources. 
A low-budget documentary made by a veteran Thai labor activist titled ‘Lerk That 
(Ending Slavery)’ pieced together familiar stories of four labor unions being busted by 
multinational companies. In a story of a women-led union that was a member of the 
ELRG, the filmmaker highlighted management tactics in a well-known Japanese 
electronic corporation of opting out union members and dismissing the union committee. 
In the same vein, a ELRG coordinator went further to remark in an article published by 
an independent media that factory workers’ lives are “worse than machines or even 
cattle.” As he went on to say, “at least cows or water buffaloes get some sleep at night, 
and machines take some rest during the maintenance, [workers] have no time left for 
nothing but the self-sustenance.” In a different piece, the author made a clearer link 
between being kammakorn and migrants from Isan in the process of transitioning to 
factory, as the state’s agenda of development has never improved, but only worsened the 
conditions of their lives.  
 
Since the Thai state has developed and promoted industrialization until now…the 
resultant policies exist to support and benefit the capitalists or the capital to accumulate 
surplus value until they are increasingly strong. After that, the excuse of promoting 
[foreign] investment is to change the laws and regulations for the privileges of the capital. 
With the support from some corrupted politicians and bureaucrats [to the capital], 
kammakorn are oppressed to the lowest class of the society. At the same time, the labor 
laws supposed to protect workers’ right are not kept up to speed with industrial 
advancement, technology and changing society. More importantly, many law enforcers 
have ignored [these laws], causing the Thai kammakorn to be taken advantage of and 
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oppressed. And the problems of kammakorn on the farms are not paid attention to, until 
they have to become kammakorn in the factories, in hoping that the quality of lives would 
get better.103 
 
 
6.4.4 Isan as Political Culture  
Contrary to all negative stereotypes, David Streckfuss (2012) points out that the 
radical movements in Thailand—from the Red Shirts movement, the Isan-led Assembly of 
the Poor, the Communist Party of Thailand, to the WWII anti-Japanese movement—
mostly drew inspiration from minority groups, especially northeasterners, rather the 
urban student movements. Questioning the idea of Thai-ness and oppression104 of ethnic 
minorities in Thailand, Streckfuss (2012) states that 
 
There is something telling in the observation that if the people of the North East 
were acknowledged as part of a distinct ethnic group, then we would understand Thai 
history in a very different way from how we do today. In that case, it would not simply 
seem to be the case that the central Thai were oppressing other ethnic groups, but the 
very sense of legitimacy conferred to the exercise of political power would be called into 
question. It is one thing to say that the state is highly centralized, thus causing a level of 
neglect of regions away from the centre, but quite another thing to argue that one ethnic 
group is using some mechanism to shield the outright use of political power to oppress 
many others. Legitimacy would evaporate on the spot (322). 
 
Based on the long history of oppression, the khon Isan (Isan people) are regarded 
as highly politicized, whereas Isan as a region is portrayed as radicalized. For instance, a 
commentator from international media, such as Time Magazine, recently raised the issue 
of Isan being a separatist movement (see Time 2014). Studying the formation of Isan 
identity in relation to the creation of the Thai state itself, Keyes (2008; 2014), offers 
insight into the way in which northeasterners view social justice through cultural and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103	  The articles were compiled and published by an independent publisher in 2014. 
104	  I use the meaning of Young’s oppression “the vast and deep injustices some groups suffer as a consequence of 
often unconscious assumptions and reactions of well meaning people in ordinary interactions, media and cultural 
stereotypes and structural features of bureaucratic hierarchies and market mechanism – in short, the normal practices of 
everyday life” (41). 
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religious values. For instance, Keyes argues, northeasterners’ actions are constrained by 
the socio-economic world in which they live, as well as by the moral universe of 
Buddhist values. In other words, while northeasterners still draw their moral principles 
from Buddhist principles, they have gradually embraced a capitalist view of consumerism 
and the discourse of development. Interestingly, in his early analysis of sufficiency-based 
villages, Keyes (1983) pointed out the seemingly ‘false consciousness’ of villagers who 
accepted inequalities as natural and regarded hard work and wealth accumulation in view 
of their function for collective merit-making. In a sense, it was similar to Protestantism 
(Keyes 1983; 1990). Such a work ethic was articulated by the foregoing of immediate 
gratification, which it seems, contrasted sharply with the life principle of some male 
workers, a theme I will discuss in Chapter Seven. Nevertheless, Keyes (2008) argues that 
the northeastern village economy has recently drawn closer to the global economy. In 
such a global era, the northeasterners take more risk such as by migrating—temporarily 
or permanently—to other areas, including abroad. Keyes (2014) believes that 
northeasterners “continue to maintain the value of belonging to a moral community” 
(172) through the identification of themselves as khon Isan or khon ban nork (upcountry 
people), wherever they find themselves. Since northeasterners migrated to a higher 
degree than other groups to work in foreign countries, Keyes (2012) considers them more 
cosmopolitan or even globe-trotting. 
Isan is actually the most populous ethnic group in Thailand, accounting for 
approximately a third of the whole population, but ironically it is the least wealthy. With 
the least economically developed places of origin, the experiences of migration and 
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awareness of always being an outsider strengthen a sense of community among Isan 
workers outside the Northeast. As McCargo and Krisdawan (2004) sum up, the  
“combination of economic deprivation, ethnic minority status, and seasonal residence 
patterns serves to enhance the self-image of Isan people as a marginalized and 
disadvantaged group which has missed out on the benefits of Thailand’s remarkable 
economic growth since the 1960s. This sense of marginality is somewhat offset by a 
strong sense of ethno-regional pride” (p. 221).  
 
6.5 Practical Consciousness, Concrete Labor and Class Struggle 
 
In The German Ideology, Marx suggests that language is both a primary and 
advanced form of consciousness. On consciousness, David McNally elaborates that Marx 
puts both language and labor at the center of social mediation (1995; 2001; 2004). In 
other words, through language and labor, individuals realize their social roles and become 
self-conscious agents. Two seemingly distinct processes—language as creation of 
meanings and labor as production of materials—are inherently connected in the sphere of 
life (McNally 2004, p. 202). In addition, the embodiment of language and labor in 
concrete space and time testifies that capital cannot turn concrete labor completely into 
abstract labor; hence the embodiment of language and labor is a form of resistance to 
capital in its own right (ibid).  
In regular sessions of after-work meetings, I found myself listening to activists 
and workers discuss and vent their frustration about bosses and working conditions in the 
regional dialect or Isan—the language that workers often referred to as phasa Lao (Lao 
language). On one trip in which I accompanied a female worker, Orn, to her home village 
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in Nakornratchasima,105 she pointed out that her spoken language was a variation of Isan 
dialects. Her ancestors had moved from the Thai-Cambodia border to Nakornratchasima, 
locally known as Korat, making her family speak a hybrid version of Khmer and Thai 
Khorat dialects. She then added that Korat Isan was curt and not nice to the ear, even 
among Lao-speaking Isan people. 106 Such self-awareness allowed me to pursue extensive 
conversations about the accents of the workers we knew. It is worth noting that, apart 
from food (and perhaps alcohol), language appeared to be a major cultural tool that 
facilitated workers’ socialization on the day-to-day basis. 
As an outsider, though, I could not really tell the difference among its varieties, 
and Isan as a regional language put me apart from all the rest who shared the same code. 
The shared vernacular facilitated socialization on daily basis and provided speakers with 
a satisfying grammar of criticism. As McNally (1995) writes, it is “a capacity to share 
and exchange ideas in order to coordinate social labor” (p. 2). In many meetings, I could 
feel the change of atmosphere as if the heat in the room was rising, when the workers 
shifted from the central Thai to the Isan dialect while debating grievances. Specifically, 
when male activists such as Yingyong and Yos only used Isan dialect in a public 
speaking to mobilize workers, known as Hi-Park, (see Chapter Seven), it felt as if the 
grammar of dissidence was immediately recognized and responded by the crowd.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105	  To facilitate my access to female workers, I often asked my wife to tag along on our trip. Her presence definitely 
allowed me to gain trust and access to women workers’ lives. However, the fact that my wife is a foreigner, albeit with 
her (central) Thai fluency, her company highlights rather than mitigates my differences from workers. These 
differences include my non-Isan and middle-class background.	  
106	  According to Keyes (2014), although it is hard to determine, around 85 to 90 percent of the Northeastern population 
is Tai-speaking people, among which various group speak a variety of domestic dialects. For example, a group of the 
Northeasterner inhabiting closer to the central plains speak Thai Khorat, a dialect more similar to the central Thai than 
the Lao dialects. The other two major linguistic groups are those who speak Phu Thai, and Khmer or Khmer related 
languages. The latter group accounts for, as a minimum, 9 percent of the regional population living around the Thai-
Cambodia border area (Keyes 2014, 16).  
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The militant connotation associated with dialect plays a certain role in 
reproducing stereotypes of Isan workers as aggressive and more violent than workers 
from other regions. For example, when I asked non-Isan counterparts about their 
perception of Northeastern workers, the typical answer was that they are suu khon 
(combative), or mai yom khon (non-compliant), which meant that Isan people always 
fight back when challenged. This kind of received idea about Isan workers, accompanied 
by the prejudice that they were uneducated and stupid, led to deep-seated discrimination 
by management and government officials. On the one hand, the urbanite management and 
government officials pre-judged workers as troublemakers who tended to incite others in 
the workplace. This attitude was apparent in the verdicts of the labor dispute court cases 
including the Mitzuki struggle. On the other, owing to the ignorance and resulting fear, 
company management and government officers always treated workers with contempt 
and mistrust. In response, workers felt that foreign executives misunderstood them, and 
saw them through the discriminating eye of Thai management. When these workers 
turned to local officers to redress the grievances, the officers’ prejudice toward the 
companies added to workers’ anger and frustration. For these reasons, the ELRG activists 
and workers felt strongly about inequality among government officers, capitalists, and 
workers.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter is an exploration of injustice and consciousness at the intersection of 
class and regional ethnicity. In a sense, it uncovers the messy and contested identities of 
the Isan working class, which straddles the scale of work, activism and migration. First, 
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the historical analysis helps us understand the sense of injustice embedded within the 
political economy of Thai uneven development. Workers’ impulses for self-organization 
started within the workplace, but the forces at play went beyond the struggle over 
economic issues. In this respect, the meanings and scope of collectivism exceed the 
boundary of labor organizations. Moreover, the underlying tensions of the labor dispute 
were based on economic, social, and cultural differences—the hierarchy created by the 
technical composition of class—between the management and labor. Therefore, I argue 
further that both the technical and socio-cultural aspects of class composition form the 
basis of the consciousness and political organization of class struggle. Similar to Fraser’s 
three-dimensional social differences, the concept of social justice as experienced by Isan 
workers captures the aspects of redistribution, recognition, and representation. 
However, such insight does not explain all internal challenges faced by the 
activists, particularly the issue of representation, as illustrated Chapter Seven. As 
Katznelson proposes, the concrete level of class analysis entails social relations and 
organization within and beyond the workplace. For the purposes of representation, I 
address the issues of gender and gender dynamics within the labor organization and 
households in the next two chapters. Now, I turn toward internal and gender dynamics 
within the ELRG and its union members, proposing a feminist analysis that deepens our 
analyses of labor activism and its challenges. 
	  
	  
Chapter 7. A Feminist View: 
Unions, Gender and Everyday Life 
 
After having submitted their collective bargaining demand, the Takiya Workers 
Union and the employer could not reach an agreement about the terms of a new contract. 
Before the union executive committee members were to have the second mediation 
meeting at the local labor office, five executive committee members were meeting with 
two main consultants, Chet and Cha, to prepare for the meeting. During the preparatory 
meeting, the consultants and the committee members decided together about which 
workers would defend individual demands to the employer’s representative in the 
negotiation. When the issue of birth control came up (i.e. a requested subsidy for 
workers’ birth control such as a sterilization fee), the Takiya unionists were suggesting 
that Ya—a female member of the executive committee—be in charge. According to 
them, traditionally in a relationship, women would have a tubal ligation after the second 
or third labor, whereas men tend to have a vasectomy later on in relationship.107 Although 
Ya explained that she hesitated to talk about this issue because she had no experience, 
Chet agreed with the rest that Ya should be in charge because the issue was generally 
seen as a women’s issue.  
After the meeting, I overheard Ya’s conversation on the phone, in which she told 
the other end of the line to have dinner without her. It was her four-year-old son who told 
her, ‘daddy made dinner ready for us’. Feeling surprised, I asked her whether this was a 
normal routine. She said no, it was not normal. Then she added that she wanted to bring 
her little boy to our English class that I had offered for workers on the weekend, free of 
charge, but she was afraid that he would be a trouble to the class. Later on that evening, 
Ya’s husband picked her up from the ELRG. Instead of waiting in the ELRG, he waited 
in the car, like most of the activists’ partners. When I asked why her husband did not 
come and wait in the ELRG, she simply said that he was not interested in any of the 
union activities.  
On that evening, apart from the Takiya union committee, Sorn was also there 
working with Chet to update the labor confederation membership database. Earlier that 
morning, Chet posted on the group’s social media that he needed a volunteer, who could 
help revise the registration. As I had already been familiar with the group, I realized that 
there were a few activists who would come to support the collective work in the 
evenings. Sorn was one of them. During my field research, there was a sort of ritual in the 
evening whereby male activists including Yingyong, Chet, Sorn, Yos and Oat would 
gather at the ELRG, either working on the group or their union paperwork. As part of the 
ritual, they would finish the evening with sharing or discussion over a few cans or bottles 
of beer. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107	  Due to misconceptions about vasectomy and a lack of sexual drive, Thai men still resist vasectomy until late in 
their sexual lives. 	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This chapter focuses on the gender dynamics of Thai labor activists inside and 
outside the labor unions. It is divided into four parts. The first part introduces the way in 
which labor activists, mostly men, socialized and planed their organizing activities. Then, 
my analyses shift from the inter-personal to the organizational level, addressing the 
connection between gender dynamics and structures of representation. Based on my 
empirical research and analytical tools from the feminist and social constructionist 
approach, I address the masculine culture of activism in which organizational practices 
and norms co-produce gender (i.e., masculinity and femininity) that in turn cultivates a 
certain notion of leadership.  
The third section focuses on distinctive gendered consciousness of activists and 
points to broader, social challenges associated with cultural norms. This feminist 
perspective sheds light on the need to understand activism in its totality of production and 
social reproduction—the focus of the final chapter.  I discuss the distinctive ways in 
which male and female activists perceived the time and space of everyday life. The 
different ways in which male and female activists cope with work-related struggle are 
embedded in personal historiography and gender construction of life’s work. By 
broadening the concept of work and labor to include both productive and reproductive 
work, I offer an encompassing analysis of workers’ participation in activism that is 
attuned to their gendered, temporal, and spatial experiences. This analysis is crucial to the 
theorization of agency and labor activism in totality of work and life in Chapter Eight. 
 
7.1 Women and labor unions 
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The empirical material in this chapter addresses two interrelated debates 
concerned with labor organizing within globalized capitalist production and gendered 
geographies of labor activism. The first debate centers on the obstacles faced by women 
within male-dominated unionism and thus the importance of democratic labor unions. 
The second debate is on the Global South workers’ accommodation and their 
relationships with place-based specificities.  
Labor scholars have long recognized patterns of gender hierarchy and women’s 
exclusion in mainstream male-dominated unionism (see Franzway 1997; 2001; Pocock 
1997; ICFTU 2003). In Asian trade union movements, women fare even worse than their 
Western counterparts (Broadbent and Ford 2008). For example, local norms derived from 
religion and other belief systems, such as Confucianism, help reinforce patriarchal power 
relations within already-existing male-led unions in East Asian economies (Broadbent 
2003; Moon and Broadbent 2008). In view of this, scholars argue that women-only, 
autonomous or separate organizing is not only necessary but also a positive step toward 
women’s liberation (Dalla Costa 1971; Briskin 2007b; Kong 2009; Federici 2017). In 
short, autonomous organizing is instrumental in overcoming women’s exclusion and 
marginalization. Depending on the local context, autonomous organizing could take 
either a form of non-union organizing (see Rowbotham and Mitter 1994 for an 
international context; Ford 2002 for Indonesia; Tshoedi 2002 for South Africa) or 
separate or self- organizing within unions (see, e.g. Briskin and McDermott 1993; Briskin 
1999; Colgan and Ledwith 2000).108  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108Separate organizing has distinctive meanings across places. As Linda Briskin (2008) points out, separate organizing 
is contextual and historical but never accepted a priori as an appropriate strategy. In North America, for example, 
separate organizing has been a response to not only gender (male) domination but also race (white) supremacy and 
other discrimination (e.g., homophobia and ableism).	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For research within the labor and industrial relations discipline, scholars in 
developed economies such as Australia, Canada, the UK, and the U.S. discuss issues of 
women’s leadership, diversity, and equality within unions against the backdrop of 
economic restructuring, neo-liberalization, and union renewal (see Briskin 2011b; Colgan 
and Ledwith 2002; Ledwith 2006; 2012). With recognition of changing labor 
demography and hence the need to reinvent solidarity (Briskin 2008), the discussion is 
often situated in theoretical debates about intersectionality and culture (see McBride et al. 
2015; Ledwith and Hansen 2013).  
By contrast, debates around Global South industrialization are concerned with 
women workers outside formal organizational vehicles (e.g., non-union and informal 
groups). Scholars writing in the late 1980s often depicted workers as passive and docile, 
highlighting disciplinary structures including economic restructuring, political repression, 
and cultural norms (e.g., Deyo 1989). However, scholars working under feminist and 
post-structural intellectual traditions contend that female workers—especially those 
organizing in some of the most disciplinary places such as Special Economic Zones or 
Free Trade Zones—were just as militant as their male counterparts in the Global North 
(e.g., Rosa 1994; Koo 2001; McKay 2005). More recently, the debate has shifted to focus 
on multiple scales of political economy (Kelly 2001, 2009), workers’ geographical 
agency and scalar strategies (Kelly 2002; McKay 2011), community-based organizations 
and social movement unionism (Rock 2001), and place-based gendered norms (Silvey 
2003). In short, the emphasis is thus on specificities of local conditions that promote or 
prohibit labor activism. 
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The literature on women workers in the Third World already attests to the ways in 
which men appropriate women’s surplus value via domestic labor done at home, 
subordinating women further through the exploitation of feminized work (Fuentes and 
Ehrenreich 1983; Beneria and Roldan 1987). As Maria Mies (1994 [1986]) argues, the 
New International Division of Labor drew on a pool of women in the Third World 
because women were the optimal labor force. They were optimal because they had been 
universally defined as housewives, intrinsically isolated, atomized, and hence politically 
weak (p. 116). Historically, “housewifization” was a capitalist strategy used in Europe 
and the U.S. and a precondition for proletarianization (Mies 1994 [1986]). Its logic is to 
reduce labor costs in the production process (p. 119). As capital intensifies its process on 
a global scale, such ‘housewifization’ has further expanded to include men in the creation 
of flexible labor (Mies 1994 [1986]). It has dis-embedded both men and women from 
formal labor relations: the protection of laws, trade unions, and the welfare state. 
Nevertheless, the gendered division of labor within workers’ households and its relations 
to women within the context of labor activism are rarely scrutinized. This research 
contributes to the literature by investigating the way in which a sexual division inside 
households affects the participation of male and female workers in labor activism.  
In Thailand, given domination and hierarchy in the mainstream and male-
dominated labor movement, women workers, especially in feminized sectors, succeed to 
carve out political spaces for activism through autonomous and non-union organizing 
vehicles (Mills 2005; Brown and Chaytaweep 2008). These initiatives include women 
workers’ formation of labor-affiliated NGOs and participation in a broader movement. 
However, as Chapters Two and Three illustrate, as a result of economic crisis and 
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restructuring in the late 1990s, the feminization of the workforce in light industries was 
disrupted and further weakened by the decline of these feminized industries. This chapter 
enriches the debate on women’s participations in unions by examining an increasingly 
masculinized workforce within the new geography of automobile production – an 
emergent export-led industry replacing Thailand’s so-called sunset industries (i.e., textile, 
garment, and electronics). Rather than focusing on abstract space of labor politics on a 
national scale, it emphasizes the ways in which masculine culture and gender dynamics 
within decision-making processes play out in the everyday, material spaces of organizing.  
Good morning, brothers and sister!                             
In a meeting of several dozens union representatives, a guest from a global union 
organization greeted participants during the opening ceremony by saying, ‘Good 
morning, brothers and sisters!’ Looking around the room, he immediately corrected 
himself and said ‘brothers and sister’, as there was only one woman in the conference hall 
full of men. As the representative of the meeting’s sponsoring organization, he proudly 
noted that one of the international events to be held by his organization would be on 
‘gender issues.’ Then he finished his opening speech by encouraging the local network to 
increase women’s participation and expressing his hope to see more women in the next 
meeting. 
This snippet, taken from my notes in a meeting of tire-producing unions, is not 
unique but rather representative of the social relations I observed during a year of 
research with a group of labor unions related to automobile industries, the Eastern Labor 
Relations Group (ELRG). One may argue that the lack of women in a meeting could be a 
result of mismanagement. However, it was also a product of organizational practices and 
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social processes. Moreover, the marginalization of women entailed more than low 
numbers of women. It is primarily concerned with the exclusion of women from the 
group’s decision-making processes, as well as subtler forms of cultural domination over 
women (Briskin and McDermott 1993). Such domination is normally rooted in already-
existing prejudices in society. For example, in Thailand, as in other countries, women in 
labor unions were generally criticized by men for ‘talking too much,’ ‘gossiping,’ or 
‘being too consumerist.’ Seeing women through this lens, male activists often dismissed 
female counterparts as unfit for the serious business of labor activism. In the next section, 
by using a soccer league organized by the ELRG as an example, I show how the 
exclusive socialization of male activists alienated women counterparts and created 
conflicts within the group. 
 
7.2 ELRG and Gendered Structure of Leadership 
 
The ELRG is an independent group working to promote educational and social 
activities for union members of the Thailand Confederation of Trade Unions (TCTU). 
Faced with low levels of organizing activities, in 2015 ELRG organizers promoted a 
soccer league to encourage more social interaction among members and cultivate a 
culture of solidarity. In a planning committee’s meeting, when asked about how women 
could participate, the all-male committee responded that “women will be cheerleaders, 
and we have prizes for the winning cheerleading teams.” As it turned out, there was no 
coordinating effort to facilitate cheerleading activities. Therefore, women were on the 
sidelines during the whole period of soccer league. 
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In retrospect, for many reasons the soccer league was not successful in promoting 
socialization or solidarity among workers. To begin, most union teams were too 
competitive and literally goal-oriented. There were also incidents of quarrels, sometimes 
caused by the use of alcohol during matches, thereby defeating the purpose of cultivating 
solidarity. Most importantly, women were not incorporated as active members of either 
planning or activities. Accordingly, after the league, a conflict broke out within the 
ELRG, when a female activist strongly criticized the organization of a retreat celebrating 
the league’s end. This woman member raised the issue of a conflict of interest, when 
male activists organized the exclusive soccer league, and spent the ELRG’s scant budget 
to celebrate their so-called ‘hard work’ at the retreat. Unfortunately, the soccer’s 
inclusiveness was never openly debated, and her criticism was unfairly dismissed by the 
quip that she should have raised this issue in the planning meeting.  
In fact, hers was the sole female voice in the ELRG. ELRG meetings were usually 
held late in the evening, and women could not fully participate in them. Over time, 
women’s voices were excluded from meetings and decision-making processes. This is 
similar to what Susane Franzway (2002) calls the ‘men’s movement,’ or perhaps more 
precisely, Sue Ledwith (2012)’s ‘culture of exclusionary masculinity.’ Given women’s 
exclusion from the planning meeting, the ELRG’s dismissal of her concerns only 
aggravated the problems of women’s underrepresentation in the organization.  
 
7.2.1 Male-dominated Unions and Culture of Exclusion 
Feminist scholars have identified male domination in leadership structure, which 
includes a quantitative aspect (i.e., a gender deficit in leadership), as a major obstacle for 
women members in labor unions around the world (Colgan and Ledwith 2002; Ledwith 
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2008; Ledwith and Hansen 2013). This is applied even when the decision-making is 
made while drinking, often in smoke-filled places. The ELRG’s soccer league 
exemplifies masculine practices created by a male-dominated structure of decision-
making. Since women’s voices were not included in the decision-making process, the 
type of activity decided by the ELRG organizers was shaped mainly by male 
preferences.109 Moreover, the ELRG soccer matches were usually organized on Saturdays 
and occasionally Sundays. Since the weekend was usually leisure time,110 over the course 
of the league, participation in the events tapered off. Eventually, the original goal of 
promoting socialization and cultivating solidarity was not achieved because the activity 
had become an exclusive men’s club. In this context, it might have been different if the 
male organizers planned for the socialization of workers from an inclusive, rather than a 
limited, male perspective, but as Joan Acker (1982) wittily points out, gender equality 
does not exist as long as a majority of people, especially women who are affected by 
decisions, are not involved in its process (p. i). 
In her study of a Latino/Latina union in Canada, Cynthia Cranford (2007) asserts 
that women staffers played a crucial role in challenging gender inequality within a union 
through recruitment of more women members, as well as development of leadership 
programs appropriate to increasing women’s leadership. Further, women’s expression of 
feminist values and the significance of women’s representation were keys to success of 
union strengthening or renewal. Within the male-dominated ELRG, the feminist value 
raised by the sole woman member was inclusiveness. Inclusiveness means that different 
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  Soccer is one of Thailand’s most famous sports, appreciated by both men and women. However, only men actively 
participate in the game.	  
110	  I use leisure loosely here as a general term. In my further analysis of social reproduction, I challenge this anti-
feminist notion of leisure.	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needs and demands are reflected in the ways organization grow and move. However, one 
voice was not enough to be heard. This example points to another issue: labor movements 
and groups often struggle to create more inclusive and gender-equal structures, when 
underrepresentation exists within individual unions.111 For the ELRG union members, 
men accounted for a majority in most executive committees, with a few women typically 
assigned token positions such as treasurer.  
For the ELRG, the additional reason for organizing the soccer league was to 
attract workers to training sessions on social security law held after each soccer match. 
By so doing, the ELRG was able to secure funding allocated by the National Social 
Security Office (NSSO), according to the number of attendees in the training. This fund 
had been a main source of income for the TCTU, as it was for other labor confederations 
in Thailand. Such reliance on public funding had been the target of strong criticism, 
though, as some activists in the labor movement viewed labor confederations as 
compromised labor organizations within the state-controlled tripartite system. By 
contrast, independent labor groups, mostly women-led labor movement in the light 
industries, preferred funding from non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Through its 
formal labor congress and informal entities, the ELRG relied on both state-funded 
sources such as the social security fund and grants from NGOs sources. 
In fact, labor union congresses in other Southeast Asian countries, which 
represented labor in the state-controlled tripartite system, faced similar criticism. For 
instance, the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines was labeled a ‘yellow union’ by 
other labor organizations (Rosa 1994, p. 90) while the Malaysian Trade Union Congress 
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  Nevertheless, women’s presence does not guarantee gender equality (Dickens 1998; Ledwith 2012), without 
organized constituency and accountability (Briskin 2011).	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was condemned for its lack of women’s participation, ‘lack of democracy, bureaucracy, 
…and even corruption’ (Grace 1990, p. 46 cited by Rosa 1994, p. 89). However, against 
such contexts, Rosa pointed to a major advantage for women within workplace unions. 
Within a similar context of hostility against labor unions in Free Trade Zones, Rosa 
indicated that women were more likely to participate directly and actively in in-house 
unions, because of the unions’ small size. However, this was not the case for women 
workers in the ELRG, except for a few unions that were women-dominated. 
 
7.2.2 Sexual Politics and Sexualized Relations  
In the union led by Sorn, all fifteen executive committee members were men but 
one. For this labor union, it had become a tradition for the employer to fund an annual 
retreat for union members. At the annual retreat I attended, the main event was a dance 
party, in which participants could dine and dance on a floating raft towed by a boat in the 
middle of the canal. This was the second year that the union executive committee 
organized a leisure retreat at this fishing resort with an advertised highlight being female 
professional nightclub dancers, hired by the union to please male members. Such extreme 
sexism was explicitly displayed on the event’s banner, with images of female dancers 
under the official union’s seal.  
 The union executive committee’s decision to invite female dancers was primarily 
shaped by two main reasons. First, since all but one member of the executive committee 
were men, the decisions were based on heterosexual and male preferences. To mask the 
male-biased activity, the union executive committee simply put gold necklaces as the 
biggest prize on a lucky draw, as an incentive for women members. Indeed, the choice of 
gold necklaces also says something about how the executive committee viewed women 
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members. Second, as the employer used the number of members as the prime indicator 
for the retreat’s success, the union was pressured to maximize member participation in 
the retreat. In truth, the union president desperately wanted to show the employer that the 
union was still relevant and that most members still attended the retreat.  
Focusing on Australian labor movement, Franzway (2002) notes that women 
workers are not subject only to the male’s movement but also to covert sexual politics 
such as heterosexuality and homophobia (and sexual harassment), since ‘heterosexual 
masculine dominance’ is prevalent in managerial and everyday practices (p. 282).112At 
the retreat, I was surprised that women, especially older women workers, were indifferent 
to the union’s decision to hiring professional dancers, as well as the male workers’ 
explicit sexist behaviors. To fully understand this women’s tact consent, the next section 
explores women’s participation in the making of masculine labor activism. 
 
7.2.3 Masculinity and militant leadership  
Western scholars have long discussed the relationship between masculinity, 
manual work, and blue-collar unions (Aronowitz 1973; Terkel 1974; Atkin 1991; 
Donaldson 1991). Particularly, the concept of hegemonic masculinities is used to explain 
the construction of gender (i.e., masculinity and femininity) in organizations (Cockburn 
1983; 1991), or among Mexican working-class community (Gutmann 1996). I use 
masculinity in a broad normative sense, akin to the notion of hegemonic masculinities 
(see Connell 1995; 1998), which suggests an embodiment of the “most honored ways of 
being a man” (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005, p. 832). As Connell and Messerschmidt 
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  Franzway (2011) defines sexual politics as ‘understood to incorporate the sexual and the political, and are always 
contested’ (p.27). She notes that the use of sexual politics of gender relations highlights relational aspects of men and 
women and the need to go beyond gender inclusivity, which refers only to women.	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(2005) put it,  
“Masculinity is not a fixed entity embedded in the body or personality traits of 
individuals. Masculinities are configurations of practice that are accomplished in social 
action and, therefore, can differ according to the gender relations in a particular social 
setting” (p. 836).  
In contrast, the concept of ‘emphasized femininity’ highlights women’s central 
roles as sexual partners, wives, and houseworkers in the process of constructing 
masculinities. Of course, it is worth pointing out that the construction of gender takes 
place everywhere in society: in school, family, and through media.113 In this sense, gender 
construction is embedded in larger social processes, where a gendered division of labor in 
the household also plays a role in the process of construction at workplace and activism. 
In our context of activism, I focus on social and gender relations that produce and 
reinforce ideas about certain types of masculinity as desirable for labor activists and 
unions.  
In the Eastern Seaboard, operational workers often associated certain aspects of 
masculinity with leaders’ most honored qualities. For example, based on my interviews, 
Thai workers often suggested that the desired characteristics of leaders included an ability 
to speak in public; boldness; and pugnacity – qualities often associated with men. This is 
based on the fact that workers frequently needed their representatives to be able to speak 
with the superior when something wrong happened at work. When I asked the women 
executive committees why they were selected, many speculated that perhaps their 
colleagues saw their boldness in talking back to supervisors. As such qualities were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113For example, Joan Acker (1992) proposes a comprehensive model of four interacting sets of processes: construction 
of gender divisions among men and women within organizational hierarchy; construction of symbols and images that 
produce, reproduce or oppose those divisions; interactions among and between men and women; and the gendered 
components of identity and presentation of self (p. 251-252; cited by Ledwith 2012, p. 191).	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associated with men, they were perceived to be better than women for leadership 
positions such as the president and secretary. Nevertheless, when certain women 
embodied such desired characteristics, they were considered good labor unionists, and 
hence accepted by men as deserving for leadership. Such a perception of leadership has 
its drawbacks. 
Advance Workers Union (a pseudonym) is an excellent case in point. At the time 
of my research, most executive committee members were women, except for two leading 
positions: the president and secretary.114 The Advance workers produced airbags and car 
seats, and the company hired more women than men because the work required sewing 
skills viewed as specific to women. These workers were generally older women with lots 
of experiences in the textile and garment industry.  
Cha, the current secretary of the Advance Workers Union (AWU), was a self-
trained legal consultant who took a distance college course in law during his free time. 
His legal expertise was indispensable for both the union and the ELRG activities. By 
contrast, the president was elected because he was a bold, self-confident man who 
presented himself as a fighter. Executive committee members believed that these two 
complementary qualities were the perfect combination for the leadership. Yet, the main 
problem was that the president was always absent from the Advance monthly meetings. 
The women committee members’ accounts concurred that he did not like to attend the 
meetings, because, as he often complained, the women ‘only gossip and talk nonsense.’ 
Some committee members also suggested that the president was not responsible because 
he liked to gamble.  
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  The gender proportion within this union was rather unique in my field site, although the gender dynamics were 
commonplace.	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The AWU president’s attitudes were typical of many male workers, who held 
stereotypes of women workers as disinterested and passive. These stereotypes were 
mentioned by Briskin and McDormott (1993), who summarized that apart from male-
dominated practices and union structures, women’s barriers to activism in the labor 
unions also include (1) the gender-bias inherent in unions, especially the notion that 
women identify themselves solely with the family, rather than work; and (2) the 
stereotype that women are disinterested and passive, particularly when it comes to 
unionism. These two factors were seen among Thai unions and the women-led unions 
such as AWU. Ironically, its president frequently attended many different general 
meetings of other unions.115 Speaking at other unions’ meetings was more appealing to 
the AWU president than ‘listening to women’s gossip’ (recall the celebratory atmosphere 
of the Siam Perfect gathering in Chapter Five).  
For a political environment in which workers’ rights of association are hard won 
and highly contested, it is understandable that workers seek outspoken and unrelenting 
leaders. Through conversations with rank-and-file workers, they often explained that they 
chose their executive committee based on the fact that particular workers showed signs of 
speaking well (phud keng) and/or were brave enough to speak in front of a big gathering 
of workers. In practice, even workers who were not interested in activism were coaxed or 
coerced into labor unions. This practice has led to many unintended consequences. First, 
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  For Thai unions, a general meeting is normally an annual gathering of union members, where the new executive 
committee is elected and the union’s yearly budget is reviewed. As Thai laws require that labor unions invite outside 
observers during the general meetings, to guarantee transparency and accountability, unions within the ELRG have 
cultivated the tradition of solidarity and mutual support at the general meetings of union members. For the host union, 
member’s participation in a general meeting is a good barometer of current members’ support. On the other hand, for 
members themselves, attendance of high-profile guests and outside observers shows the extent of the union’s social 
network. In a sense, the general meeting is a strategic site, where not only union members and activists could learn 
about mutual support and broader significance of the organization, human resources officers from companies also 
attended to monitor the union’s activities. Moreover, union executive committee anticipated local government officers, 
who could be asked by the company to be there and ensure the procedure’s legality, since the Thai Labor Relations Act 
requires that at least half the members be present for the general meeting to be lawful. 
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it led to a high degree of homogenization among labor unionists, and hence lack of 
diversity—a dynamic that undermines labor activism’s long-term sustainability. 
Specifically, those masculine qualities tended to promote certain types of leaders, 
including those who dominated meetings. They were often prioritized at the expense of 
other more important qualities, such as ability to listen or sensitivity to inter-personal 
relations. Second, that many workers were persuaded or pressured into labor unions 
resulted in what I call ‘involuntary volunteerism.’ In effect, involuntary volunteerism in 
the ELRG was commonplace. As a result, many unions were in such an inactive state that 
unionists felt stagnated and discouraged, leading them to be pessimistic about activism as 
a whole. For instance, many unionists tended to generalize the problems by blaming 
inactive unionists for being selfish and greedy. 
 
7.2.4 Demonstration Culture and Gender-Biased Empowerment 
The fact that the Advance Workers Union needed to have male leadership, while 
most executive committee members and members were women, signals gender- biased 
perception of leadership among workers. Apart from gender relations and sexual politics, 
such a perception had also been conditioned by what I call a ‘demonstration culture.’ As 
the Chapters Five and Six show, demonstration culture is a product of laws, labor 
relations regime, and organizing practices, which are mediated by social relations within 
activism. 
 The member unions of the ELRG were accustomed to a tradition of public 
demonstration called ‘Hi Park’ – a Thai appropriation of the English ‘Hyde Park,’ a place 
in London historically known for free speech. Hi Park refers to a semi-public 
demonstration during which activists and unionists speak openly to mobilize rank-and-
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file members, mostly during the collective bargaining negotiation. It is ‘semi-public’ 
because usually the gathering takes place in front of the factory—a gray area between 
private and public space.116 
For ELRG activists, Hi Park was a real test of leadership. A veteran activist, who 
prided himself for his militant activism against a giant American car manufacturer in the 
Eastern Seaboard, once revealed to me that he used to be so scared of Hi Park—public 
speaking in front of workers—that he often pretended to be on his mobile phone to avoid 
being called. For activists, Hi Park was nerve-racking because speakers were generally 
expected to ‘lead the crowd (num mob)’ – a well-regarded skill to which many union 
executive committee members and rank-and-file members repeatedly referred. Moreover, 
as examples of worker mobilization in Chapter Five revealed, Hi Park could be both 
challenging and rewarding. Finally, it is empowering to be able to communicate with and 
be answered by a crowd of rousing workers. Hi Park was a chance to educate rank-and-
file workers about the general labor situation or specific topics such as casualization of 
work.  
In principle, to master public speaking, activists needed a great deal of practice 
and support. However, this kind of support was generally absent for young activists, 
especially women. In fact, the core ELRG organizers who were mostly male had 
regularly benefited from indirect trainings by attending public seminars and conferences 
organized by governments, NGOs, and a wider network of labor organizations. These 
events provided activists with the space to learn about broader economic and political 
issues. They also gained confidence in how to carry themselves and present their 
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  The idea of the public-private divide in industrial estates is somewhat problematic because ‘public’ space is still 
privately owned. As the areas outside the factory belong to the industrial estates, these spaces are subject to official’s 
close surveillance techniques, such as photographing as well as incrimination.	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organizations. Such spaces were extremely empowering because union activists gained 
experience of situating themselves in the larger network and presenting and framing their 
own grievances to others. In the international context, unions used such ‘extramural’ 
activities to educate and prepare young activists while also building ties with outside 
networks. For example, Turner’s (1995) study of two Japanese unions facing bankruptcy 
crises in the 1980s documents how radical unions empowered the rank-and-file by 
organizing internal study groups and regularly sending members to external activities. In 
the Thai context, Mary Beth Mills’s (2005) work shows how such a radical space became 
the breeding ground on which women activists around Bangkok formed their 
subjectivities and identities through oppositional politics. It is important to acknowledge 
that the network of NGOs working on labor rights in the Bangkok metropolitan area was 
generally absent in the Eastern Seaboard. Given the limited space of what Mills calls 
oppositional politics, the ELRG itself was thus a rare empowering ground in which 
unions prepared activists for activism.  
However, the empowering spaces were contested. For the ELRG union activists 
who held positions as executive committee members in workplace unions, it was 
necessary to get employers’ permission to participate in outside opportunities. 
Management often used this permission as leverage in the factory to negotiate with union 
activists. During my research, there were just a few unions that had creatively inserted the 
right to education and training outside the workplace in their collective bargaining 
agreement (CBA). For example, these unions concretely specified minimum days of paid 
absences per week in the CBA. Yet, in practice workers still needed to negotiate with 
management on an occasional basis, for instance, in a factory management required a 
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certain days of advanced notice to allow sufficient time for management flexibility. 
However, as the TCTU was a legally recognized entity, its committee members generally 
faced less resistance when making requests to attend external seminars and trainings. 
Since most TCTU and the ELRG core activists were male workers, it meant that women 
activists had fewer opportunities for political education. Such a lack of opportunities was 
compounded by women’s primary roles in household labor, an issue I explicitly explore 
this issue in the next chapter. Despite this opportunity gap, ironically, male unionists still 
blamed women for being disinterested and passive in learning.  
 
7.2.5 Gender mobility and Empowerment 
From women’s perspective, such criticism of their lack of interest in self-
education was unfair. From my interviews, female union activists appreciated the chances 
to attend outside trainings and seminars, just as much as men did, but they 
disproportionately faced barriers: structural, organizational, and gendered. In addition, as 
I have mentioned in the case of Takiya Workers Union, women unionists were far less 
mobile than men. Most women workers did not own a car, as men did; some married 
women workers had never learned how to drive a car. Women’s mobility is a main factor 
limiting their ability to join such trainings and conferences.  
In the Eastern Seaboard, most workers relied on transportation provided by their 
companies. Depending on routes and workers on each route, the vehicle they rode could 
be a van or a bus. In such an area of highly concentrated workers where at least four main 
industrial estates are located, without public transport, traffic during rush hours could be 
really congested. Therefore, activist workers preferred to use their own vehicles. For 
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instance, Sorn frequently rode his own motorbike, especially when he wanted to visit the 
ELRG office in the evening. In comparison, Naam owned a compact car, which she 
shared with her partner on the weekend. Another female activist, Orn, had a motorbike, 
but much preferred to have a car to pick up her daughter and go on vacation during the 
holidays. Despite its convenience, an implication of activists and workers using their own 
vehicles was that workers had to bear the costs themselves. In a context where activist 
roles were volunteer work, without pay, from the familial perspective it was done at the 
expense of household’s budget and time. 
Second, women workers disclosed that they could not travel long distances by 
themselves, particularly if they did not own a car or did not drive. Most women workers 
actually did not drive a car. A woman activist explained once that there were generally 
fewer women organizers and union committee members in the Thailand’s Eastern 
Seaboard because “women cannot drive [a car], and that their husbands would not like it 
if they were to drive.” Among four women executive committee members participating in 
the focus group, only one woman owned a car, while the others rode motorbikes.  
Most women knew how to ride a motorbike, a typical transport for women 
workers in the Eastern Seaboard. For instance, Nan, Chet’s wife, could travel freely with 
a motorbike. After the company locked her out, along with her husband and other 
unionized workers, she spent years applying for a factory job. Being sure about her lack 
of a chance, she tried selling food at the local market. However, her mobility was much 
restrained, as she then had to rely mainly on her husband to transport her materials in a 
pick-up truck to the market. 
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 In another focus group interview with six women workers and one male worker, I 
asked participants to draw a mental map of their everyday lives. From the exercise, it was 
clear that male union activists had a much broader scope of geographic mobility and thus 
more geographical knowledge than women activists. While male activists frequented 
local government offices and conference halls in neighboring provinces, women were 
more accustomed to local markets, supermarkets, and supply stores. In fact, the 
differential degree of mobility between men and women was significant, and largely 
overlooked by male organizers. As Mills (1999a) argues, “Mobility in space is perceived 
as a natural and valued characteristic for [Thai] men, while women’s bodies and their 
movement are subject to far greater restrictions” (p. 94). Women workers have rather 
distinctive experiences regarding the way they navigate space and time, leading to 
distinct preferences about the preferred time and place of labor activism.  
 
7.3 Placed-based activism and gendered norms 
Rachel Silvey (2003) suggests that geographical research must pay particular 
attention to women’s active roles and negotiations in the production of gender relations 
and spaces of activism, as well as community-scale specificity such as local religious 
beliefs on gender norms. My analyses have so far covered only the spaces of activism 
within a limited scope—the framework of labor organizations, treating labor and work in 
simply one dimension. That one dimension is waged labor in the process of commodity 
production, leaving out workers’ reproductive work (i.e., housework and sexual 
reproduction). Without taking a holistic approach that accounts for both gender dynamics 
in activism and place-based gendered division of labor in the household, we cannot fully 
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grasp the complexity of the processes leading to women’s marginalization. Consequently, 
here, I turn to issues of social reproduction and union activists in Thailand’s Eastern 
Seaboard. 
7.3.1 Labor Activism and Gender Consciousness 
I would like to offer an intimate look into workers’ everyday life, by starting with 
the way two worker-activists began a normal working day. For comparative purposes, 
stories of two union executive committee members – one male and one female – are 
provided. Sorn was a male president of a labor union in a plant of Japanese manufacturer 
producing car brakes in an Eastern Seaboard Industrial Estate, whereas Naam was a 
female executive committee member of Advance Workers Union, a union producing car 
seats in the same industrial estate. 
For a morning shift, Sorn would wake up around 6:15 a.m. to get on a company 
van, which would arrive at the workplace around 7 to 7:10 a.m. At 7:45 all workers were 
scheduled to exercise, so he had approximately thirty minutes for breakfast and 
preparation for work. As he worked in the supply and inventory department, his role was 
to monitor daily parts delivery, which started at 8.30 a.m. After the first fleet was ready 
for delivery, he then switched to updating parts stock inventory affected by the previous 
day’s delivery. From 10-11a.m. he tended to reception of coils delivery for the production 
and then switched back to monitor another parts delivery. The last delivery was around 4 
p.m., after which he dealt with the daily paperwork. If he could not finish paperwork by 
5pm, he would inform his supervisor and the work afterwards be counted as ‘over time.’ 
His overtime was thus mostly paperwork, during which he could also work on the union 
and/or ELRG paperwork. After work, Sorn usually came to the ELRG office. 
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By contrast, Naam would wake up at 5.30 am. Although the company bus picked 
her up around 6.30 a.m., she needed an hour for a shower, feeding her pet hamster, and 
cooking for herself and her partner. Her bus arrived at the plant around 7:30 am, and she 
also had half an hour for breakfast and personal cares. During our conservation, Naam 
expressed her feeling that life was always a race with the ticking clock. She explained,  
Since I wake up, I time everything I do. Because we [the union committees] are in the 
spotlight, we are being watched. Therefore, we have to excel beyond ordinary workers. 
We have to be on time and what not. If we make a mistake, [we] lose everything.  
 
It appeared that companies in the Eastern Seaboard tolerated labor unions more 
than in other areas. However, workers knew that as labor activists they were subject to 
reprisal and unfair dismissals that frequently happened when the unions pressed too hard 
for better working conditions or when union executive committee members made a 
mistake at work. For Naam, she was very conscious about her own role in the union 
because the union had only been established for a few years and because she was a 
woman. In fact, Sorn was also conscious of his role as a union president, in which he took 
a great pride. Our conversations, often led by him, were about how he constantly 
challenged the controlling human resources personnel in workplace meetings. During my 
field research, Sorn was perhaps one of the most rebellious workers who explicitly 
challenged workplace regulations. One form of his open resistance was absenteeism, 
which I sometimes found worrisome as he and I developed a friendship. There were 
times when he could not go to work on a Monday morning, because he drank too 
much.117  
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  A year after I left my field site, Sorn was fired. Other activists told me that he was involved in a systematic abuse 
of the company-funded medical care. 	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At times, such as in the group and union retreats, Sorn drank to the point that he 
lost self-control. When I expressed my concerns for his health, he often said, “brother, be 
happy today, let tomorrow be.” During the first few months of my research, it seemed to 
me that many male activists I had befriended showed such patterns, and I had difficulty 
making sense of them. Later, once I got to know them better, I came to some sort of 
realization that it was a coping strategy, which could be understood in isolation from 
gender roles and struggles at work. Focusing on fun in the present moment was not just 
Sorn’s personality but also a tactic for many male activists to deal with alienation and 
uncertainties. Indeed, all union activists, men and women alike, were well aware of the 
precariousness associated with waged work and labor activism. For instance, when asked 
about her future plans, Orn, a female executive committee member at Advance Workers 
Union, told me, “for workers like myself it was hard to make a future plan.” Due to a lack 
of job security, workers and activists lived one day at a time. In short, labor activists lived 
with the uncertainty of dismissal on a daily basis.  
It is of great interest that male and female activists — which Sorn and Naam were 
exemplars of — exerted different sets of coping strategies. Naam took precautious 
measures. As she said, ‘it’s not easy to be a union activist, you are always watched [by 
management], and you know that you have to do better than the other workers.” On the 
contrary, Sorn chose fun and alcohol to keep him from thinking or worrying about the 
uncertainty. Nevertheless, alcohol abuse had taken its long-term toll on his body and 
health. But so did the work he toiled away on everyday. Then, why not let tomorrow be, 
and be happy today instead?  
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7.3.2 Women’s Life Work and the Construction of Masculine Workers 
The different ways in which male and female activists coped with workplace 
discipline and alienation are deeply related to gender constructions and how their labor is 
valued accordingly, across the spatial and temporal division of work and non-work. 
Based on our conversations, I learned that Sorn grew up with a single mom who worked 
hard as a seamstress. He recalled seeing his mom work until 1-2 am in the morning every 
day. According to him, he would always have the particularly fond memory of the sewing 
machine’s noise imprinted on his mind. Despite being a single breadwinner, his mom 
provided him with whatever he needed. Sorn believed that his mom did her best and 
ended up spoiling him.  
Sorn graduated junior high school in 1998-1999. His mom wanted him to pursue a 
college education, but he did not want to. He went to work at a duty-free store in the 
major international airport in Bangkok, where his mom’s sibling also worked. Sorn 
admitted that he benefited greatly from personal connections, especially the protection he 
got from friends of his boss in the Customs Department. This patronage allowed him to 
maintain a sideline job, in which he helped tourists navigate procedures and evade 
custom duties. He said that he learned about people from this time period. Unfortunately, 
when the SARS epidemic broke out, he was laid off and went to work in the airport’s 
cargo department. It was here that he learned about shipping and cargo procedures. After 
that, he worked for a Thai company producing auto parts, and then at the warehouse of a 
Japanese electronic company in Laem Chabang Port, where he learned to drive a forklift 
car. The skills he learned from these previous jobs were formative for his career in auto-
parts inventory and the supply chain industry. 
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While I was in the Eastern Seaboard in 2015 - 2016, Sorn was president of a big 
workplace union. In retrospect, with his apparently mischievous character especially 
while intoxicated, I was very critical of Sorn. Nevertheless, over the longer period, he had 
shown unmatched determination and great listening ability. He made two disclosures that 
changed how I viewed him, and helped me make sense of his philosophy of happiness 
here and now. First, he avowed that he used to be both a night owl and heavy drinker. 
Around four or five years before I met him, Sorn would go out every night after work, 
and in his words, on average 26-27 days per month, he stayed out drinking until midnight 
or sometimes 3-4 am. Second, he lost his child, who was born with a dysfunctional heart, 
when the baby was eight months old. After being in and out of the hospital for a certain 
period, he learned the nitty gritty of the childcare system. Based on his experience, he 
once said, “I have lived enough.”  
 
7.4 Women and the Question of ‘Overtime’ 
As the preceding section addressed, it was much more difficult for women 
activists, especially those in relationships, to participate fully in labor activism. First, 
women workers found it hard to attend ELRG or union meetings, particularly in the 
evenings and on weekends. The main reason was that women were still the main 
caretakers in the households, despite the fact that men and women equally played the role 
of breadwinner. As workers in Thailand’s Eastern Seaboard were mostly internal 
migrants from Northeast Thailand, they generally sent their little children back to their 
parents or relatives, thus relieving themselves of reproductive work such as childrearing 
on a daily basis. The women were still, however, the main providers of care labor such as 
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communication with their children in long-distance relationships, through smartphones. 
Interestingly, the role of care providers was reinforced as communication technology 
such as smartphone was culturally more associated with women than men. For these 
reasons, women activists had to work hard both outside and inside their households. In 
addition, as mentioned earlier, male activists had the privilege of attending meetings and 
seminars, which were the only forms of self-education and empowerment. Moreover, 
married women, especially those whose husbands were not involved in activism, felt 
uncomfortable attending ELRG activities when the main organizers, who were all men, 
socialized by drinking alcohol in the evening.  
How workers experience time actually depends on gender, and it is crucial to 
acknowledge the traditional gender-biased concept of time in social theories (Mies 1994 
[1986]). As Maria Mies (1994 [1986]) contends, a feminist concept of labor needs a re-
thinking of the concept of time. According to Mies (1994 [1986]), the traditional concept 
of labor is falsely based on divisions of time into work and leisure, where workers enjoy 
themselves during their leisure time outside work. However, according to a gendered 
division in the household, men and women do not equally enjoy such a division of time. 
More than that, this feminist understanding of time, together with Naam’s account of her 
subjectivity as both woman and activist, reveal the conflicted consciousness that women 
activists faced. This is similar to what Dorothy Smith calls ‘bifurcated consciousness’. 
According to Smith (1987), when women move from the personal and private sphere of 
home to public and professional spaces of work, they always deal with a shift of 
consciousness “involving a different organization of memory, attention, relevance and 
objectives and indeed different presences” (p. 7). This shift is concerned with 
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discrepancies and tensions between the space of the general at work and the particular at 
home, institutionalized in gendered division of labor. In fact, Smith conceptualized the 
concept from her own experiences working in a male-dominated Sociological 
Department (1987). In a similar sense, a trade union as an organization or labor activism 
as a set of social practices and spaces is a world of men. With regards to ELRG, 
similarly, I noticed that when male activists moved from the workplace to spaces of 
activism, they maintained their professional behaviors and consciousness. However, 
when women moved away from workplace, either to spaces of activism or reproductive 
work, they dealt with a shift in consciousness and expectation, toward inter-personal and 
casual modes. It is worth noting that the shift in consciousness for women workers goes 
beyond location and standpoint. It is rather an outcome of gendered processes that 
produce and reproduce meaning and gendered roles related to activism and housework.  
Further, more time spent by men on commuting means less time left for activism 
and self-care. As women were the ones who performed immaterial and caring labor in the 
households, accordingly, women partners worked harder when men activists were less 
attentive to their bodies. When I was doing my field research, Naam was co-habiting with 
her partner, Wit. Wit was previously the president of a union, in a multinational company 
that filed for bankruptcy a few years ago. After the company was out of business, he was 
hired as a coordinator of the labor congress for a certain period, until the budget ran out. 
Then he started driving a container truck for a refrigerator company, which required 
several trips between a port and the company per shift. Naam explained how Wit’s night 
shifts disrupted her organization of work and leisure time as follows: 
It is a routine. Sometimes I slept very little, about two or three hours, because [Wit] came 
back at 2 a.m. Even when I finished from work at 8 p.m., due to traffic I would arrive 
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around 8.45-8.50 p.m. After all the walking, showering, cleaning up my hamster’s cage, 
it wasn’t until 10 p.m. that I ate and almost 11 p.m. that I went to bed. Then he came 
back, so I woke up. It’s like this. How long I actually sleep depends. So when workers say 
that they are “ork-o (choose not to work overtime)”, it doesn’t mean that they have much 
rest time. For those who choose to not work overtime, it means they have chores like 
laundry and childcare. Folks who have children, they have plenty of chores. They go to 
bed as late as 10 or 11 p.m. Sometimes, people ask what you do when you are not 
working overtime, it's not true that work is only in the factory or that you get out of work, 
and you rest. Men, when they get out, their wives cook for them. They can rest, just like 
that. 
 
Naam was referring to male activists who frequently criticized workers who 
neither worked overtime nor participated in labor activism. Specifically, she was raising 
an issue of women’s time that does not have a clear boundary neatly drawn while 
crossing the spatial confines of work and household sites. Additionally, Naam was 
indirectly replying to the accusation of male activists that workers were more interested 
in financial gains than in betterment of their own working conditions. While some male 
activists deliberately chose to opt out of the overtime system, criticizing it as opium, they 
dismissed those who relied on overtime work. In fact, not only did they believe that 
workers need no overtime but that workers could spend that ‘extra time’ on activism. In 
contrast to this idea, as a single mom, Orn was a union executive committee and worked 
overtime whenever chances arose. She even took up other odd jobs such as piece-rate 
sewing at home. As she was juggling three kinds of work, her colleagues sometimes 
criticized Orn when her working schedule conflicted with the union meeting. In fact, her 
supervisor encouraged her to become a union executive committee member because Orn 
was very outspoken about working conditions and often targeted by a manager. With her 
status as a single mother, the supervisor knew that she could not afford to risk a job. As 
Orn could not change who she was (i.e., being both a single mom and an outspoken 
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person), from the supervisor’s perspective, at least being on the union executive 
committee could protect her from being easily dismissed. Despite marginalization in the 
unions, women workers such as Orn still persevered because they felt that they were 
‘doing the right thing.’ 
On the surface, the spaces of production and reproduction appear to be separated. 
However, in reality and thus in theory, they are integral to the process of capital 
accumulation (Bhattacharya 2017). As a British socialist feminist scholar, Sheila 
Rowbotham, pointed out,  “the contradiction which appears clearly in capitalism between 
family and industry, private and public, personal and impersonal, is the fissure in 
women’s consciousness in which revolts erupt” (1973, p. 29).118 Now I turn my attention 
to workers’ reproductive network and its roles in private organization as well as the 
collective organization of labor power. By posing the space of labor activism as a bridge 
between spaces of production and of reproduction, this chapter exposes a tension between 
such private and collective organization of labor power. It throws into relief the way in 
which gender dynamics interact with labor politics and class struggle, as a goal of this 
research is to understand factors that undermine and enable workers’ strength and 
resilience. 
Based on my synthesis from the previous chapter, as well as interdisciplinary 
approaches, drawing especially from feminist and Marxist-Feminist traditions, I propose 
the concept of the third shift, which will help reveal the tensions between men and 
women workers whose priorities were different. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118	  The page number used here is based on an Electronic book version.	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7.5 The Third Shift: Women in Men’s world of labor activism 
At work, women and men workers are subject to different sets of standards, based 
on both the local, gendered perception of labor and practices of a gendered division of 
labor (Silvey 2003; 2006). Male workers are expected to do manual work, which requires 
an exercise of bodily strength. Women workers, on the other hand, are seen as better at 
delicate crafts such as sewing, that requires dexterous and nimble fingers (see also 
Theobald 2002). Moreover, women workers are expected to be more discreet, diplomatic 
and better at following rules than men. Outside work, women are the main caretakers, 
and their partners also judge women’s reproductive work in the households.  
Further, as explained earlier, the distinctive strategies men and women workers 
choose to cope with precariousness, disciplining, and alienation also point to different 
ways in which male and female workers/activists take care of their bodies. In their 
discussion of sexual politics, activism, and everyday life, Franzway and Fonow (2011) 
suggest that, as part of the second shift (Hochschild and Machung 1989),119 women take 
up the responsibility of caring for others, including men, at the expense of their own 
bodies. For women activists, an opportunity to engage with public roles, including 
political activism, depends on their ability to negotiate the second shift. According to 
Franzway and Fonow (2011), women activists often put aside self-care, especially 
exercise, and prioritize the reproductive work of their partners’ labor. Thai women 
activists such as Naam then had three work shifts: the first shift at work, second shift at 
home, and the third shift in the union. While male counterparts easily found more time 
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  Hochschild and Machung (2012[1989]) argue, “women who do a first shift at work and all of a second shift at 
home can’t compete on male terms” (p. 26, ebook version). Franzway and Fonow (2011) note that the notion of second 
shift, which is grounded in the lived experiences of women in the Global North (i.e., heterosexual, and Western, 
nuclear family), cannot adequately address experiences of women in non-heterosexual (i.e., queer activist) and other 
family structures and cultures (p. 32).	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within their leisure slot to participate in activism, as their second shift, women activists 
busily squeezed the second and third shifts within their non-work opening.  
7.5.1 Male executive committee members and their wives 
To tell a story of the way in which men and women workers shared responsibility 
on domestic work, I start with my experience with two male labor activists and their 
wives.  On a normal working day’s evening, I was invited to dine with two male union 
activists—Yos and Oat—along with their wives, at Oat’s house. It was the second time I 
had come to his house, but this time it was different because his wife, Kai, did not work 
on the night shift like the first time, and Yos’s wife, Bo, also joined us. I had hung out 
with Yos many times but never had a chance to spend time with Bo. This was thus a 
normal working day, but a rare and special occasion for me. 
During the meal, Yos and Oat were passionately engaged in a conversation about 
their union’s internal conflicts. At the time, they both worried about polarization within 
the executive committee, with Oat and Yos on one side and the rest on the other. They 
had a long discussion about how other executive committee members ignored Yos’s 
initiatives, despite his role as president. Trying to engage their wives, who were only 
listening into the conversation, I joked that Kai and Bo were bored to death already. To 
my surprise, Kai looked at Oat and said that “we don’t mind this kind of talk. They can 
manage the union, but they need to manage the household too.” Bo echoed Kai’s 
statement, while Yos suddenly added that he had recently been a good househusband, 
who ironed Bo ’s clothes and cleaned up everything in the household. Bo finally 
responded that he was guilted into doing it.  
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 During this time, Yos was not allowed to enter the workplace. Around three 
months before that, the company had requested the labor court’s permission to discharge 
Yos on the grounds of his low performance. In the official complaint,120 the company 
claimed that Yos took too many leave days during the year and most importantly, that 
during the CBA negotiation, he led the ‘slowdown strike’ that caused the company a 
large amount of underproduction and thus a huge delay of car deliveries. According to 
the company, the estimated damage caused by Yos’s foot-dragging was over $6 million 
worth of production. In fact, the only evidence provided by the company to the court for 
such a serious accusation was the record of daily targeted and real production during the 
CBA negotiation. The court of first instance agreed with Yos, who claimed that he 
strictly followed workplace regulations and his leave was legal and thus acceptable. 
However, the court found it hard to contest the performance evaluation results, known by 
the workers as the ‘grading’ system. With Yos’s lowest evaluation result (i.e., E grade) 
from his supervisor for two successive years, the company claimed that Yos was hua 
khaeng (a verbatim translation is hard head; obstinate and indocile) who was impossible 
to work with.  
  Like many male activists, including Yingyong and Sorn, Yos took personal 
leave when the company did not give them permission for taking day(s) off as concerned 
with the union or group affairs. Otherwise, they were exhausted or ill from activist work 
during the weekend, so they had to take sick leave on Monday. In general, while the 
company still tolerated the absenteeism, activists like Yos or Oat spent most of that time 
outside their households, away from their wives’ sight. Therefore, after the company 
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  While I was writing this chapter, the court of the first instance had already made a ruling.	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started to get the court’s permission, Yos was paid without going to work and could 
spend more time at home. An unintended consequence was that the company now 
appeared to subsidize the domestic labor for Bo and Yos’s household. During the day, 
Yos was allocating time for housework such as cooking, washing clothes, and ironing, 
while still maintaining his activism in the evenings. With Yos’s ‘paid vacation’, Oat had 
worked harder to represent the radical voice in the union, perhaps at the expense of his 
wife, Kai, who in turn had to work harder at home. At one point, Pat drove three hours 
each way two days in a row to attend a training and seminar, organized separately, in 
Bangkok. In their union where a majority of union executive committee members were 
men, other male activists stepped up to fill the gap when male leaders were dismissed. 
Therefore, whether a union sustains harassment by the employer depends on mutual 
support both within the union and between male activists and their partners in the 
households. 
7.5.2 Women executive committee members and the partners 
The group’s meetings usually took place in the evening after work and would last 
two to three hours. Unlike their counterparts, women workers who were married or lived 
with a partner did not have privileges to regularly attend meetings at these hours. 
Although both male and female workers were breadwinners, Thai women workers were 
still expected to take up more responsibility for household chores such as cooking for all 
familial members. Women activists from a female-dominated union argued that married 
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women had more responsibility than men because “men can sit still once at home, they 
leave everything to the housewife”.121 
 Some women activists in this union seemed to have understanding and 
supporting partners. For example, Thip was an executive committee member whose 
husband, I was told by other women committees, drove her to the local government office 
or even the Ministry of Labor office in Bangkok. Another women committee member, 
Orn, said that the partners of women activists had to be open-minded and understanding, 
to let the wives do what they were doing like this. Orn added that she was lucky that she 
was now a single mom; her husband would be a burden to her activism if they were still 
together. Orn and her husband had separated, but she still took care of both her daughters. 
In fact, her mother-in-law raised both her daughters, even after their separation. After the 
older daughter finished middle school, she had come to stay with Orn and went to a 
vocational college in the Eastern Seaboard area.  
It is rare to see couples that are both union activists because activism is time-
consuming and there is always a risk of being dismissed by the company. Naam and Wit 
were one of the couples that came closest because Wit used to be an activist. When I met 
Wit in 2015, along with many dozens of workers, Wit was anticipating wages and 
compensation from the debt consolidation process with a multinational company that had 
filed bankruptcy during the financial crisis in the late 2000s. At the time, Wit drove a 
truck that transported containers between the nearest port and factories, while Naam was 
an executive committee of a union in the Hemaraj Eastern Seaboard Industrial Estate. 
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not allowed to enter the workplace. In Thailand, such gender norms do not only apply to working class households; 
middle-class women are also subject to similar societal expectation. However, the fact that middle-class households 
with greater income are able to purchase some domestic work through the market reduces the strains on middle-class 
women.	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They moved in together to live in a dorm near the ELRG office because they wanted to 
dedicate more time to labor activism. When I visited the office on the weekend, some 
times I saw Wit often walking in the neighborhood, waiting for the laundry, or filling up 
water containers from a dispenser.  
While I asked Naam about how Wit supported her, she responded,  
He tries to be flexible about what to eat, and shares the responsibility when he can, 
though not equally. When he has time, for example, he helps with the laundry and 
prepares some food for me. We try to take turns. As we both work, we do not pressure 
ourselves with the idea of being housewife or househusband. He understands that it will 
be too hard if I take up all the responsibility. As a woman, I have to take it up anyway. 
Like today, after the meeting, I need to finish the ironing. [I] don’t know when I’ll finish, 
perhaps when he comes back around 1 am. 
 
The shift-lapse between men and women workers who co-habited was quite 
normal, but this lifestyle added strain specifically to women. During an interview, a male 
worker had a great metaphor when he said that an amount of electric fans used in the 
household was a good indicator for the fact that he and his spouse regularly worked at 
alternative shifts. As their shifts alternated, they rotated the use of an electric fan almost 
24 hours a day. For this reason, electric fans were constantly broken and regularly needed 
a replacement. Using such metaphor, women workers-caretakers worked 24/7 like an 
electric fan.  
Owing to his activist background, Wit was very understanding of Naam’s 
situations.122 In fact, it is not an exaggeration to state that Wit had personal stigma from 
the workplace struggle and unionism. In 2009, the company suddenly dismissed him out 
of the blue before filing for bankruptcy. As the workers had no workplace union, the 
sister company’s union convinced Wit and other workers that joining the union would 
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  On writing this chapter, Wit and Naam had recently had their first baby together. Through our long-distance 
communication via social media, they said they were raising the baby by themselves. 
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help them reclaim wages and compensation. He followed the union to all the protests, 
from the local to national government offices in Bangkok, before realizing that the union 
only needed their mass (around eighty-six workers) as a leverage to pressure the parent 
company. It turned out that the owner negotiated with the sister company’s union but 
refused to talk to Wit and his dismissed colleagues, on the ground that without 15% of 
the workers’ support, the bargaining unit was not legally recognized. For over three 
months, not only did he lose the job, he felt that he was fooled into supporting the sister 
company’s union. Without job and salary, he could not afford rent, his car payment, and 
necessities for his one-year-old toddler. He was then forced to return home to the 
Northeast, along with his ex-wife and son. Subsequently, after his savings ran out, he 
broke up with his ex-wife, who took their one-year-old son away. Wit blamed the 
consultants of that sister company’s union for all his loss. However, subsequently, Wit 
was able to find a job at a nearby industrial estate. He even started a labor union and 
became the president. According to Wit, after the first yearly CBA negotiation when the 
union could not deliver what members expected, the executive committee abandoned him 
and the union. As a result, he was singled out and disciplined by the employer, who 
banned him from overtime work. Abandoned by co-workers, he resigned and stayed 
away from activism. His voice expressed profound bitterness when he recounted the past, 
When I was the leader, no one protected me. No one was my real friend. So I see no need 
to do anything for the others. When I was submitting the new CBA, I did not get a raise, 
everyone else did. I did not get a good grade, but everyone else did. When I went to the 
court, not a single friend came with me; not even a single question. The company 
harassed me with the charge that I missed the work… I rode a motorbike to Rayong court 
by myself, under the rain. When I came back, I told myself that I have had enough with 
all of these. 
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Wit was also critical of labor activism that focused mainly on demanding higher 
wages and bonuses. Nonetheless, not unlike other male activists such as Chet, he also 
believed that workers should not depend on income derived from overtime work and 
should otherwise try to spend more time on activism. As he learned firsthand, apart from 
being a mechanism for flexible working hours for management, the company also used 
overtime work as a disciplinary measure, in particular with union activists. Specifically, 
he strongly criticized workers who ‘were addicted’ to overtime work because they had 
too much debt. In other words, consumerism was the most serious problem that, 
according to him, seemed to plague the workers in general.123  
From the union perspective, Wit’s criticism is somewhat well justified. However, 
it unfairly dismisses the material needs, such as those felt by a single mother like Orn. 
Again, it should be noted that such a criticism of overtime (and a lack of time for 
activism) is still based on a non-feminist notion of time. Moreover, this viewpoint is 
implicitly rooted in a problematic perspective that waged work is the only value-creating 
or productive activity. Therefore, in the next chapter, I turn to a social reproduction 
framework, which will help us better understand the issues of overtime. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter explores the relationships between militancy and masculinity in the 
Eastern Seaboard’s labor unions. In the local context, workers were obliged to constantly 
display shows of strength to leverage their collective bargaining power. This chapter 
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  On the issue of overtime, a male activist incidentally told me that male workers tend to work overtime because 
they gave all their salary to the wives. Therefore, what they earned from overtime belonged to the men, who usually 
could use the money to have “some fun after the hard work.” 
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illustrates that women’s participation and internal dynamics between men and women in 
the unions are conditioned by organizational practices (i.e., gendered meaning of 
leadership), gender norms, as well as gendered divisions of labor in the households. 
Moreover, it shows the distinctive ways in which male and female activists shifted their 
consciousness across time and space, and differently coped with work-related 
precariousness. This chapter proposes the concept of the third shift to explain women’s 
subjectivity and gendered barriers within the unions. Finally, it also reveals, despite 
workers’ strong sense of injustice, gendered and sexual politics led to gender-biased 
structure and marginalization that weakened the labor organizations as a whole. Male 
activists can use insights from the third shift as a corrective to better support women and 
strengthen the union movements from the inside. 
 
Chapter 8. Organizing from Hidden Abodes:  
Centering Household Reproduction as Collective Consumption 
 
The previous chapters show that the Eastern Labor Relations Group (ELRG)’s 
labor militancy was conditioned by Thai industrial relations system, local organizing 
practices, and the group’s gendered dynamics. Despite the will and efforts of the ELRG 
activists, they were faced with several challenges, internal and external. Apparently, one 
of the main internal challenges came from a gap of commitments between the unionists 
and rank-and-file members; the gap itself was a result of conflicting demands between 
the families and the labor unions. In this chapter, I explore workers’ roles as consumers 
and how consumption—as integral part of social reproduction—could potentially pose 
challenges to capital accumulation and simultaneously cause internal rift within labor 
activism.  
This final chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section, I briefly review 
the relevant literature on social reproduction and debates around migration, gender, and 
labor activism. The first section provides the framework for discussing, in the next 
section, issues of spatially extended household reproduction of Thai workers across 
regions. The rich ethnographic research with Northeastern workers in the Eastern 
Seaboard points to connection, as well as conflicts, between workplace activism and 
social reproductive practices done by workers’ family members across places. To wholly 
understand such tensions between workers’ social-reproductive practices and capital 
accumulation process, in the third section, the social reproduction framework brings to 
the fore the often-neglected ‘background conditions’ (Fraser 2016) which connect 
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workplace struggle with the larger working-class struggle. In the last section, I place 
labor activists’ struggle in the context of daily reproductive work, education, childcare 
and generational reproduction of the labor force across places, making a full circle of the 
migratory flow.  
My main argument in this chapter is that while union executive committees 
focused on workers’ collective demands (i.e., the wages and remuneration), these 
demands reflected not only the needs of workers alone but also the larger familial 
network of social reproductive process. To achieve such needs, as organized labor, 
workers caused disruption to the production process, leading to labor disputes with 
employers. Paradoxically, during labor struggles, unionized workers put more strains on 
familial network of support that in turn depended financially on workers’ waged work. 
This chapter explores these conflicts and contradiction by incorporating labor activism 
and consumption into the same analytical framework. 
According to Social Reproduction Marxism, social reproduction represents both 
workers’ personal consumption, as a form of self-development, and collective 
consumption, as workers’ household members participate in caring and reproductive 
work of labor power reproduction. From the social reproduction perspective, this chapter 
proposes that, workplace struggle articulates both self-development and collective 
demands. When these two objectives—personal and collective—align, workers’ struggle 
becomes powerful forces against capital accumulation, reflecting what Autonomous 
Marxists calls workers’ power to attack. Nevertheless, when interests of organized labor 
comes into conflicts with the larger working-class movement, the two objectives 
contradict and stand in the way of increasing the class’s power. 
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8.1 Social Reproduction, Migration and Households 
Feminist scholars have long disputed domestic work’s place in the theorization of 
wage labor-capital relations in capitalism. As far as the domestic labor debate has 
progressed, scholars agree that social reproduction and production are interdependent and 
contradictory (Picchio 1992; Caffentzis 2002; Weeks 2007; Kelly 2009). For example, 
geographer Linda McDowell asserts that patriarchy and capitalism are whole; not only is 
the wage labor-capital relation contingent on gender relations within patriarchy, but the 
relationship between childbearing and the appropriation of surplus value for workers’ 
social reproduction is central to women’s oppression (1986). Here, social reproduction 
refers to “those activities that enable the maintenance of both workers’ daily lives and the 
intergenerational re-creation of a labor force” (Picchio 1992: cited by Kelly 2009, 451). 
Social reproduction feminism advances the notion of social reproduction with the 
concept of expanded modes of production, encompassing waged and unwaged (i.e., 
domestic) labor in both processes of commodity production and the 
production/reproduction of labor power (i.e., child-bearing, child-rearing, and 
housework) (Ferguson 2008). The political economy strand in social reproduction 
emphasizes the contradiction and correspondences between structures (e.g., state-led 
social welfare), social relations (i.e., class, gender, and race) and practices (Strauss and 
Meehan 2015, p.8). The studies of international political economy also recognize the 
existence of both formal and informal economies, especially the roles of unpaid workers 
(i.e., women and the elderly) in the latter as subsidizing the male-dominated economy 
(Bakker and Gill 2003).  
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 Moreover, feminist scholarship on gender and migration foregrounds the 
significance of households as units of decision-making in which gendered hierarchies of 
power shape migration patterns (see Lawson 1998; Chant 1992). Feminist geographers 
have further contributed to deepening understanding of households as a socially 
constructed scale (e.g., Silvey 2006). As Rachel Silvey summarizes, feminist geographers 
are quick to highlight place-specific meaning of households ‘through the social practices 
defining domesticity, tensions around the boundaries separating the public and the 
private, meanings of kinship relations, norms of sexuality, and the relationship between 
various work and caring spaces” (Bondi and Rose, 2003; Mitchell, Marston and Katz, 
2003) (Silvey 2006, p. 68). In this chapter, I explore the way in which dual meanings of 
labor (i.e., abstract and living labor) offer an understanding of dynamics and conflicts 
between needs from personal and collective perspectives. The empirical material extends 
geographical knowledge of the way in which households become mediating spaces 
between conflicting demands of short-term labor activism and long-term household 
reproduction. This insight contributes to enrich studies of labor activism and deepens 
theories of labor agency. 
Anthropologist Mary Beth Mills has laid the foundation for studies of workers’ 
identities and cultural struggle through her in-depth ethnographic research of rural female 
migrants. Set against the early stage of Thai economic development from the late 1980s 
to 1990s, Mills (1997, 1999a, 1999b) explores experiences of young Thai women who 
migrated from rural villages to become industrial workers in urban industrial zones 
around Bangkok. In her studies of migratory experiences, Mills (1997, 1999a) shows how 
Thai women negotiated their personal desires with household obligations and socially 
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constructed images of modern women through consumption. Focusing on women’s 
contested identities as avid consumers and labor activists, Mills’s (2003, 2005) account of 
structural obstacles facing workers’ class-based identities and collective action in Thai 
society are of great value. Mills (2003, 2005) argues that despite apparent obstacles and 
images of compliant workers, Thai labor activists and women workers regularly 
negotiated class and gender conflicts by using symbolic and gendered discourses to 
construct workers’ self-image and class-consciousness. In short, through rural-urban 
migration, Thai women workers took progress (khwam thansamai) as a social goal of 
workers’ cultural struggle (Mills 1997).  
In her more recent work, Mills (2008) examines the spatial practices of female 
labor activists who navigated different spaces of activism. Mills (2008) makes the case 
for politics of recognition by concluding, “[by] entering into spaces of authority and 
privilege, workers assert demands for recognition in both concrete and deeply satisfying 
ways. By transgressing social hierarchies and traversing spaces of power and exclusivity, 
labor activists make important spatial claims to inclusion within the national society as 
full, modern citizens” (p. 122). Similarly, Piya Pangsapa compares two groups of Thai 
women workers who expressed different forms of accommodation, one with militancy 
and the other with compliance. Piya Pangsapa adds that the reasons why and how certain 
groups of Thai workers successfully mobilize are usually contextual and place specific. 
According to Pangsapa (2007), labor activism cannot be understood without the context 
of ‘the structure of the work environment, [workers]’ particular experiences within the 
workplace, and their personal and social relations both inside and outside the factory” 
	   250	  
(14). For these reasons, this research focuses on workers’ experiences across spatially 
extended household reproduction. 
 
8.2 Spatially extended household reproduction: ‘outsourcing’ caring labor  
 
 In contrast to the personal histories of arrival upon the Eastern Seaboard in 
Chapter Three, this section addresses temporary return of migrant workers’ children to 
the Isan region. When workers in the Eastern Seaboard, including Orn or Chet (and his 
partner), had babies, they normally sent the children back to their hometowns, shifting 
childbearing duties to the grandparents. Depending on the familial situation, childrearing 
and childcare could be performed by parents-in-law, siblings, or even the parents’ 
siblings.124 By doing so, workers made sure that their children grew up in the same places 
where they learned the same language and culture.  Most importantly, workers were able 
to lower a part of the reproductive costs including childrearing and education expenses. 
As family members who received remittances from workers lived in the places where the 
living expenses were generally lower, this phenomenon is similar to the practices of 
outsourcing.   
In fact, in the Northeast region, the commodity basket was cheaper than in the 
Eastern Seaboard because food and basic necessities partially stemmed from self-
sustainable and small-scale farming. On the national scale, this strategy could be seen as 
being promoted by state policies that had long contributed to geographically uneven 
development. On the micro scale, however, as it appeared, workers and their families 
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  There was an exception, though, which was usually a case whereby workers had the privilege of having relatives 
with them.	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intentionally chose the migration and temporary return of children as survival 
strategies—an expression of labor’s agency to an over-powering economic and political 
structure (i.e., export-led industrialization policy, flexible employment, uneven 
development etc).  
In the following section, I offer ethnographic notes from participant observation 
with families of three activists, Orn, Chet, and Yos, whose children were raised by their 
relatives in the Northeastern provinces. This first story was observed when I 
accompanied Orn to visit her youngest daughter on Mother’s Day. Although these 
snapshots do not wholly tell the stories of daily reproductive work, they were moments in 
which tense relationships within the familial configuration revealed themselves.  
8.2.1 Long-distance Mom and Mother’s Day  
Orn was a single mom; she was separated from her husband and had two 
daughters—Duan and Dao.  During my research, Duan, the older one, was eighteen and 
Dao, the youngest, four years old. Despite the separation, Orn left both daughters with 
grandparents—for her case, parents-in-law—perhaps because Orn’s parents already 
passed away. After Duan finished middle school, she moved to a vocational school in the 
Eastern Seaboard and shared a small space in a studio room with Orn. While I visited 
them, the older daughter had already finished the vocational degree and entered the local 
workforce in the Eastern Seaboard. Following her oldest sister’s footsteps, Dao—the 
younger daughter—stayed with the grandparent. Dao saw her mom only during holidays 
and long weekends. Accordingly, Orn performed most long-distance caring work through 
communication on smart phones.  
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In 2015, Mother’s Day was on Friday. Therefore, like everyone else, Orn took 
advantage of the long weekend by going to see her younger daughter in Sa Kaeo 
province, a small town on the Thailand-Cambodia border approximately a hundred miles 
from the Eastern seaboard. Orn made a plan to pick her daughter up from Sa Kaeo and 
then to go to Nakornratchasima (or Korat), her hometown, another one hundred and 
seventy miles away. Because Orn did not have enough money to purchase a car, she 
would normally travel to these places by bus, but for this year, I volunteered to drive a 
car for them, in order to visit Sa Kaeo and Korat.  
Mother’s Day bore some significance to Orn and her daughter, who had a long-
distance relationship and met only on holidays. When Orn arrived at her in-law’s house, 
Dao was waiting with her small backpack—with a towel, a comb, and a few changes of 
clothes prepared by the grandparents. Rejoiced by the sight of her mom, Dao’s single 
braid swung from one side to the other while she ran toward Orn. After they had a hug, 
Dao quickly took out a handmade card, with a big red paper-heart on it, and held it in 
front of Orn. “Look, look what I made for you mae Orn (mae means mom in Thai). 
Teacher helped me make this.” To my wonder, her daughter also used the same pronoun 
‘mae’ with her grandmother.  During the trip, sometimes Dao did not feel comfortable 
with the long car ride and wanted to ‘go home.’ For many times when she felt like that, 
she would cry and ask to see her other mom. Orn would calm her, by letting Dao watch 
cartoon from Youtube on her phone. Orn told me that she preferred turning on the 
Buddhist praying chants for her daughter, which made Dao fall sleep. At times, Dao 
would say that she wanted to live with mae Orn on the daily basis. During the trip, Dao 
seemed to be conflicted with the emotional pull and push, from one mom to another.  
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In Korat, Orn stayed with an older sister, who was herself the grandmother of two 
small children: one boy and one girl, similar in age to Dao. They were happy to see Dao. 
Orn’s niece—the daughter of her sister and the mother of two kids—worked   in a local 
food factory. I was curious how she felt about her situation, as opposed to being a 
migrant in the other areas such as the Eastern Seaboard. She replied that being able to be 
with and take care of her children was the most important thing. 
 
8.2.2 The Come-and-Go of Working Parents 
 On another occasion I accompanied two couples, Bo and Yos and Chet and Nan, 
on a trip to Yasothon province, Yos’s hometown. It was a survey trip before the ELRG 
would come to organize the annual community service at the local village school. Since 
Chet was locked out of his factory (see UM struggle in Chapter Four),125 he was a main 
coordinator for the community service. In fact, Chet’s wife, Nan, was from Sisaket—a 
small Northeastern province bordering Cambodia, sixty-five miles from Yasothon—and 
Chet and Nan’s only son was taken care of by Nan’s stepmom in Sisaket. Coming along 
on the survey trip, Chet would represent the ELRG in the meeting with community 
leaders. Moreover, Chet and Nan planned to visit and pick his son up on the way to 
Yasothon, so that they could spend a few days together, before dropping him off on the 
way back to the Eastern Seaboard. In this trip, I had an opportunity to observe three other 
long-distance parents with their children: Chet and Nan with their son Way; Yos and Bo 
with Ton, and Yos with his senior parents.  
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  Three years earlier, Chet was secretary of the workers union in an American car-marker, while Ta worked for the 
sister company that produced car engines. Both were involved in the protest that led to the indefinite period of lock-out 
and the dismissal of unionized workers.  
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Like Orn’s older sister and parents in law who took care of the children, Yos’s 
parents were the main caretakers of their grandson, Ton, a seven-year old boy. During 
our trip to Yasothon, Ton was independent because he was familiar with the 
neighborhood in which he attended the village school. He would freely go out and play 
with local kids. It is worth pointing out that the village was a tight-knit community and 
safe, as most neighbors were related to Yos.  
When we visited the school, which would be the site for the ELRG’s community 
service, Ton was very helpful in showing us around.  As for Way, Chet and Nan’s two 
year-old boy, he was rather attached to Chet, who normally communicated on a daily 
basis with him via the smartphone. There was a moment when Chet and Nan were away, 
and Bo was babysitting Way, who was sleeping in their place. The moment he was 
awake, he asked “phor pai sai” (Where is dad going? in northeastern dialect). Bo’s first 
reaction was simply to say, “he is buying some things nearby.”  Then, Bo realized the 
situation and added that “he is working too”. For the children, it is not only normal but 
also necessary that their parents work and stay in different places. To refer to work is to 
normalize Chet’s absence and comfort Way at the same time. Workers such as Chet or 
Orn would try to see their children whenever they could. Nevertheless, such 
unpredictability and lack of consistency seemed at times to confuse their children. 
Having noticed the children’s reactions to their parents’ unannounced coming-and-going 
over a period of time, I often came to think of Sorn’s strategies of momentary happiness. 
Eventually, it makes much sense to seize the moment while it lasts. 
 
8.2.3 Reproductive and Caring Work: Reproducing the class and gendered subjectivity 
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It is understandable that these workers tried to compensate for their absence by 
indulging their children with toys and complacency. Thanks to our mutual affinity, I 
spent a great deal of time with Chet, Nan, Bo, and Yos, which allowed me to observe 
their relationships with the children, as both parents and individual workers. For this 
reason, I was aware of the different styles in their childrearing, which appeared to be 
shaped by gender norms. To begin, Nan said that Chet liked to spoil their son whereas 
Way was more heedful of Chet than of her. Similarly, Bo had the same comment that Ton 
was more obedient to Yos than to her. According to Bo, while her parents were taking 
care of Ton, when he was very little, her dad was also very sweet and lenient. She 
suggested that Ton never grew up with a strict male figure, except with Yos. From my 
experience, Yos’s dad was one of the sweetest men I had met. Both Bo and Nan seemed 
to agree that their kids were heedful to the male counterparts more than to themselves. I 
suspected that such a tendency was also related to the fact that the male activists were the 
dominant ones in their relationships.  
Actually, there were similarities between Chet and Yos, who had similar 
background, particularly as unruly teenagers. While their two boys spent some time in the 
Eastern Seaboard, during pre-school for Way and school break for Ton, as activists both 
Chet and Yos brought them to the ELRG office and other places. For instance, as Ton 
was capable of being by himself, Yos could bring him to the protests, at which he took 
pride that Ton was not shy while participating in the ‘hi-park.’ This kind of socialization 
allowed Ton to see how other workers related to Yos professionally as union president. 
Likewise, as a son of a naval officer and trainer, Chet was a highly masculine man. At the 
ELRG office, Chet would go about freely without shirt and frequently attend meetings 
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shirtless, which he proudly exhibited a tattoo of the union seal on his chest. Chet’s son, 
however, had at one time been the subject of anecdote among male activists, as Chet 
found himself complaining in front of other activists that his son picked up feminine 
mannerisms after starting kindergarten. Since then, as a joke, many friends, including 
Sorn, teased Chet for having a daughter, instead of a boy, which embarrassed Chet a great 
deal. 
 In fact, the original story was concerned with a video of Way that Chet received 
from Nan’s stepmom—Chet’s mother in law—who was the main caretaker. In this 
context, the smart phone became a indispensible means of communication and a tool for 
caring and affective labor across places. With the aid of his mother-in-law, Chet and Nan 
were able to carry out caring work via the Internet call. In the same way, Chet was able to 
communicate with his dad and siblings, who lived in the Western region and the Bangkok 
Metropolitan area, respectively. While I was with Chet at the ELRG office or Chet’s 
house, the video call with Way was a daily routine for him—a routine that seemed to 
regenerate their energy and strength on a day-to-day basis. The most interesting aspect of 
the regular video chat between Way and his parents was that Way took to calling his dad 
Pii Chet (pii means older brother), as it was the way Nan referred to him with her 
stepmom. Just as the network of social reproduction was able to adapt to the 
configuration of household reproduction, workers’ children were also adaptive and 
resilient. Similar to the way in which Dao learned to accommodate the distances between 
two mothers, Way was malleable in accepting Chet as an older brother and dad at the 
same time. To what extent stretching social reproduction across places had affected the 
semantics of hierarchies and kin relationships remains to be answered in the long term. 
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On a trip to Yasothon, we visited Nan’s stepmom, who had a small grocery in the 
town of Sisaket. She was a middle-aged woman who took care of the store and six 
children coming from four families: two of her own, one of Chet and Nan’s, and the 
others from neighbors. The children’s ages ranged from two to eleven years old, with 
four in the same age cohort: 6, 6, 7, and 8. For a brief period when I was there, she 
complained that there were too many children for her to take care of. Yet, it was obvious 
that she had much affection for the children, especially Way. On the way to Sisaket, Chet 
and Nan explained half-jokingly that they did not give Nan’s stepmom a head’s up that 
they would pick Way up because they were afraid that she would refuse. Apparently, the 
relocation and outsourcing of social reproductive work had not neatly re-allocated 
material needs and affective labor within the familial network. In such re-configurations, 
workers were also obliged to carefully calibrate the complex emotional entanglements 
involved.  
As a result of the locational shifting of reproductive work, workers were able to 
keep their household structure as simple as possible, such as the nuclear family without 
children on the site. In this configuration, the inter-generational recreation and 
reproduction of labor force were still going on, but where, how, and by whom were 
reworked through the process of relocation and reorganization—just like outsourcing. 
Nevertheless, such reworking of the household structure and relocation of social-
reproductive work were not without repercussions for inter-personal relations and affects.  
As social reproduction theorists (e.g., Fraser 2016) point out, the capitalist system 
benefits from free-riding on the seemingly non-economic work of provisioning and 
caregiving that produce and sustain life and community. As social reproduction is 
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indispensable, as a precondition for socially reproducing wage labor, made free by the 
capitalist system, Nancy Fraser (2016) calls it the ‘background condition’ for the 
economic production of commodities. Similarly, Dalla Costa and James (1972) argued 
that by instituting a nuclear family structure, capital frees men from reproductive work, 
and allocates reproductive work to women, hence subjecting both men and women to 
capitalist, exploitative waged relations. The family’s roles are crucial in both producing 
generational labor power and reproducing labor power on a daily basis, especially in time 
of economic crises. In this sense, family is thus ‘the very pillar of the capitalist 
organization of work (1972, p. 19)’. This chapter borrows such insight to understand how 
capital indirectly uses workers’ family and social reproductive network to discipline 
workers while directly increasing work intensification in the workplace. 
 
8.3 Consumption, Migration, and Counter-Production Activism 
In waged labor relations, workers are conditioned to rely on waged work, and the 
interests of capital (i.e. profits and accumulation) become the driving forces in their lives. 
Workers’ collective action, such as the UM workers’ denial to the introduction of 
Saturday as a working day, is exemplary of resistance to the lengthening of workdays. 
Further, through my research, activists and unionized workers showed in various forms of 
actions and speeches that they could not let productive forces take control of their lives—
lives that stretched across spaces of production and social reproduction. For instance, 
male workers such as Chet and Wit resisted the normalization of overtime work and 
criticized the rank-and-file’s reliance on it. Such a refusal should be seen as a declaration 
that workers’ lives were not to be dictated by capital. In other words, workers were 
	   259	  
saying that they were not abstract labor but living labor that makes things (i.e. use value) 
for their pleasure. Likewise, some workers such as Sorn and Yos, who enjoyed leisure 
such as fishing and drinking, stressed the importance of life in the present and the 
irreducibility of concrete space-time. While they prioritized the use of their time and 
energy in social and organizing activities, from capital’s perspective, their acts were 
irrational because it was a waste of productive labor power. Hence, management 
responded harshly to workers’ denials, or the waste of productive energy. Specifically, 
the motive for struggles was based on conflicts between interests of production and 
accumulation, on the one hand, and the goals of consumption and social reproduction, on 
the other.  
In this final chapter, by building on the insights of Mary Beth Mills and Piya 
Pangsapa, I look at workers’ demands for higher wages and bonus payments as ways to 
fulfill the needs of consumption for both workers and their families. However, based on 
the social reproduction framework, I view such consumption differently from Mills, who 
theorizes consumption as a cultural tactic in expressing and forming identity. By 
comparison, in my analysis, consumption directly counterposes social reproduction with 
production through workplace activism because consumption is the principle way that 
workers reproduce labor power on the daily basis, and households in the long term. 
Moreover, consumption plays a dual role in the theory of value of labor power. As 
outlined earlier, Bhattacharya (2017) argues that individual consumption is a part of the 
circuit of capital because labor power, the product of consumption, is simultaneously the 
means of reproducing capital (see Chapter 1).  
M—Ac—P—Lp—M       (p. 81) 
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According to Bhattacharya, the consumption of workers in the circuit is 
purposeful, in the sense that workers consume commodities as use-value (e.g., food, 
clothing, housing, education), for self-development, or even self-transformation, not for 
capital. Such purposes in the reproduction process contradict the capitalist’s goal of 
capital accumulation in the first circuit (M—C (Mp, Lp) —P—C’—M’). Bhattacharya 
(2017) applies her “method of social reproduction of labor theory” to the question of 
workplace struggle, pointing out the differences between what Marx calls “capital in 
general” and “many capitals” (p. 83). While the former (i.e., capital in general) appears as 
the sum of the latter (i.e., many capitals), according to her, because of ontological and 
strategic reasons, it is impossible for labor unions to confront capital as a whole. 
Ontologically, labor and capital are relational and cannot exist without each other. 
Workers as abstract labor cease to exist if only the capital-labor relations end. By 
contrast, workers as living labor could confront an individual boss or group of bosses, 
through the process of surplus value realization. Strategically, it is feasible for labor 
unions to confront many capitals, a group of capitalists, as forms of surplus value 
realization are concrete and experiential, from workers’ viewpoint. These forms include 
the extension of working hours, wage cuts, or production acceleration. In short, workers 
will always attempt to “pull in the opposite direction to increase time, wages and 
benefits… for self-development” (83). In this purview, labor activism is such workers’ 
attempt to pull in the opposite direction for self-development and social reproduction. 
From the viewpoint of capital, self-development, which is closely linked to 
personal empowerment, is similar to what Cleaver (1992) calls ‘dis-valorization.’ 
	   261	  
According to Cleaver, “valorization designates the complex process through which 
capital is able only to put people to work, but to do so in such a way that the process can 
be repeated on an ever greater scale” (8). Therefore, it is the process of subjecting 
workers to labor power extraction and value creation—an inverted concept of ‘alienation’ 
from capital’s perspective—through social control, in order to reproduce capitalist social 
relations. While dis-valorization signifies labor’s refusal to such subjectivity and de-
skilling, it is the process that can be understood at the most aggregated and abstract level 
of analysis. 
As labor is both commodity and living being, and the value of labor power is 
determined by the value of necessities required to maintain and reproduce labor power 
(i.e., means of subsistence), labor is unique—in the sense that unlike other commodities, 
labor adjusts its needs according to changes in its own prices. In other words, when the 
prices of wage goods increase, workers reduce their needs accordingly. Nevertheless, 
labor’s unique nature as both commodity and living being allows capitalists to benefit 
from the intrinsically reduced value of labor power—always sold at its face value in a 
labor market. In this regard, Bhattacharya (2017) argues that labor’s struggle for higher 
wages is connected with the struggle of the working class to improve standards of living 
in the realm of social reproduction.  
 
8.3.1 Symbolic Consumption  
Automobiles, especially passenger cars, occupy a unique social location in rapidly 
changing Thai society. Explaining how consumerism constructs gender identity among 
middle-class Thais, James Ockey argues that “in advertisements, women worry about 
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clean houses and clothes, about looking more beautiful; men impress beautiful women by 
buying expensive imported whisky and fancy cars” (2004, p. 163).  It is true that Ockey’s 
statement, aimed toward explaining the psyche of the Thai middle class, is primarily 
concerned with representation and caricature. However, it contains some grains of truth 
about gendered roles in consumption that seem to transcend class in Thailand. The strong 
connection between masculinity and cars in Thailand is manifested by the public display 
of female bodies to attract male clientele in events such as motor shows in Thailand (see 
Andrew et al 2003, p. 261).126 As Connell and Messerschmid (2005) argue, there is 
geography of masculinities that can be analyzed on local, regional, and global levels. On 
a national scale, the motor shows and car commercials exemplify discursive and cultural 
constructs of masculinity through representation and sexist practices in Thailand. By 
contrast, the local construct is concerned with the “face-to-face interaction of families, 
organizations and immediate communities” (p. 849).  
Within the Eastern Seaboard, some men workers belonged to racing clubs, whose 
members decorated pick-up trucks with a hi-fi stereo and accessories. With limited living 
space, many male workers, including Yos, were always seen sitting in the back of pick-
up trucks and drinking together in the evening. This was a common image that I saw 
during field research while observing their social lives. In her recent work, Fortunati 
(2011) argues that automobile and car culture strengthen the enclosing and private sphere 
within the domestic sphere even more (see also Williams 1974; Urry 2003). It appears, 
for instance, that SUVs and family-based vehicles have become a mobile unit of family, 
within which familial activities and the sexual divisions of labor continue to operate. As 
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  For studies of motorcar consumption and construction of the male working class in other contexts, see for example, 
Bengry-Howell and Griffin (2007) and Lumsden (2010).	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both producer and consumer of automobile in Thailand, ELRG activism plays a specific 
and unique role in this process of economic and symbolic production. 
8.3.2 Social Reproduction as Collective Consumption and Counter-Production 
 During my two trips to Yasothon, I stayed at the house of Yos’s parents. Because 
Yos proposed the community service project to the ELRG,127 his family was the official 
host. Furnished with modern roof-tiles, the house itself stood out from all other houses in 
the village. It was a concrete house, as opposed to tin roofs on wooden structure, like 
others. The house’s inside was even more impressive, with marble tiles. Although the 
ground floor was basically without any furniture, except for the television set, the house 
looked new from the shining effect of the marble floor. The other signs of modernity 
were the shower and modern toilet. By contrast, the second floor remained wooden—the 
previous condition that only showed from the inside. Simple plywood walls separated the 
two small rooms on the floor. In the room in which I stayed, there were photos and 
several signs of past memories. A picture of his grandparents—a painting based on an old 
photo—hung on the wall outside. Inside one room, there were photos of Yos in military 
uniform—he posed alone with a hand salute on one photo, the other with two friends. 
Yos confided to me once that he used to be a real troublemaker before entering the army, 
and the discipline changed him. Despite his good performance in schools, he lost interest 
in pursuing a high-school education because of drugs. On the first trip to Yasothon, when 
we had a meeting with community leaders about the project, two teachers who used to 
teach Yos came to greet us. As they reminisced about Yos’s time in the school, the 
teachers complimented him endlessly, saying that his performance was actually good.  I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127	  On the official trip of the community service, I could also join most workers who stayed at the school. However, as 
Yos’s parents considered me ‘a guest’, they kindly invited me to stay at the house again. I was touched and grateful for 
such hospitality.	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could not help but think about his ongoing lawsuit with the Mitzuki that accused him of 
misconduct, poor performance, and foot-dragging. Such a contrast was so stark. 
 His parents’ modern lifestyle was the fruit of labor from Yos and especially his 
younger sister, an accountant at one of Thailand’s biggest agro-business companies. In a 
sense, her access to white-collar job market was based on the college degree—hers was 
the first in the family, supported in part by her brother’s remittances. Yos told me that he 
worked hard to send money to his sister, while she was in college. After she graduated, 
she managed to get a secure desk job. With Yos’s ongoing lawsuit with Mitzuki, she had 
become the family’s main breadwinner. When we visited his family, Yos was already 
banned from entering the factory. His sister began to suggest that Yos should drop the 
battle and come home. She also suggested, with her support to provide him with the 
products at cost, he could become a local middleman and leave activism behind him. 
 As remarked by Charles Keyes (2014), over the past three decades, the numbers 
of modern houses in Northeastern villages have multiplied (p. 154). A main reason is that 
Northeastern villagers have greatly benefited from remittances sent by out-migrants, both 
domestic and abroad. For Keyes (2014), migration is a way in which Northeasterners turn 
the national development agenda into their personal goal. Geographers Rigg and 
Salamaca have also argued that Thailand’s uneven geographical development and the 
cross-regional migration of the Northeastern workforce have resulted in the 
reconfiguration of Northeastern households, confirming the absence of the middle 
generation and the local cross-generational co-habitation composed of mainly 
grandparents and grandchildren (Rigg and Salamanca 2011). In short, the stretching of 
household reproduction is a form of collective resilience. Similar to Katz’s web of care, 
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workers’ family members in the network of stretched household reproduction provide 
caring and reproductive labor, in exchange for remittances. 
 Compared to his sister’s, the manual work Yos had in the Eastern Seaboard was 
tedious and precarious. However, Yos prided himself on coming from where he used to 
be to becoming a trade union president in a global Japanese car-marker. After Mitzuki 
requested a court to dismiss Yos, a series of official letters sent to his home had 
considerably troubled his parents. This had especially disturbed his mom, who had long 
suffered from a chronic ulcer. For most Thai villagers, the court order is a sign of serious 
nuisance.   
8.3.3 The Rural as Social Factory  
The community service project lasted two days during one weekend. On the first 
day, the local community hosted a welcome ceremony at the school, where 
schoolteachers and staff organized student performances and prepared food and drink for 
workers in the evening. As a way to show that the community was well placed in the 
network of national support, the school invited the deputy director of the local education 
office to speak at the ceremony. Seeing the symbol of the labor group on the flag 
decorating the stage, the deputy director stated in his opening speech that he was 
surprised to see a display of the sickle and hammer these days. According to him, this 
reminded him of the time in which he grew up. During that period of social ‘upheaval’ 
in the 1970s, college students went out to rural areas ‘educating’ rural villagers with 
community development as the premise. Then he went on to praise the workers’ 
initiative and made the case for the workers’ revival of past ideology. As a result of the 
lack of government funding, he added, local government was now under a new 
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development scheme, where a public-private collaboration was the driving force of local 
schools’ development. In this purview, he deplored the community’s underdevelopment 
as the country’s ‘childcare and senior centers’ and denounced the reluctance of the 
private sector. Finally, he acknowledged organized labor’s roles in filling the gap left 
wide open by the public-private collaboration scheme.  
Having listened to such a speech, which alluded to crucial issues including 
uneven development and the local community’s subsidy of capitalist accumulation, I 
appreciated the acknowledgment of the local officer. Most importantly, his reference to 
‘childcare and senior centers’ seemed to crack open a small space where villagers started 
the hitherto-silenced conversation about the way in which the Thai economy has long 
exploited the Isan region by drawing generations of migrant workers into urban areas 
and forcing them to rely in part on the subsistence economy of their families through 
wage repression. Following the local officer’s speech, a local community leader also 
referred to the community as ‘a factory producing the national workforce.’ As the leader 
of the workers, Yingyong responded that it was the ELRG’s directive to educate society 
about labor exploitation. According to Yingyong, to raise the awareness of future 
generations of workers, the school curriculum should include the issues of labor laws 
and labor relations. Notwithstanding the educational opportunity, it pained me to see the 
irony that the workers had now taken another aspect of social reproduction (i.e., 
education) into their hands, given the unfair and discriminatory situations they were in.  
8.3.4 Plan Bs and Reconciliation 
Central to this research is the effort to make sense of the way in which workers 
reconciled the conflicts between a personal sense of righteousness and the bundle of 
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responsibilities wrapped inside the aspiration for a better life. Most importantly, some 
male workers articulated such reconciliation in the form of finding a sustainable way of 
livelihood.  
For instance, during the last six months of field research, Chet and Sorn had 
invested in a crayfish128 breeding business, which was very trendy in Thailand. In the 
process, they were preoccupied with educating themselves and others about the exotic 
animal. As Sorn still had a full-time job, Chet ran the business while Sorn took care of 
online marketing via social media. In the beginning, they only acted as middlemen who 
bought a small batch of crayfish to sell to local customers. Often, customers were 
workers or neighbors who lived in the same compound. For example, Chet was able to 
convince and convert two adjacent neighbors to become crayfish enthusiasts.  One was 
the immediate neighbor who shared the same wall with Chet and Nan and had a stall 
selling homemade a la carte dishes on rice in the neighborhood. The cook was a middle-
aged and full-time housewife, who sometimes took our food order from the other side of 
the wall. The other neighbor had the bigger house across from Chet and also came from 
the same province as Chet. One time during which I joined the workers in the evening, 
drinking, Chet was running around in and out helping this neighbor construct a home-
made pond built mainly from PP Flute board, synthetic turf mat, and fishing line. Further, 
Chet was determined to use his knowledge about crayfish breeding as a platform to teach 
workers about subsistence farming. For instance, when ELRG activists provided labor 
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  Also known as crawfish, they are freshwater crustaceans, to which workers often referred as ‘lobster.’ In 2016-
2017, crayfish breeding became so famous, not only in Thailand but Southeast Asia, that its how-to books became the 
best sellers in local bookstores. In early 2017, crayfish were reportedly one of the most expensive aquatic pets, when an 
owner of Isan food restaurant bought a single crayfish for over USD31, 000 
(https://www.bangkokpost.com/learning/advanced/1190776/the-million-baht-crayfish). One indicator was the exposure 
of a large pyramid scheme fraud associated with crayfish that entailed a USD570,000 investment 
(http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-06/08/c_136350638.htm).	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unions with a legal training on Social Security law, the National Board of Social Security 
required that the ELRG educate workers about a self-sufficiency economy. Seeing an 
opportunity, Chet introduced the crayfish farm as an income-generating activity for 
workers. I was compelled by his argument that “whatever products you sell, there is 
nothing better than those that you can unilaterally determine the prices. And crayfish is 
one of those.” Notwithstanding the ongoing fad and resulting price bubble in the crayfish 
market, such an argument resonated with workers, themselves children of Thai farmers 
who had long been faced with food price repression. It is worth noting that Chet had a 
plot of land back home that he was always dreaming of returning to cultivate when the 
struggle was over.  
Before he was teaching other workers about crayfish, Chet was experimenting 
with crayfish by breeding and raising them in his own homemade pond, built in the 
garage space in front of the house. As crayfish was not native in tropical climate, Chet 
gained the know-how about breeding and hatching mostly from an online forum and trial-
and-error. That also meant that any casualty became a loss in investment. As a result, 
Chet and Sorn invested a great deal of time in nurturing and tending to the crayfish. By 
volunteering to build a pond for the neighbors and demonstrating how to raise crayfish 
with his own investment, Chet was able to turn his experiment into a group learning 
process.  
In August 2016, when both Chet and Sorn had more confidence from small 
transactions, they stepped up the venture and planned to order a large batch to breed and 
sell baby crayfish. According to Sorn, this large investment, if successful, would render 
profits large enough for Chet to pay off his debts. A month later, a male executive 
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committee member of a union came to the ELRG office, despite his long absence, with 
the real purpose of buying the crayfish to sell to his co-workers. While Chet was replying 
to the union fellow who complained that Chet did not leave any profit margins for his 
sales, Yingyong teased Chet and Sorn that with their crayfish business, he had a hard 
time keeping up with the increasing labor cases. Since Chet and Sorn were busy, 
Yingyong was overwhelmed by the increasing cases of workers dismissal. Yingyong was 
referring particularly to the dismissal of two union executive members. Chet simply 
replied that “these folks did not pay attention to anything; no surprise they were 
dismissed.” He went on to tell a story that one worker asked him, “are you not going to 
work today?” As Chet had became active in the group after he was locked out, he thought 
that if workers paid attention at all about his situation, they would not have asked such a 
question to him.  
Since I had known them, the contrast between Yingyong, the idealist, and Chet, 
the pragmatic man and perhaps pessimist, always intrigued me. Since 2009, Yingyong 
had been providing distraught workers with free legal advices and support, despite his 
full-time job. Based on his dedication to labor activism, in 2014 he received an award 
from a well-known national human right organization. According to Yingyong, 
notwithstanding the workers’ situations, the ELRG’s role was to lend them a helping 
hand. For instance, one of the most recent members was Pat, who had never heard of the 
labor union before coming to file grievances at the ELRG. After a machine at work slit 
off a part of his index finger, Yingyong helped Pat retain both compensation and better 
treatment from the employer. Following the incident, not only did the employer not 
apologize or inform him of his rights to work-related compensation, but the employer 
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also treated him as if the accident was his fault. Because of the ELRG’s support, Pat 
would later receive a sum of money from his workplace as compensation, which Chet 
said that Pat would also invest in building a small crayfish farm at home in the Northern 
Thailand. 
On the contrary, Chet was involved with workplace activism first, and then in the 
ELRG following the UM protest that led to his indefinite lockout. As a result of the 
protracted protest that ended with the dramatic demonstration at the national parliament, 
Chet came back to the Eastern Seaboard and took up several odd jobs, including riding a 
motorcycle taxi and selling Siamese fighting fish to local kids. I did not realize that 
during a certain time, he lived with his wife’s mom in the Northeast until our 
conversation about Pat later brought up this memory. On one evening, replying to my 
question about Pat’s whereabouts, Chet was telling me that Pat was taking his pregnant 
wife back to her home in Isan, as she had some complications. I recalled Pat sharing his 
plan with me that he would wait until his wife went into labor, and they would go back to 
his hometown in Chiang Rai together. He wanted to start a crayfish farm. According to 
Chet, the mother-in-law wanted Pat to quit his job and take full-time care of his wife. In 
short, she asked Pat to choose between his job and wife. In response to this, Yingyong 
and Chet seemed to have the similar, strong opinions on the matter. Both insisted that the 
mother-in-law could not say such a thing because she was not a breadwinner. “Being 
with mother-in-law while unemployed, you only devalue yourself,” commented Chet. He 
added that one morning while he was staying with his mother-in-law and helping care for 
her hens, without a job and money, his mother-in-law asked him, “will you not look for 
	   271	  
any job and only tend to your child?” For him, it is difficult for a man to live with the 
mother-in-law while he is without job or income.  
Before the UM lockout, Chet always sent remittances to his home so that his dad 
could invest in farming. He planned to work on the farm when he ever returned home. 
Yet, the plan came to an abrupt halt when Chet and his wife—who was working at the 
UM’s sister company—were together locked out by the companies. For the past five 
years, he had been living on the hope that he would finally receive the deserved sum of 
compensation and severance if the struggle were over.  
During the same period, his wife—Bo—was struggling to find a form of 
livelihood as well. For a few months, after several attempts to get factory jobs, she 
experimented with the selling noodle salad—a kind of snack food, catered by a local 
franchised brand. After considering pros and cons of being self-employed, she seemed to 
like the autonomy of having no boss. Having a chance to talk to customers—mostly 
workers in the area—she also seemed to benefit from the conversations with them and 
learned about how the situations went inside and outside factories. Despite some support 
from friends, unfortunately, the business did not go as planned because of the lack of 
customers and perhaps the high price. Bo finally stopped the business. After I left the 
field site, I later found out that she finally went back to work in a factory.  
Even though most workers eventually lost their battle with the workplace, they 
continued to search for an alternative way of organizing their labor. After the court gave 
its permission to dismiss Yingyong and Sorn, they joined with Chet and Ya to start the 
organic farming project in which they managed to turn ELRG members’ collective 
energy and labor into a livelihood project. Owing to the laws, one consequence of losing 
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their factory jobs is that these activists could not continue to be union executive 
committee members or members. However, as labor consultants, they continued to 
pursue social justice through their support for workers with grievances. 
 
8.4 Struggle for Self-development and its conflicts with Household Reproduction 
 For me, at first I thought we fought for the bonus only; now I believe we fight for 
the better life. It’s not about the bonus any more, but about security in life. - Yos 
 
As seen in this research, workers such as Yos, Chet, Sorn and Na did not simply 
talked about working conditions. They were also concerned about inter-personal 
relationships at work and in the unions, as well as living conditions that reflected fairly 
shared economic gains. Security mentioned by Yos also meant a longed-for quality of life 
that reflected the desire to have non-working time for self-development. Here, I borrow 
the idea of self-development from Lebowitz (2003 [1992]), who argues that Marx himself 
insisted on a central contradiction between capital’s alienating nature of production and 
the resulting growth of workers’ needs. To put it simply, waged workers are 
impoverished by their increasing dependence on a waged labor system, which 
simultaneously augments the growth of their needs (p. 204). On the one hand, 
consumption has become the mechanism in which capital sells its commodities. On the 
other, it is the principal way in which workers achieve daily reproduction and social 
status. For these reasons, social reproduction—as collective consumption of the 
households of workers—is contradictory as it pushes workers to self-organize and form a 
workers’ association. Workers finally become empowered in the process. In the Eastern 
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Seaboard, empowered workers were no longer employable and hence dispensable. Again, 
owing to gender inequality and sexual politics among organized workers, male workers 
benefited more from the formal organization and empowerment than did their female 
counterparts. As women were viewed as non-militant, women-led unions managed to 
operate in the less visible environment. By contrast, as male workers assumed the main 
breadwinner role, they took up responsibility (and pressure) of fulfilling familial needs. 
Such responsibility thus reflected the larger sets of conflicting or competing short-term 
and long-term aspirations.  
In this purview, the aspiration for a better life encapsulates a bundle of needs, 
often conflicting. These needs include, first, workers’ personal desires; second, the needs 
of caregivers and household members, who provided the social reproductive work that 
supports the intergenerational reproduction of the labor force. In other words, workers, 
including Yos, recognized the need to have enough resources and capacity to support his 
son in his education, as well as for his parents to live a comfortable senior life, even 
though these needs could come into conflict with his engagement in activism. Moreover, 
with regards to the gap of commitment, it also goes without saying that union activists’ 
aspiration could conflict with aspiration and needs of rank-and-file workers, who were 
driven mostly by the needs for their symbolic and collective consumption. 
Notwithstanding such complexity, workers’ experiences with unions and the 
ELRG allowed them to learn about mutual aid and solidaristic collectivism. I could argue 
that activism was a first-rate political education that rewarded them with a systematic 
way of critical thinking, courage, and pride. It is important here to note the partial and 
contradictory nature of working-class resistance, what McNally refers to as “partial and 
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contradictory anticapitalist dynamic within the lived experiences of actual social groups” 
(2004, p. 206). This may be interpreted as internal limits on the collective worker, in the 
sense that the group of workers still represented the collective power of capital (Lebowitz 
2003 [1992]). But, as Michael Lebowitz points out, we need to move away from political 
economy of capital toward the political economy of the working class. As Lebowitz 
explains, 
 
In contrast to the political economy of capital, the political economy of the 
working class encompasses more than just the labor mediated by capital—just as the 
workday for workers is longer than the capitalist workday. This political economy 
includes the labor where the mediator among workers is the state (which provides ‘that 
which is needed for the common satisfaction of needs, such as schools, health services, 
etc’), and it includes the labor ‘absolute necessary in order to consume things’—that is, 
that labor unproductive for capital that Marx included under the costs of consumption. (p. 
201). 
 
Drawing on the early work of Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto, 
Lebowitz  (2003 [1992]) foregrounds the social relations of workers and their recognition 
of the unity within family and community. The inclusion of family and community as 
mediators of workers’ social relations allows us to understand the discrepancy of life 
projects envisioned by activist-workers vis-à-vis those of their family and community 
members. By adopting such a perspective, we understand the power at play in the 
conflicting interests and goals among struggling workers such as Na, Samart, and Chet. 
Despite the disruption of her union activities, for instance, Na admitted that she had 
learned a great deal from her role as a union executive committee member and activist in 
the ELRG. Similarly, through their long struggle, Yingyong, Chet, and Yos were 
empowered and went on to connect with other political movements, particularly the 
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national pro-democracy movement and the international solidarity movement, that 
monitored an investment of multinational capital in Thailand and Southeast Asia. 
When the ELRG organized the community development trip in Yasothon, 
Samart,129 who played a major role in designing and building the school’s new toilet 
building, was surprised that the community leaders preferred money donations over 
donations in kind. According to Samart, the community leaders did not seem to care 
about the duration over which the toilet building would be built. They wanted to manage 
the funds to construct the building according to their will. From the workers’ perspective, 
the construction of the toilet building by workers themselves (i.e., use value) is a great 
way to show their solidarity and support to the community. Therefore, for Samart, it 
seemed unappreciative of the leaders to demand money instead (i.e., exchange value). 
Samart suggested to me that money had become central to people’s inter-relations.  
During the community service trip, I was also surprised to hear complaints from 
workers, such as Na, who lamented that they did not receive proper treatment from the 
community. She was particularly frustrated that the school did not prepare adequate 
sleeping materials such as floor mats and that the food was self-service. While I saw this 
minor inconvenience as issues of mismanagement and expectation, rather than disrespect 
or ingratitude, the gap between the standards of livings cannot be ignored. Compared 
with the conditions of the rural school, the workers’ ways of life in the Eastern Seaboard 
were relatively comfortable. I could see how some workers who were not themselves 
from Isan might feel offended by the simple ways of living into which they were put. In 
addition, workers appeared to view themselves as guests, rather than volunteers. Hence, it 
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  Samart was previously a manager in Mitzuki who was unfairly dismissed along with the other union 
executive committee members, see Chapter 4.	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is worth noting that despite their material and subjective experiences, the workers did not 
always assume the working-class identity, especially when the consumerist identity was 
hegemonic. 
 
Conclusion: Empowerment, Labor Collectivism and Class Power 
The impacts of struggle on personal empowerment and collective transformation 
cannot be overstated. To begin, personal empowerment is the process in which 
individuals discover the agency of the self, understood at the concrete level of 
experiences. It is the process of personal transformation that results in a different 
consciousness. Through and through, the stories of strong-headed unionized workers 
from the Northeast region showed us exactly the way in which the concrete level of 
experiences transformed their social and political consciousness. 
This process of empowerment is relational, in the sense that it also presupposes 
interaction with the others. For instance, through the negotiation and labor disputes that 
led to achievement of their rights to association, workers attained a sense of self-esteem 
and dignity. This attainment implies an element of recognition of own rights by oneself 
and by others. Perhaps this is the reason the ELRG workers insisted on calling each other 
‘than’ (a venerable you), which suggests that everyone deserves respect no matter what.   
Moreover, the process of empowerment is dialectical because dignity moves 
along the spectrum of autonomy and vulnerability (Sayer 2011). With the original 
conditions of vulnerability, workers were exposed to discrimination and potential threats. 
Starting from their vulnerable position, they were thus spurred by the sense of injustice to 
pursue respect and dignity. In the process, they became conscious and understood their 
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relationships with others. But solidarity in practice was fraught with power and 
domination, such as the gender bias and male domination experienced by women 
unionists. In addition, when we consider material concerns and solidarity, conflicts could 
arise. For example, activists could not easily demand solidarity from union members, 
when the latter focused on the end-of-year bonus while the former aimed for recognition 
from the employer. Likewise, conflicts could take place between activists and family 
members such as female partners or parents, when the search for personal dignity clashed 
with the self-development of the working-class community. 
In my research, workers were empowered by their personal struggle and 
collective experiences, which made them realize the potential of personal and collective 
agency. From the company’s perspective, though, they appeared to become ‘more 
demanding,’ ‘disobedient,’ and hence labeled as ‘unable to work with’ by the company. 
For instance, according to court documents, the Mitzuki management repeatedly argued 
that the company could not reinstate workers such as Samart and Yos, who organized the 
Mitzuki workers union, because they were unable to work with them. Hence they were 
not reinstated. The company called many male activists including Yos ‘hua kaeng’ 
(literally meaning strong head or stubborn). Such an idea of stubbornness finds resonance 
with the image of water buffalo walking the street of Bangkok, as portrayed by the 
urbanite and business elite Yellow Shirts movement. Based on such the portrayal of Isan 
workers as hotheaded troublemakers, many activists including Samart and Yos believed 
that they were so blacklisted by the local business association as a whole. They could not 
find any job in the Eastern Seaboard. From the household’s perspective, finally, 
individual consumption as workers’ self-development came into conflict with collective 
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goals. Although activists collectively developed political consciousness through activism, 
their empowerment could not potentially lead to ‘dis-valorization’—the disruption and 
reversal of the capitalist social reproduction—as organized labor cannot resolve the 
conflicts between personal and collective consumption through its organizational and 
political vehicles. 
   
 
Chapter 9. Conclusion: 
Capturing dynamics of labor agency on constantly shifting ground 
 
For the sake of conclusion and evaluation, I will reiterate the three main research 
questions and the respective research findings briefly. The first research question is about 
the ways in which strategies of the state, capital, and organized labor shape labor 
geography and worker agency in Thailand’s Eastern seaboard. The second question 
concerns the way in which labor and gender politics within spaces of activism shape the 
organization of labor for household reproduction. Third, I ask, how did the intersections 
of class, gender and regional ethnic identities inform labor activists’ political and class 
consciousness? 
My research shows that strategies of the Thai state and foreign capital were the 
predominant forces that contributed to transforming the local landscape, patterns of labor 
migration, and composition of the workforce. Accordingly, the strategies of the state and 
capital posed challenges to workers, shaping in turn organized labor’s militancy and 
masculinity. As Chapter Seven illustrates, workers were obliged to constantly display 
shows of strength to leverage their collective bargaining power. As a result, labor’s 
organizing practices have become masculinized because of several factors including and 
gender inequality within the unions as well as workers’ gendered divisions of labor. 
Historically, Thailand’s Eastern Seaboard, or the “Detroit of Thailand,” was a 
unique product of American liberalism, Japanese production process, and Thai uneven 
development. While both American and Japanese capital needed a disciplined workforce, 
they appeared to have different approaches in producing desirable individuals. For 
example, as modeled by Henry Ford, American investors preferred to create a disciplined 
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workforce in the mold of avid consumers. By comparison, Japanese carmakers 
disciplined workers at the scale of the workplace through a localized human resource 
regime and particular work ethics. The Thai state facilitated the global production process 
by encoding capitalist-labor relations in the Thai industrial relations framework, the 
contradictory labor regime in which foreign capital and organized labor contested the 
control of labor on the local scale.  
Despite such influences of the state and capital, my ethnographic research reveals 
that Northeastern migrant workers were far passive subjects of the capitalist process. 
When multinational carmakers and industrial developers radically transformed the 
physical landscape and livelihoods in the Eastern Seaboard, migrant workers from the 
Northeast showed resilience and creativity through their migration and social 
reproduction strategies, particularly outsourcing of childrearing and reproduction of 
generational labor forces.  
  While the cultural politics of ethno-class inequality provided workers with 
solidaristic impulses, sexual politics and gender norms created tensions and conflicts 
within the social group.130 A recently masculinized labor force had profound impacts on 
gender relations within labor activism, shaping the way labor activists socialized, 
strategized, and understood collective notions of leadership. In such masculinized 
activism, male activists promoted sexist practices and reproduced gender prejudices, 
further marginalizing minority voices that raised feminist values of inclusiveness. 
Although masculinized activism sometimes appeared as militant, women workers’ 
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  I also use Young (1990)’s definition as ‘a collective of persons differentiated from at least one other group by 
cultural forms, practices, and ways of life” (43).  
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underrepresentation undermined organizational resilience, leading to internal weaknesses 
in the long run.  
  Conceptually, paying closer attention to how decision-making was usually made 
in the union hall takes us away from tired debates about labor unions’ militancy. Most 
importantly, the more inclusive and democratic the processes are, the more effective the 
strategies. Such effectiveness means solid membership bases and long-term development 
of the labor organization itself. This internal strength is critical to organizational 
resilience, a decisive quality conducive to the long-term struggle against capital.  
  Despite its limitations, the labor relations framework opens a small window in 
which activists find the way to collectively organize and empower themselves – to learn 
what they were capable of. A space of empowerment is crucial because it transforms 
workers and makes them ‘dangerous,’ from management’s viewpoint. This 
transformation is a fundamental reason why companies spent so much energy and 
resources in pursuing legal battles with dismissed workers. In the context of the Eastern 
Seaboard in which workers were regional migrants without political representation, 
workplace activism, albeit limited in scope, was significant in creating social and political 
spaces for empowerment.  
 Worker empowerment is the process through which individual workers who 
experienced injustice understood their roles in the larger collectivism and realized the 
possibility of change. For example, after long years of labor struggle with the companies, 
Universal Motors and Mitzuki union activists such as Yos were transformed and would 
never be the same again. They had been disillusioned with the companies and with waged 
work. They had even developed a sober understanding of the capital and state collusion. 
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Notwithstanding the possibilities, organized labor fell short of the transformative 
potentials owing to two main hindrances. First, organizational weaknesses (i.e., gender 
and group dynamics) posed internal challenges to the group. Second, it failed to address 
the conflicts inherent to the oppositions between group building on the one hand and 
individual-based self-development and household reproduction, on the other. 
 
Contributions and Future Directions 
My research contributes to the theory of labor agency by shifting the scope of 
study beyond the sphere of production to account for the underlying connection between 
production and reproduction. Moreover, it enriches the concept of labor agency in three 
main ways. First, the research affirms the dialectical relations between collective and 
individual agency. Far from being simply individualist, workers’ agency is both 
constrained and enabled by the collectives to which they belong. Thus, this research 
points to empirical needs to broaden the confine of labor collectives beyond trade unions 
to include labor organizations, households, and hometown communities. Not only did 
these collectives play indispensable roles in the spatiality of workers’ lives, they were 
mediators of workers’ social relations. Moreover, collectivism such as trade unions and 
households can be spaces of contestation, struggle, and divisions.  
Second, the research deepens the materialist analysis of labor geographies by 
foregrounding the intersectionality of ethnicity/nationality, gender, and class. The 
findings uncover the symbolic and material relationships between workers’ 
organizational forms and ethno-regional practices. As the nation’s most politicized ethnic 
minority, northeastern workers in general and men in particular were perceived as 
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dissenters and troublemakers. In the context of labor activism, workers used their ethnic 
culture (i.e., dialect, food, music, and belief systems) as symbolic sources of collective 
identity and solidarity, as well as the material medium through which workers socialized 
on a daily basis. In this sense, labor agency is embodied and simultaneously a bundle of 
multiple cultural and political identities.   
The research also points to several contradictions, especially between 
organizational and individual levels. Both the workers’ organizational power and social 
locations—and the larger community of the working-class to which they belong—
together forged labor’s collective agency. While various factors including the legal and 
political landscape, firm strategies, and local practices of labor organizing shaped the 
organizational forms, socio-cultural elements such as gender norms and ethnic identity 
played important parts in determining its strength and resilience. In short, workers’ 
constrained agency is a result of these contradictory processes relating to the internal 
dynamics of organized labor, as well as of their socio-geographical and political positions 
in the larger political economy. 
Third, apart from being culturally embedded and embodied, labor agency is 
spatially located in the webs of places to which workers keep ties. The empirical material 
from this research extends geographical knowledge of the way in which households and 
labor organizations become mediating spaces between conflicting demands of short-term 
surplus value creation and long-term household reproduction. The use of a social 
reproduction framework illuminates the often-neglected link between labor struggle at 
points of production, and its conditions embedded in the larger network of social and 
households’ reproduction of the labor force. In normal circumstances, agriculture-based 
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households in the Northeast served as the organizing space for the family’s caring work 
and reproduction of the labor force. Supported by remittances, left-behind household 
members (i.e., grandparents and grandchildren) organized everyday life around 
childbearing, education, and the long-term reproduction of the workforce. Nevertheless, 
as the families depended on remittances, such material reliance could become a source of 
pressures, psychological and social, for activists and especially those engaged in 
protracted labor disputes. This finding affirms the concept of labor agency as  
“constitutive of particular capitalist regimes” (Carswell and De Neve 2013). Therefore, 
the social reproduction framework sheds new light on labor activism, in the sense that the 
latter is no longer seen as purely political, ideological, and moral in nature. In other 
words, labor activism driven by consumption—whether private (needs and personal 
development) or collective (i.e. social reproduction)—is an expression of such 
contradiction between the private and collective, or the reproduction and disruption of 
social relations. In this sense, labor activism can be conceptualized as material and 
central to capitalist social relations.  
Finally, the focus on workers’ motivations and actions highlights the need to 
theorize labor agency in a nuanced manner. Such collective agency reflects divergences 
between the goals of individuals, plurality of politics (i.e. class, sexual and gender, ethno-
regional politics) and potential tensions between short-term coping strategies and the 
long-term growth of labor organizations. Through the space-time created by labor 
activism, workers were conscious of their collective power and transformed by political 
education.  
I would argue that a missing element in the debate about agency and resistance is 
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an examination of the ways acts of resistance impact personal empowerment and 
collective transformation. In other words, in relation to resistance, the sought-after 
concept of agency should be able to explain two crucial dynamics. First, while workers 
who participate in activism often gain awareness and critical tools in evaluating the status 
quo, our theories need to be able to explain the resulting personal and collective 
transformation. In other words, what are the dynamics and changes that happen following 
shifts in consciousness? Second, based on Cindi Katz’s categorization of resilience, 
reworking, and resistance, most studies tend to ignore the links and dynamics between 
the three modes of resistance and treat them as static and isolated. In practice, resilient 
acts are fundamental to the sustenance and growth of communities, allowing workers to 
develop more powerful and radical strategies. Therefore, it remains unknown how 
workers build strategies moving from resilience to reworking. In the last chapter, I 
described how two concepts help conceptualize these dynamics: self-valorization 
(Cleaver 2002; Cumbers et al 2010) and self-development (Lebowitz 2004; Bhattacharya 
2017).  
The concept of empowerment captures the dynamics of personal transformation, a 
crucial but underexplored process in which workers go through internal shifts in social 
and political consciousness. With regards to the current debate on labor agency, the 
concept reconciles the central dilemma in which labor agency is framed as either 
purposeful or consequential. In other words, the concept of empowerment helps us 
understand that just because agents may not be able to act in a way that successfully 
changes the system—namely resistance, according to Katz’s categories—does not mean 
that collective and political activism are in vain. It offers a sober but much-needed 
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realization that internal shifts in perceptions and worldview are important steps toward 
concrete social change. While activists and practitioners often experience the 
consequences of empowerment through personal experience, due to an overemphasis on 
observable actions, scholars may understate the significance of changes and hence 
workers’ agency.  
Recent empirical studies of labor agency tend to equate agency with actions based 
on a short-term decision making process. A moral economy approach could help 
explicate the complexity and internal struggles faced by workers who must negotiate 
short-term and individual interests, on the one hand, with long-term and collective goals, 
on the other. As Andrew Sayer (2011) suggests, a moral economy theory which 
foregrounds the oppressed’s vulnerability, as well as their autonomy and dignity, can 
contribute to further thinking about the politics of recognition. This research agrees with 
Castree (1999) and Sayer (2011), who suggest that the analytical framework for labor 
agency must capture both the politics of redistribution and the politics of recognition. In 
other words, studies of agency must apprehend the materiality, and the sense of justice 
and dignity, articulated by workers, particularly in times of struggle. Therefore, the 
concept of empowerment is a corrective to the static and false dichotomy between culture 
and economy.  
 This research is not devoid of limitations. There are at least three gaps to be 
addressed. First, as my research reveals, waged labor is simply one of many identities in 
workers’ lives; furthermore, for many workers, waged labor is simply one stage among 
many others. This fact is even more pronounced in the context of Thailand and the Global 
South, where workers slide back and forth between the so-called formal and informal 
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economy. In my research, for instance, as a result of the lockout, Chet had been outside 
the formal economy for over four years. Despite the employment interruption, striking 
workers had not stopped their activism. This reality potentially complicates research on 
labor activism and agency, which theoretically presupposes that waged work is the main 
and predominant form of labor. Future research should address such discontinuation of 
waged work and make sense of the centrality of unwaged work and its relationship with 
waged work. It is clear that the definition of labor activism should extend to include 
organized efforts both inside and outside the workplace and formal labor organizations; 
nonetheless, a theory of activism that integrates unwaged work with analyses of labor 
movement remains a future task.  
Secondly, given the rich analysis regarding household reproduction strategies, this 
research does not focus on the way in which decisions within households were actually 
made. Again, future research could dedicate equal weight to the work done in the realm 
of social reproduction, the so-called unwaged labor. While not within the scope of my 
research, future research could pay more attention to internal dynamics within 
households, the same way this research grappled with the internal dynamics within 
unions and labor groups.  
Lastly, as this research attempts to show, we can deepen the theory of labor 
agency empirically by steering labor geography away from actions-based research, for 
example, toward projects that focus on life choices and long-term outcomes of class 
struggle. One potential research project is thus a study that can underscore market-based 
strategies such as consumption adaptation of both waged and unwaged labor and theorize 
them as integral part of political and class struggle. However, a challenge is the 
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constantly shifting ground upon which the working class operates, ground which is 
deeply intertwined with structural conditions that restrict and enable agency at the 
moment. In this research, for instance, the crucial backdrop was the booming Thai and 
global automobile industry, which induced carmakers to intensify the labor process. 
Toward the end of my field research, however, the prospects for the automobile industry 
changed drastically due to the global economy, as well as economic mismanagement of 
the military government that ruled the country for over three years. It is imperative that 
research on labor agency captures the dynamics of constantly shifting structures, an 
approach which may require the creative integration of archival research in labor history 
with ethnography.  
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